KPA & FISP 국제학술대회

Global Problems and Philosophy

2022. 5. 19.(목)
9:00~18:00

건국대학교 새천년관 국제회의장
오프라인과 온라인 병행(줌주소 : 997 4079 7743)

주 관	(사)한국철학회(Korean Philosophical Association)
공동주최	국제철학회연맹(Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie), 건국대학교 철학과, 전남대학교 인문학연구원
후 원	(재)김희경유럽정신문화장학재단, 서울사이버대학교, 건국대학교 인문학연구원

한국철학회
Korean Philosophical Association

KU 건국대학교
KONKUK UNIV.

전남대학교 인문학연구원
Chonnam National University Institute of Humanities

KHK 재단법인
김희경유럽정신문화장학재단

서울사이버대학교
SEOUL CYBER UNIVERSITY

KU 건국대학교
KONKUK UNIV.
건국대학교 인문학연구원
KONKUK UNIVERSITY Humanities Research Institute

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Opening Remarks

It is my immense pleasure to welcome all philosophers from home and abroad to this conference. My name is Kim Sung-Min, president of the Korean Philosophical Association (KPA). The Korean Philosophical Association, the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), Department of Philosophy at Konkuk University, and the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University have come together to jointly organize this conference. Under the theme of "Global Problems and Philosophy," the conference has significance in that it is possible to share various philosophical reflections on the global problems facing mankind with philosophers from Korea and around the world. As a Korean philosopher and representative of the Korean Philosophical Association, I believe that the conference will provide an opportunity to enhance mutual communication between the Korean and global philosophical circles and to confirm the practical significance of philosophical reflection.

Currently, people around the world are eager to see what life will be like after the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to the classic values of freedom and equality, concrete issues such as the true meaning of human existence, the value of society and national community, coexistence with nature, and solidarity and cooperation against hardships have become an important subject of philosophical reflection. But more importantly, the fundamental question today is, "How will human life after the pandemic be realized concretely?" This is precisely where the present meaning and role of philosophy can be located since philosophy is not just a theoretical reflection but also a practical reapplication of the realities of the times.

The philosophy of all mankind, which is situated in different historical environments and the conditions of the times, is naturally different in its subjects and themes. I think this is where the theme of "theory and practice" comes along with another key issue of philosophy, "universality and particularity." The concern about the combination of the universal and particular has been a problem that many philosophers have engaged from the past to the present. Throughout the brilliant and vivid history of philosophy, the core principle that defines philosophy has been established. It is none other than the principle that philosophy has dealt with the problems of the "now, here, us" and has to deal with them in the future. I think this is the reason why the Korean and global philosophical circles can communicate and cooperate with each other on a specific topic and jointly carry out philosophical reflection and response. If the synthesis of theory and practice is the duty of philosophy, it is because the attempt to find the particular in the universal and to acquire the universal in the particular is an active right inherent in philosophy.

The era of globalization is often perceived as an era where particularity is emphasized more than universality. However, at least in the realm of philosophy, I think that globalization raises the relevance of

universality. For example, universal ideology such as the realization of humanity has relevance for overcoming, for example, a problem specific to the Korean context, which is overcoming the division of the Korean peninsula. As such, the differences of philosophies around the world are becoming a common ground for creating new things. The fact that humankind has accumulated different philosophical achievements in all parts of the world is perhaps a factor that produces the richness of the academic field of philosophy. Furthermore, I believe that it can be a condition that can amplify the richness of ideas and a holistic understanding of the history of world philosophy.

In the end, what we need to ask again is the fundamental question of "What is philosophy and what should it be?" The corona pandemic that we recently witnessed was the starting point that clearly confirmed the immediate task of philosophy. Various tasks of philosophy that carry out the synthesis of theory and practice, the universal and particular across time and space are now before us.

Before concluding these remarks, I would like to express my deepest gratitude once again to all those philosophers who have come to Konkuk University on this occasion. I believe that the presentations and discussions carried out at this conference will provide a fresh stimulus to the Korean philosophical community and further demonstrate the universal value of philosophy with the world philosophical community. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the representatives and working staff of the Korean Philosophical Association, the International Federation of Philosophical Society, Department of Philosophy at Konkuk University, and the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University.

The generous support of the Konkuk University Foundation chaired by Madame Yoo Ja Eun, Kim Hee-Kyung Scholarship Foundation for European Studies chaired by Madame Kim Chung-Ok, and Seoul Cyber University have made this conference possible. Now, let us begin the conference where various philosophical reflections envisioning life after the corona pandemic will be presented.

Thank you.

KIM Sung-Min
President, Korean Philosophical Association

Welcoming Address

Distinguished guests, good morning. My name is Yoo Ja Eun, chairperson of Konkuk University Foundation. On behalf of Konkuk University, I would like to express my warm welcome to all those researchers from Korea and overseas participating in this international conference jointly hosted by the Korean Philosophical Association (KPA), the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), Department of Philosophy at Konkuk University, and the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University. In particular, I am grateful to Dr. Kim Sung-Min, president of the Korean Philosophical Association, Dr. Luca Maria Scarantino, president of the FISP, Dr. Jeong Sang-bong of Konkuk University's Department of Philosophy, and Dr. Mira Chung of Chonnam National University's Institute of Humanities for all their dedication to hosting this conference that marks the beginning of the 'post-corona' era at home and abroad. Also, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those participating as presenters and moderators in today's conference.

I understand philosophy as a discipline that poses fundamental questions to everything that exists, including humans, conducts comprehensive and complex thinking, and finally undertakes holistic intellectual reflection based on the circumstances of history and times. Therefore, I am well aware that the academic community of the university of the past was filled with the discipline of philosophy and is still at the root of it to this day. As Chairperson of Konkuk University Foundation, I have the highest regards for the fundamental significance of philosophy. Philosophy seems to be growing in importance today. This is because the rapid changes in history and times, as well as the transitions that countries and societies undergo, breed philosophical questions and require philosophical answers. Questions such as the 'corona pandemic' and 'post-coronavirus' that we are experiencing recently have further raised the significance of philosophy to tackle everyday problems.

As one representative of the Konkuk University community, I also have serious concerns about what the 'post-coronavirus' era should look like. This is because 'post-corona' is our immediate problem closely connected with the academic community of universities and the restoration of academic daily life. In this regard, it is necessary to realize the complete restoration of the learning and educational environment of students, the research and lecture environment of our faculty, and the work environment of employees. Accordingly, I am pursuing a strategy to link the post-coronavirus issue with the development of the university through organic cooperation and communication with members of the university. In this regard, I hope that today's conference will propose important directions and values to prepare for the post-coronavirus era.

The question of how to shape life after the corona pandemic will become a core academic field that universities should be responsible for in the future. As a representative of the school, I am very proud that this conference, which takes the lead in presenting such an important social agenda, is held here at Konkuk University. Our Konkuk Academy, which has the founding ideology of sincerity, fidelity, and righteousness, is a historic private university representing Korean nationalism, celebrating the 91st anniversary of the establishment of the University Foundation and the 76th anniversary the launching of Konkuk University.

Today, Konkuk University is a prime leader in Korean higher education in various fields and seeks to earn a ranking within the top five universities in Korea through our faculty's world-class cutting-edge research. As the university's chairperson, I recently set my vision for 2022 as 'New Initiative toward 2031.' I believe that by 2031, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the university, Konkuk University will continue to grow and develop as the nation's representative institution of higher learning and respond to the demands of the times by shaping talents needed by the nation and society. 'Post-Corona', which is also the topic of today's conference, is also the starting point for realizing the vision of our university. In this regard, once again, I hope that this conference can be successfully concluded.

I would like to express my gratitude and congratulations to the representatives of the Korean Philosophical Association (KPA), the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), the Department of Philosophy at Konkuk University, and the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University. Also, I would like to applaud the working-level staff of each organization for their continued efforts to make this conference a success. Lastly, I hope that health and happiness will always be with the families of the participants of this conference.

Thank you.

YOO Ja Eun
Chairperson, Konkuk University Foundation

Opening Speech

Luca Maria Scarantino

President of FISP / IULM University Milan, Italy

Congratulatory Address

Hello, my name is Mi-La Chung, the president of the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University. And I am honored to be part of the opening ceremony of the "Global Problems and Philosophy" conference hosted by Korean Philosophical Association. This international conference is jointly organized by International Federation of Philosophical Societies, the Department of Philosophy at Kunkuk University, and the Institute of Humanities at Chonnam National University.

I would like to thank everyone here today for being part of this prestigious event. Especially I would like to express that it is a great honor to see so many distinguished scholars on our conference agenda. who are participating in the academic conference as speakers, discussants, and moderators. I would also like to offer great thanks to all those who have been involved in organizing this event, which is taking place virtually and in-person at the same time.

As we all know, the Covid-19 has changed our society in an unprecedented way. While the Covid-19 is still not ending, we are trying to imagine the Post-Corona life at this academic conference because we believe the philosophical reflection and imagination on the future legacy of the pandemic is the pressing issue today. The Covid-19 was, and is, a truly global crisis; not only in the sense that it ruined thousands of people's economic, social, and political lives; but also in the sense that it made us realize that the social vulnerabilities and intellectual problems cannot be confined and contained within the territorial and demographic borders. At this "Global Problems and Philosophy" conference, we are invited to examine and discuss the imminent global challenges globally. I hope that this academic conference will be a valuable and meaningful place for discussions on today's vital issues to re-confirm the relevance of philosophy.

Thank you.

CHUNG Mi-La
Director of the Institute of Humanities, CNU

2022 KPA & FISP Symposium : Foreign Scholar List

NO	Affiliations		Name
1	IULM Univ. Milan, Italy	President	Luca Maria Scarantino
2	Aoyama Gakuin Univ. Tokyo, Japan	Vice-President	Noriko Hashimoto
3	Quinnipiac Univ., USA		Anat Biletzki
4	Roskilde Univ., Denmark		Jacob Dahl Rendtorff
5	Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana, Italy		João J. Vila-Chã
6	Univ. College Dublin, Ireland		Maria Baghramian
7	Univ. of South Africa, South Africa		Mogobe Bernard Ramose
8	Tor Vergata Univ. of Rome, Italy		Riccardo Pozzo
9	Rutgers Univ., USA		Ernest Lepore
10	Tilburg Univ., Netherlands		Peter Jonkers
11	Univ. of Athens, Greece		Stelios Virvidakis
12	Neuchâhtel, Swiss	FISP Secretary	Johanna Lott Fischer

KPA & FISP Symposium
"Global Problems and Philosophy"

‣ **Host**   KPA(Korean Philosophical Association)

‣ **Co-organized**   FISP(Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie),
                      Konkuk Univ., Institute of Humanities(Chonnam Nat'l Univ.)

‣ **Sponsor**   Kim Hee-Kyung Scholarship Foundation for European Humanities,
                      Seoul Cyber Univ., Humanities Research Institute(Konkuk Univ.)

‣ **Date**   19. May 2022

‣ **Place**   KU conference hall, Seoul / Zoom: 997 4079 7743

‣ <u>18. May 2022</u>

∘ Arrivals of FISP board & steering-committee members

Time	Detail
Meeting & Dinner with KPA philosophers _at Riviera Hotel 'Chamonix Hall' host : KIM Do-Sik(KU)	
17:30–18:00	〈Welcome〉 – President of KPA(KIM Sung-Min, KU) – President of FISP(Luca Maria Scarantino, IULM)
18:00–20:00	Dinner

‣ <u>19. May 2022</u>

∘ Symposium "Global Problems and Philosophy"(at KU conference hall)

Time	Detail
Opening host : KIM Seon-Wook(Provost, Soongsil Univ.)	

09:30 – 10:00	– Opening Remarks : KIM Sung-Min(President of KPA)
	– Welcoming Address : YOO Ja Eun
	                (Chairperson, Konkuk University Foundation)
	– Opening Speech : Luca Maria Scarantino(President of FISP)
	– Congratulatory Address : CHUNG Mi-La
	                (Director of the Institute of Humanities, CNU)

Time	Detail
Session 1	chair : KIM Seon-Wook(Provost, Soongsil Univ.)
10:00-11:00	– Polarization in the Post-Truth World from the evolutionary perspective CHOI Jongduck(Independent Scholar) – Moral and Political Dilemmas at the Time of the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Role of Philosophical Thinking Stelios Virvidakis(Univ. of Athens, Greece)
11:00-11:30	Coffee break
Session 2	chair : PARK So-Jeong(Sungkyunkwan Univ.)
11:30-12:30	– Autonomous AI and how will we regulate it? SHIN Sangkyu(Ewha Univ.) – Philosophical Messages from COVID-19: Human Survival, Coexistence with Nature, and Transformation KIM Yang-Hyun(CNU) / PARK Ey-Yeon(CNU)
12:30-13:30	Lunch at KU
Session 3	chair : Anat Biletzki(Quinnipiac Univ., USA)
13:30-15:00	– The Opportunities and Boundaries of Intercultural Encounters: Confronting Charles Taylor's views with those of Paul Ricoeur Peter Jonkers(Tilburg Univ., Netherlands) – What Role for the Reflective Society? Riccardo Pozzo(Tor Vergata Univ. of Rome, Italy) – The Ukraine War and Philosophy LEE Sang-Hoon (President, The Korean Federation of Humanities and Social Science)
15:00-15:30	Coffee break
Session 4	chair : JEONG Se-Geun(President-elect, KPA)
15:30-17:00	– Philosophizing in Korean: *Uri* as Extended Self PARK So-Jeong(Sungkyunkwan Univ.) – Calling a Spade a Spade: Reflections on Political Language in time of Covid Gerhard Seel(Univ. of Bern, Switzerland) – Ethics and Africa in international relations: An ubu-ntu perspective Mogobe Ramose(Univ. of South Africa, South Africa)
Meeting with KPA philosophers _at KU conference hall	moderator : LEE Sang-Hoon(President, The Korean Federation of Humanities and Social Science) JANG Dong-Ik(Gongju Nat'l Univ. of Education)
18:00-	– Welcome : Presidents of KU, KPA, FISP – Presentation of KPA SUH Yu-Suk(Howon Univ.) – Presentation of FISP & WCP(Rome 2024) Luca Maria Scarantino(President of FISP)

‣ <u>20. May 2022</u>

Time	Detail
09:00–15:00	FISP CD meeting(at hotel 'Rose Hall')
15:00–18:00	Seoul tour
Dinner _at hotel 'Rose Hall' moderator : SUH Yu–Suk(Howon Univ.)	
18:00–20:00	Dinner hosted by SCU – President of SCU(KANG In)

‣ <u>21. May 2022</u>

Time	Detail
09:00–13:00	FISP CD meeting(at hotel 'Rose Hall')
13:00–	Departure of CD members

KPA & FISP 국제학술대회
"Global Problems and Philosophy"

1. 대회 개요

▸ **주관**   (사)한국철학회

▸ **공동주최**   (사)한국철학회(Korean Philosophical Association),
국제철학회연맹(Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie),
건국대학교(KU) 철학과, 전남대학교(CNU) 인문학연구원

▸ **후원**   (재)김희경유럽정신문화장학재단, 서울사이버대학교(SCU),
건국대학교(KU) 인문학연구원

▸ **일시**   2022년 5월 19일(목) 09:00~18:00

▸ **장소**   건국대학교 새천년관 국제회의장
오프라인과 온라인 병행(줌주소: 997 4079 7743)

2. 대회 취지 및 배경

▸ (사)한국철학회 70주년(2023년)에 즈음하여 한국철학계와 세계철학계의 교류 기회 마련

▸ (사)한국철학회가 '국제철학회연맹'(International Federation of Philosophical Societies(약칭 FISP / 회장: Luca Maria Scarantino, Italy) 회장단 및 운영위원 초청(서울 방문 일정: 2022년 5월 18일–21일)

▸ 2024년 세계철학대회(World Congress of Philosophy)(로마 개최) 준비에 한국철학회 협조

3. FISP members 방한 총 일정(2022년 5월 18일–21일)

▸ <u>5월 18일</u>

◦ 외국학자들 도착(숙소: 리베라청담 호텔)

◦ 건국대 제공 만찬(오후 6시: 호텔 '샤모니 홀'): 한국철학계와 교류의 시간

일정	내용
	Arrivals of FISP members('hotel Riviera Cheongdam', Seoul)
Meeting & Dinner with KPA philosophers _ at hotel 'Chamonix Hall' 사회 : 김도식(건국대)	
17:30–18:00	⟨Welcome⟩ – President of KPA(김성민, 건국대) – President of FISP(Luca Maria Scarantino, IULM)
18:00–20:00	Dinner

‣ <u>5월 19일</u>

◦ 국제학술대회(9시-5시)
◦ 한국철학회 주관 환영 만찬: 세계철학계와 한국철학계 교류의 밤(오후 6시)

일정	발표 및 내용
Opening	사회 : 김선욱(숭실대 부총장)
09:30-10:00	- 개회사 : 김성민(한국철학회 회장) - 환영사 : 유자은(건국대학교 이사장) - 대회사 : Luca Maria Scarantino(국제철학회연맹(FISP)회장) - 축　사 : 정미라(전남대학교 인문학연구원 원장)
Session 1	사회 : 김선욱(숭실대 부총장)
10:00-11:00	- Polarization in the Post-Truth World from the evolutionary perspective 최종덕(독립학자) - Moral and Political Dilemmas at the Time of the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Role of Philosophical Thinking Stelios Virvidakis(Univ. of Athens, Greece)
11:00-11:30	Coffee break
Session 2	사회 : 박소정(성균관대)
11:30-12:30	- Autonomous AI and how will we regulate it? 신상규(이화여대) - Philosophical Messages from COVID-19: Human Survival, Coexistence with Nature, and Transformation 김양현(전남대) / 박의연(전남대)
12:30-13:30	Lunch at KU
Session 3	사회 : Anat Biletzki(Quinnipiac Univ., USA)
13:30-15:00	- The Opportunities and Boundaries of Intercultural Encounters: Confronting Charles Taylor's views with those of Paul Ricoeur Peter Jonkers(Tilburg Univ., Netherlands) - What Role for the Reflective Society? Riccardo Pozzo(Tor Vergata Univ. of Rome, Italy) - The Ukraine War and Philosophy 이상훈(한국인문사회총연합회 회장)
15:00-15:30	Coffee break
Session 4	사회 : 정세근(한국철학회 차기 회장 / 충북대)
15:30-17:00	- Philosophizing in Korean: *Uri* as Extended Self 박소정(성균관대) - Calling a Spade a Spade: Reflections on Political Language in time of Covid Gerhard Seel(Univ. of Bern, Switzerland) - Ethics and Africa in international relations: An ubu-ntu perspective Mogobe Ramose(Univ. of South Africa, South Africa)

일정	발표 및 내용
Meeting with KPA philosophers _at KU conference hall	사회 : 이상훈(한국인문사회총연합회 회장) 장동익(한국철학회 사무총장 / 공주교대)
18:00-	− Welcome : Presidents of KU, KPA, FISP
	− 한국철학회 소개 서유석(한국철학회 대외협력위원장)
	− Presentation of FISP & WCP(Rome 2024) Luca Maria Scarantino(President of FISP)

▸ **5월 20일**

◦ 국제철학회연맹 운영위원회(2024년 로마 세계철학대회 준비)

◦ 서울 투어 / 서울사이버대 주관 만찬(오후 6시: 호텔 '로즈 홀')

일정	내용
09:00−15:00	FISP CD meeting(at hotel 'Rose Hall')
15:00−18:00	Seoul tour
Dinner _at hotel 'Rose Hall'	moderator : 서유석(한국철학회 대외협력위원장)
18:00−20:00	Dinner hosted by SCU − President of SCU(KANG In)

▸ **5월 21일**

◦ 국제철학회연맹 운영위원회

일정	내용
09:00−13:00	FISP CD meeting(at hotel 'Rose Hall')
13:00−	Departure of CD members

Contents

Session 4

Meeting with KPA philosophers

Session 1

Polarization in the Post-Truth World from the evolutionary perspective

CHOI Jongduck

Independent Scholar; philonatu.com/english

Premise: Dual track of selfish and cooperative behavioral characteristics and balance of conflict

Traditional normative ethicists attribute the human desire to the realm of nature and morality to the realm of heaven(or culture). Evolutionary ethics has another view that even human morality results from the adaptation by natural selection. There is no debate about thinking of desire as human nature. It could be allowed to see moral behavior as a continual extension of human nature of desire from the evolutionary biological view.

My thesis starts from the premise that desires directed human nature and morality directed human nature are the products of the two-track process of human evolution. If one considers my basic premise unsatisfactory, one might regard human desires as a selfish behavioral trait and morality as a kind of cooperative behavioral trait. I suppose human nature has evolved a dual track of selfish and cooperative behavioral characteristics.

The nature of the double track is the cause of psychological-social conflicts. We cannot eliminate the conflicts in our society. Paradoxically speaking, it is crucial to control the conflict balance. The concept of conflict balance can be described as a metaphor for magnets. One cannot make a magnet with only one side pole by cutting a bar magnet with positive and negative poles in half. Because the bar magnet automatically creates another pole when we cut it in half. Attempts to make social polarization into a single polarity also lead to social chaos. Just as the balance of two sides of polarity is the nature of a magnet, we might not avoid social conflicts of selfish and cooperative behavioral tendencies.

If someone asks me, "Are you a selfish **or** cooperative style person?" I could ignore their asking. Or I might answer confidently, "I am selfish **and** cooperative."

Inference 1: Two-track of human nature and its dynamism

Being dynamic that is being exposed as a constant push and pull between selfish behavior-trait and cooperative behavior-trait is a feature of human nature. Human nature is not immutable and fixed but changes and fluctuates according to circumstances because dynamism itself is nature. In other words, Which way of two-track one will ride on might differ depending on the circumstances.

A human being is not a two-track as a noun subject but a conflict itself that pushes and pulls as a verb due to my evolutionary premise. That means human nature is a verb-type 'becoming' escaped from a fixed 'being.' From the view of Deleuze, the verb-type becoming corresponds to the 'multiplicity' from which 'oneness' is eliminated.

Inference 2: Psychological homeostasis and social durability

The dynamic structure between individual behavioral traits supports society's collective behavior-pattern dynamic structure and vice versa. An individual's moral dynamism appears as psychological homeostasis in a human being. Psychological homeostasis means that although conflicts between selfishness and cooperation exist in us, we maintain an exquisite balance of conflicts.

In a society, the dynamism of a group (or state) appears as social durability. In this sustainable community, conflict dynamics become an internal driving force that maintains the equilibrium in conflict as a whole while experiencing individual conflicts.

Inference 3: The psycho-social inflection point: post-truth world

Unfortunately, we, especially Koreans and Americans, are facing a moment when the equilibrium of conflict is gradually breaking down. The immunity of our community is bound to drop when a geographic division, racial discrimination, wealth gap, chauvinism, and macho hegemony(power) spread.

The psycho-social inflection point is when the community immunity of psychological homeostasis and social conflict equilibrium begins to break through. The biased society, which comes after the psycho-social inflection point, is called "the post-truth world."

The term 'post-truth,' which derives from the ex-president of US Donald Trump's shock, was named Word of the Year in 2016 by the Oxford Dictionary. It is defined as "social circumstances in which emotion and personal belief instead of objective facts are dominant at shaping public opinion." (Mackey 2019)

Inference 4: Psycho-social symptoms of the post-truth era

As features of the post-truth world, immune-deficient social diseases induce psycho-social symptoms such as exclusion, disgust, and bullying. In other words, as the social conflict balance is disrupted, the individual's psychological homeostasis is reduced. Conversely, atrophy of psychological homeostasis (i)lowers each individual's shame or self-esteem, (ii)makes them act confidently in lies and further spreads self-deception, (iii)divides sides and extremes of bias. It reveals the nature of selfish behavior. Eventually, a vicious cycle arises in which the social conflict equilibrium is more threatened than before.

Inference 5: From post-truth to pernicious polarization

We could not avoid political polarization in party politics. However, if the pathology of post-truth leads to polarization, then the polarization appears as 'the pernicious polarization' that I take issue with. In this polarization, instead of compromise, agreement, and tolerance, the psychological pathology of exclusion, disgust, hatred, and greed begin to restructure our society. It is called "pernicious polarization."

The pernicious polarization heads to society which exposed an explosion of severe mistrust, intolerance, and discrimination that spread beyond the two political parties' sphere into societal relations.(McCoy et al. 2018) It is a psycho-social state blocked by the dichotomy of "us" and "them."(Somer and McCoy 2019) Even though the characteristics of the political group holding hegemony are unfair, the dishonest and disguised behaviors of the hegemony group overwhelm the other polar group, which is the relatively moral group. It is the general phenomenon of pernicious polarization.

The pernicious polarization can easily move to the form of monopoly or totalitarian politics since social conflict balance was disrupted. In this regard, I quote Hannah Arendt's famous saying.: "The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist." (Arendt 1973/1951, 474)

Inference 6: Bias of information polarization

Anyone can become a producer, consumer, and distributor of information through social media such as personal broadcasts via youtube or personal blogs. Through the social media platform, bits of knowledge and pieces of information are being distributed at an exponential rate. Distributed

information is stained with confirmation bias, and social media-based information consumers converge from dispersed individuals to synchronized bipolar groups. Social media-based information consumers, producers, and distributors synchronize with each other, thereby forming antagonism of merged biased information. Afterward, only two opposing clusters of information remain. It is what we call biased information polarization.

Inference 7: Lower cost of deception

The deception and bias of information polarization are products of behavioral tendencies of exclusion and disgust, hate and greed. Anyone can expose their inherent selfish behavioral tendencies without reflective filtering with just a laptop or smartphone equipped with the Internet. Therefore, the cost of deception has become very cheap through the convenient sharing of biased information. The destructive post-truth symptoms of lies and conspiracies spread too easily and quickly. There are various personal broadcasts on the Internet that hate groups run. The bridge between political polarization would be destroyed by indiscreetly attacking the opposing camp by the Trump-like group armed with conspiracy and witchcraft in the Korean political landscape. The German weekend newspaper <der Freitag> represented the Trump-like phenomena in Korean as "K-Trump."(Ausgabe 11/2022) Eventually, pernicious political polarization gradually began to dominate our society.

This risk of pernicious political polarization is not only present in Korea but all over the world. Not only developing countries but also countries such as Italy, France, the UK, and the United States are no exception, so I think we need to discuss this issue practically.

Can the pernicious polarization phenomenon be resolved?

I am embarrassed that I cannot show a concrete and practical strategy for the justification to dissolve this problem. My suggestions are only philosophical ideas. Even my suggestions are things that many political philosophers have already discussed. They are as below:

① It is a transition to a culturally center-less society that disperses the power centers of skin color, gender, ideology, and religion.
② Since the pernicious polarization is the first step toward a monopoly of political power, global solidarity that can break down the monopoly phenomenon in the international community is essential.
③ International or regional civic solidarity is needed to realize concrete (scientific) action to control

the balance of conflict, not the ideal (metaphysical) pursuit of completely eliminating conflict.

④ Besides political and social criticism, it is essential to popularize philosophical discourse on social and cultural polarization.

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탈-진리 세계에서 양극화 문제
-진화론 관점에서-

최종덕

독립학자, philonatu.com

전제: 욕망 본성과 도덕 본성의 이중트랙과 갈등균형

전통 윤리학자들은 욕망을 본성 영역으로, 도덕을 문화 영역으로 귀속시킨다. 진화윤리학자들은 인간의 도덕성도 자연선택의 적응결과라는 다른 입장을 취한다. 욕망을 본성이라고 하는 데에는 논쟁이 없다. 진화생물학적 관점에서 도덕적 행동은 욕망의 본성에서 연속된 확장으로 볼 수 있다.

욕망 지향의 인간본성과 도덕 지향의 인간본성이 인간 진화에서 이중트랙 과정의 소산물이라는 전제에서 이 논의가 시작된다. 이런 전제가 마음에 들지 않는다면 욕망의 본능을 이기적 행동성향으로, 도덕성의 본능을 협동성 행동성향으로 바꾸어 생각하면 된다. 이중트랙의 본성이 바로 심리-사회적 갈등의 원인이다. 그래서 우리 사회가 안고 있는 갈등을 완전히 제거시킬 수 없으며 단지 갈등의 균형을 조절하는 것이 근원이다. 갈등균형 개념은 자석의 메타포로 설명될 수 있다. 마이너스극과 플러스극의 양극을 갖고 있는 막대자석을 반 잘라서 하나만의 극을 갖는 자석으로 만들 수 없다. 왜냐하면 자석은 반으로 자르면서 새로운 자석의 양극이 다시 생기기 때문이다. 사회적 양극화 역시 단일 단극으로 만들려는 시도는 사회적 혼란을 불러온다. 극성의 균형이 자석의 본성이듯이, 우리 사회도 사회적 갈등균형을 피할 수 없다.

혹시 누군가 나에게 "당신은 이기적이냐 아니면 협동적 스타일의 사람이냐?"라고 질문한다면, 나는 그 질문을 무시하거나 아니면 자신있게 이렇게 대답할 것이다. "나는 이기적인 동시에 협동적이다."

추론 1: 이중트랙의 역동성

이기성 행동성향과 협동성 행동성향 사이의 밀고 당기는 갈등의 역동성 자체가 인간본성이다. 인간 본성은 불변하며 고정된 것이 아니라 상황과 환경에 따라 변화하며 유동적이다. 왜냐하면 역동성 자체가 본성이기 때문이다. 달리 말해서 이중트랙의 어느 궤도를 탈 것인지는 상황에 따라 다를 수 있다.

나의 전제에 따르면 인간은 명사형 주어로서 이중트랙이 아니라 밀고 당기는 동사형으로서 갈등 자체이다. 인간본성은 고정된 실체론의 존재에서 탈출한 동사형 과정적 존재이다. 들뢰즈의 시선으로 본다면 동사형의 과정 존재란 일자oneness가 제거된 다양체에 해당한다.

추론 2: 심리적 항상성과 사회적 지속성

개인의 행동성향들 사이의 역동적 구조는 사회의 집단성 행동유형behaviour-pattern 역동구조를 지지해주며, 그 역도 성립한다. 한 인간에서 개인의 도덕적 역동성은 심리적 항상성으로 나타난다. 심리적 항상성이란 우리 인간에게 이기성과 협동성의 갈등이 상존하지만, 그 속에서 갈등의 절묘한 균형을 유지하고 있다는 뜻이다.

한 사회에서 집단(국가)의 역동성은 사회적 지속성durability으로 나타난다. 이렇게 지속가능한 공동체sustainable community에서 갈등의 역동성은 부분적으로 갈등을 겪고 있으면서도 전체적으로 갈등 속의 평형을 유지하는 내적 원동력이 된다.

추론 3: 사회−심리적 변곡점 이후, 탈진리세계

불행히도 우리는, 특히 한국인과 미국인은, 갈등의 평형이 점점 깨져가는 순간을 지금 맞이하고 있다. 지리적 분단, 인종 차별, 빈부격차, 쇼비니즘, 마초권력이 확산되면서 심리적 항상성과 사회적 지속성을 유지하는 공동체 면역력이 깨지고 있다. 심리적 항상성과 사회적 갈등평형의 공동체 면역력이 돌파되어 깨지기 시작하는 문턱점이 사회-심리적 변곡점이다. 그리고 사회-심리적 변곡점 이후의 편향-사회를 우리는 "탈진리 세계"post-truth world라고 한다.

'탈진리 세계'post-truth라는 용어는 미국 트럼프 대통령 선거과정의 충격에서 시작된 말로, 옥스퍼드 사전 2016년 올해의 단어로 선정되었었다. 탈진리 세계는 대중의견을 형성하는 데 있어서 객관적 사실이 아니라 감정과 개인신념이 지배해버린 사회적 상황으로 정의된다.(Mackey 2019)

추론 4: 탈진리 세계의 병증

탈진리 세계의 특징으로서 공동체 면역력이 깨진 병증들은 배제와 혐오 그리고 왕따 등의 증상으로 발현된다. 즉 사회적 갈등평형이 깨지면서 개인의 심리적 항상성이 위축된다. 역으로 심리적 항상성 위축은 ①개인마다의 수치심을 떨구고 ②거짓을 당당히 행동하게 만들고 나아가 자기기만을 팽배하게 하며 ③편을 가르고 편향성을 극단화하며, ④이기적 행동형질을 노골적으로 드러나게 한다. 결국 사회적 갈등평형이 더 많이 위협받는 악순환이 일어난다.

추론 5: 탈진리에서 양극사회로 논리적 이전

정당 민주주의 사회에서 정치적 양극화는 피할 수 없다. 그러나 탈진리 병증이 양극화로 이어질 때, 그 양극화는 내가 문제 삼는 악의적 양극화pernicious polarization로 나타난다. 이런 양극화의 경우, 타협, 합의, 관용 대신에 배제와 혐오, 증오와 탐욕greed의 개인의 심적 현상이 우리 사회를 재구조화시킨다. 이런 사례가 악의적 양극화이다.

악의적 양극화는 양당정치 관계에서 사회적 관계로까지 번진 불신과 무관용 그리고 차별이 심하게 노출된 사회를 만든다.(McCoy et al. 2018) 이는 "우리"와 "그들"이라는 이분법으로 서로에게 막힌 심리-사회적 상태를 의미한다.(Somer and McCoy 2019) 헤게모니를 쥔 정치집단의 특징이 불공정하다는 점에도 불구하고, 헤게모니 집단의 위선과 거짓이 상대적으로 도덕적인 다른 집단을 압도한다. 이것이 악의적 양극화의 일반적인 현상이다.

사회적 갈등균형이 깨진 이후 악의적 양극화는 독재정치 혹은 전체주의 정치의 양태로 나타난다. 이와 관련하여 한나 아렌트Hannah Arendt의 유명한 말을 인용해본다. 아렌트는 자신의 책『전체주의의 기원』(1951)에서 말한다. "전체주의 통치가 희망하는 주체는 확신에 찬 나치도 아니고 확신에 찬 코뮤니스트가 아니라 사실과 허구의 차이 그리고 진실과 거짓의 차이를 눈감아 버리는 사람들이다."(Arendt 1973/1951, 474)

추론 6: 정보 양극화의 편향

개인 블로그, 유튜브나 인터넷 플랫폼 등의 SNS를 통해 누구나 정보의 생산자이면서 소비자 그리고 유통자로 될 수 있다. 사회망 플랫폼을 통해 지식과 정보는 지수함수적 속도로 분산되고 있다. 분산된 정보는 확증편향으로 염색되어, 사회망 서비스SNS 기반 정보소비자는 분산된 개체에서 동조화된 양극 집단으로 분리하여 수렴된다. 즉 SNS 기반 정보소비자와 생산자 및 유통자는 서로 간의 동조화 현상을 일으켜 수렴된 편향 정보들의 대립이 형성된다. 나중에는 두 개만의 대립된 정보 클러스터만이 남는다. 이를 나는 편향성 정보 양극화라고 한다.

추론 7: 저렴해진 기만행위 비용

정보 양극화의 기만과 편향성은 배제와 혐오, 증오와 탐욕이라는 행동성향의 소산물이다. 누구나 인터넷이 갖춰진 랩톱이나 스마트폰 하나로 자신 안에 내재된 이기적 행동성향을 반성적 여과 없이 그대로 노출시킬 수 있다. 그래서 사회미디어의 편리한 공유를 통해 기만행위의 비용이 매우 저렴해졌다. 거짓과 음모의 파괴적 탈-진리 증상이 너무 쉽고 너무 빠르게 확산되었다. 그리고 한국 정치 지형에서 모략과 주술로 무장한 트럼프 성향 집단은 상대방 진영을 무분별하게 공격함으로써 정치 양극화 사이를 이을 수 있는 교량이 파괴되었다. 독일의 주간신문 <der Freitag>은 한국에서의 트럼프 성향의 정치현상을 "K-Trump"라고 표현했다.(2022년11주차 판) 결국 악의적 정치 양극화 현상이

우리 사회를 점점 지배하게 되었다.

　악의적 양극화의 위험성은 한국만이 아니라 전 세계에 퍼져있다. 개발도상국만이 아니라 이탈리아, 프랑스, 영국이나 미국 같은 나라도 예외가 아니다. 그래서 철학자들도 이 문제를 실천적 차원에서 논의할 필요가 있다.

문제: 악의적 양극화 현상을 해소할 수 있는가?

　이 문제를 해결해야 하는 당위에 대해 나는 구체적이고 실천적인 대안을 보여줄 수 없어서 당황스럽다. 나의 제안은 겨우 철학적 아이디어일 뿐이다. 그 제안마저도 실제로는 이미 논의되었던 것들이다. 그 제안은 아래와 같다.

① 피부색, 성별, 이념, 종교의 권력중심을 분산시키는 문화적 무중심 사회로의 전이다.
② 악의적 양극화는 정치적 모노폴리 혹은 독재정치로 가는 전단계 과정이기 때문에 모노폴리의 국제사회적 현상들을 무너트릴 수 있는 글로벌 연대가 중요하다.
③ 갈등 자체를 완전 제거시키려는 이상적(형이상학적) 지향이 아니라 갈등의 균형을 조절하는 구체적(과학적) 지향을 실현하려는 국제적 혹은 지역적 시민연대가 필요하다.
④ 정치사회적 비판 외에 양극화에 대한 철학 담론을 대중화하는 일이 필수적이다.

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Moral and Political Dilemmas at the Time of the Coronavirus Pandemic
—The Role of Philosophical Thinking—
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Stelios Virvidakis

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

1. Introductory remarks

The coronavirus pandemic isn't over yet and we are already trying to imagine the post-covid era, in the hope that the crisis we have been going through may have made us somehow wiser. In fact, philosophers engage in abstract reflection on the human condition, as it appears in the light of what has been experienced as an unprecedented existential threat, but also participate in public debates concerning crucial ethical and political issues calling for urgent practical decisions. One wonders about the scope and the significance of their involvement in such debates, as well as about their wider role in helping elucidate our responses to serious challenges and in refining our sensibilities.

In what follows, I intend to focus on some particular dilemmas we have been confronted with at the time of the pandemic, with a view to highlighting and to assessing the contribution of philosophical reasoning to their resolution. However, I am not aiming only at understanding the justification of the conclusions I believe we should reach and, eventually, of the decisions we could make, by appealing to specific theories, principles and arguments; I am also interested, conversely, in seeking a better grasp and a comparative evaluation of the strength of the latter. In any case, I will be relying on the methodological perspective of a "reflective equilibrium" between, on the one hand, our intuitions and considered judgments providing premises of practical reasoning, and, on the other, theoretical principles sustaining them, aiming at their mutual elucidation and adjustment (Virvidakis, 2015).

Actually, due to the limitations of this rather brief article, my account shall be concise and somewhat schematic. The dilemmas, summarized in the form of disjunctions implying quandaries about alternative courses of action and presented in two groups (before and after the availability of vaccines) are much more complex and nuanced than they appear in their dense formulations.

However, I have tried to avoid extensive reconstructions of the debates and of the positions to which I want to draw attention, also keeping bibliographical references to a minimum. The dilemmas that are introduced first have a distinctively moral character and are followed by queries regarding decisions of more legal and political import. It could be pointed out that they all have practical implications, but they also reflect concerns for which we could employ the broader notion of the *ethical*.[1]

Thinking about the implications of possible responses to the pandemic could be regarded as amounting to an exercise in applied ethics, also partly involving metaethical and metaphilosophical considerations. Moreover, although I will be drawing mostly on moral and political philosophy, the concepts and arguments which I will employ are also relevant to reasoning in the area of law, especially constitutional law. Last but not least, my analysis may extend to queries preoccuping contemporary philosophy of science.

Naturally, philosophers taking seriously the ideal of interdisciplinarity and the method of "wide" reflective equilibium will eventually have to rely on exchanges not only with fellow philosophers, but also with biologists, doctors and other health professionals, lawyers, judges, social scientists, policy makers, journalists and intellectuals expressing public opinion. To be sure, I do not pretend to corroborate the premises of my arguments by providing detailed empirical evidence, which would require a systematic scientific investigation of the evolution and of the current state of the pandemic. Thus, I will be concentrating mainly on aspects of the experience of the health crisis and on the broader issues that they raise, as they are perceived in Greece in April 2022, also presupposing acquaintance with basic data from all over the world, easily accessible through the international media and the internet.

2. Facts and issues to be taken into account

Before we begin our discussion, we should be reminded of some generally acknowledged facts which have by now become more or less common knowledge. They may still be disputed by people lacking adequate information or the education required to interpret it, as well as by those who put forth conspiracy theories and by those likely to be fooled by them. However, they cannot be ignored by anyone trying to assess the severity of the challenges we have been facing.

The spread of Covid-19 is undoubtedly a serious threat to public health. The infection by some of its variants causes heavier symptoms and higher death rates than most kinds of flu, even in wealthy

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1) Here, I am referring to the distinction between the concept of the "moral", understood as concerning principles dictating our duties to our fellow people and that of the "ethical" interpreted as pertaining to broader issues about how one ought to live (Virvidakis, 1996: 7n1, 2014b: 74n20).

countries. The vaccines (those based on mRNA technology and some produced by traditional methods) have been a game changer, to the extent that three doses do prevent, if not infection and mild illness, especially in the case of very contagious variants, serious symptoms, hospitalization and death, at least if patients do not suffer from comorbities, usually appearing in old age. Still, even in countries where vaccination covers most of the population, the Covid-19 pandemic hasn't yet been fully eradicated or tranformed into a more benign endemic disease such as the seasonal flu as we know it. As these lines are being written, new spikes are reported not only in Greece, but also in many parts of the world, including South Korea and even China, where a "zero covid" policy all over the country seemed to have come close to stamping out the virus.

The agonizing experience of those in critical condition, taken into intensive care units, usually undergoing intubation, and often ending their lives in the hospital, is compounded by the strict isolation, necessary to protect the medical personel (who wear heavy protective suits and gear) and their relatives, who may not be allowed to come close to them. Thus, they may die without being able to embrace, or even see, say a last farewell and be comforted by their loved ones.

Now, it is easy to understand that such circumstances, calling for immediate practical decisions and political action facilitating their implementation, provide occasions for philosophical reflection at various levels. To begin with, one may dwell on the results of a careful study of our lives during the pandemic, offering new insights into the human condition, which make us dramatically aware of the contingency, the finitude and the fragility of our existence. The fear of the invisible and intangible virus, the spread of which seems to evade our efforts to contain it, is gradually transformed into a deeper, indeterminate anxiety about terminal suffering and mortality. Indeed, it is worth pursuing a philosophical investigation of these broader issues and of their ethical significance (Velázquez, 2020). Nevertheless, our discussion will bypass the current rise of existential concerns and will move to more concrete moral and political matters.

3. Concepts, theories, norms, principles and values

I have already alluded to the philosophical toolkit which will be needed for the pursuit of our task. Among its contents we should highlight a few interpretive concepts, as well as normative theories and principles that are usually invoked, explicitly or tacitly, by moral and political philosophers, at least in the analytic tradition.

These include: a) General approaches or orientations in normative ethics, such as *consequentialism*, *deontology* and *virtue ethics*, seeking the basic criterion of moral assessment of actions and of the rules which guide them, respectively, in their consequences, in their intrinsic features - regardless of

consequences, and in the virtues, that is in the excellent character traits of agents; b) particular normative theories, expressing, respectively, the above approaches, namely, *utilitarianism*, *Kantian deontology* and *Neo-aristotelian* or other variants of contemporary *virtue-ethics*; c) the main concepts and principles corresponding to the theories just mentioned. These are: the *principle of utility* (dictating the pursuit of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" of people), the *moral law*, according to Kant, (requiring as a *categorical imperative* that "we act in such a way so that we can at the same time will that the maxim of our action becomes a universal law", and that "we treat humanity whether in our own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end") and *ethical virtue*, to be exercised along with *intellectual virtue*, conceived as a form of *practical wisdom*, enabling us to act in the proper way in a wide range of particular circumstances. d) Moving to political philosophy, we may have to refer to conceptions of *liberal democracy* (prioritizing respect for individual rights and the value of freeedom), and to more *communitarian* forms of social organization (laying emphasis on the preservation and promotion of the *common good*).

We should eventually appeal also to principles of *autonomy* entailing *liberties* and *rights*, as well as to conceptions of *justice*, presupposing ideas of *equality* and imposing practices of fair treatment, and, if we follow John Rawls' influential account, concern for the benefit of the "least advantaged" social groups (Rawls, 1999: 64-9) Here, it must be noted that the actual implementation of most of the above norms and principles requires the application of an auxiliary *principle of proportionality*, balancing the goals aimed at and the consequences of the courses of action to be followed, which plays an important role in a variety of key arguments deployed in applied ethics and in juridical and legal practice. As we shall see, the severity of the emergency measures at the time of the coronavirus pandemic must respect the rights of those who are going to be affected by them, as much as possible, and proportionality considerations help us determine a threshold which should not be breached.

The above exposition is, admittedly, very sketchy and doesn't provide precise definitions or interpretations which would be called for by technical philosophical analysis.[2] However, it may suffice for a basic understanding of the concepts and the principles we have tried to introduce as a preamble to the examination of a series of dilemmas besetting our lives during the pandemic. To these we must now turn.

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2) I have also omitted references to the works of philosophers who first defined and elaborated many of the concepts and principles that I will be using. The relevant information, as well as details of interpretation of the theoretical resources described in this section can be easily found in introductory books and articles (Rachels & Rachels, 2019, and Kymlicka, 2002).

4. Particular dilemmas I

At the beginning of the pandemic crisis and during its first phase, before the production and the distribution of effective vaccines, most governments were confronted by dilemmas which could be formulated succinctly through the following disjunctions:

a) Active protection of everyone's life and health through restrictive measures (mostly lockdowns and quarantines, extensive limitations of free movement, social distancing, mandatory use of masks in closed and crowded spaces and also suspension of various work and recreational activities), *or* maintenance of the normal operation of free markets (regular production and consumption of goods, open enterprises and shops, everyday business transactions and continuation of services, etc.), saving jobs and consistently promoting the unfettered growth of the economy.

b) Pursuit of "herd immunity", through relaxation, or even suspension of restrictive measures recommended by committees of health professionals, thus allowing the infection of the majority of the population and consequently putting at risk the lives of the most vulnerable members of society (the elderly and those with underlying illnesses and comorbities), *or* care for the protection of everyone, especially those who need it most, that is the most vulnerable, old and weak.

c) *Selection* of the patients suffering from Covid-19 to be admitted to intensive care units of hospitals, if the public healthcare system cannot provide sufficient facilities and personnel to cope with the emergencies of the pandemic, - according to criteria related to prognosis or evaluation of the social utility to be maximized -, *or* equal treatment of all patients, perhaps on a "first come first serve" basis, or by resorting to a kind of lottery.[3]

d) Concern for the common good, conceived as consisting in ensuring the survival and the health of most members of the community, *or* unconditional respect for individual rights and liberties, even of those who are ready to disobey emergency laws and to violate restrictive measures regarding them as illicit limitations of their autonomy.

e) Justified legislation and implementation of more or less authoritarian policies (because of the requirements of a state of emergency regarded as a state of exception), *or* full conformity to constitutional guarantees of liberties.

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3) Such criteria are presented and discussed in special articles dealing with issues regarding the admission to ICUs. These issues are not limited to the treatment of Covid-19 patients, but the peculiar circumstances of pandemic emergencies have made the relevant questions particularly pressing. Thus, it has been observed that one could prioritize: those most likely to survive the current illness, those most likely to live the longest after recovery (considering comorbid conditions), those who have lived fewer life stages (the younger), those who have a particular narrow social utility to others in a pandemic, the worst off, or use a lottery (Oswald, S, Lewiński, M. Greco, S. & Vilata, S., 2022).

Here, we shall not engage in a detailed analysis of these dilemmas which would involve the careful examination and weighing of all aspects of the alternatives we are presented with and of their many practical implications. What we are interested in mostly are the norms and values which may determine our choices. Even if they are not mentioned explicitly in the arguments mounted respectively on each side, they could be invoked to butress the main premisses from which we shall draw our conclusions. Their function in our reasoning reflects, to an important extent, the strength of more or less common intuitions which lend them support.

Thus, the first option in (a) and the second option in (b) express the recognition of the absolute value of human life, and of the primacy of health of all individuals (with special attention to those more endangered by the pandemic). They rely on the conviction that deontological norms commanding the respect for the values at issue take precedence over any utilitarian calculus, which would allow some of the weak to perish, with a view to promoting the interests of forward looking, younger and healthier social groups, and also to cater for the requirements of a well-functioning economy.

Now, governments in Great Britain and in Sweden originally favored policies aiming at herd immunity, while many (predominantly Republican) States in the U.S.A., encouraged by populist leaders, rejected measures which would harm the economy. On the contrary, most countries in Europe and elsewhere seemed to prioritize the protection of life and health of all. Politicians and intellectuals trying to downplay the severity of the pandemic, or to support the view that avoiding long term damage to economic activities would be worth jettisoning the safety of supposedly less socially useful groups, such as the elderly, didn't prevail.[4]

To be sure, a utilitarian approach, regarding the admission and treatment of patients in hospitals, especially in ICUs, would have to be adopted, if the healthcare system reached a breaking point and its collapse appeared imminent. There were moments in the first months of the pandemic (in Italy, Brazil, India and some places in the U.S.A), when we felt that triage practices would be unavoidable. So, the first horn of dilemma (c) above would then have to be chosen and Kantian or other deontological directives sustaining the alternative option would be given up. The vulnerable and the weak would be at a disadvantage in such cases, because priority would be accorded to the ones more likely to survive and recover.[5] However, this should be regarded as a second line of action and its choice should be conceded only as imposed by circumstances of *force majeure*.

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4) It would be worth studying the debates among French philosophers. such as Jean-Pierre Dupuy, criticizing Covid-19 scepticism and negationism and defending precautionary and restrictive measures, and André Comte-Sponville pleading in favor of giving precedence to the rights and needs of those pursuing normal economic activities (Dupuy, 2021).
5) See above, note 3.

Legal and political arguments to the effect that liberal principles require the unconditional respect of the rights and liberties of those who reject any kind of restriction of their movements and activities as unconstitutional and as an infringement upon their autonomy, shouldn't be accepted. The rights to life and good health, regarded as part of the common good which a government must protect, override the rights invoked by the reckless minority who oppose the measures. Moreover, at this point, we could appeal to a *Kantian* notion of autonomy, entailing self-limitation and the full respect of the rights of our fellow human beings, which is much stronger than the *liberal* version supposedly justifying disobedience to restrictions imposed in order to avert the dangers of the pandemic. Thus, the second option of dilemma (d) has to be rejected. [6]

Finally, (e) is a dilemma which seems to emerge from broader political considerations, concerning threats to our liberal democracies by measures, which according to some intellectuals, both on the right and on the left extremes of the political spectrum, jeopardize our constitutional liberties. In fact, some philosophers, who end up indirectly supporting unjustified conspiracy theories and also forms of virus negationism, denounce the austere policies against the pandemic, implemented by many Western goverments. According to their allegations, these goverments aimi at using the pretext of the need of a "state of exception", in order to intensify, expand and prolong a nefarious biopolitical control, which is supposedly already being exercised, to an important extent, by politicians and health administrators in contemporary capitalist societies. However, it could be observed that in this case we are dealing with a false dilemma, in so far as these arguments, put forth by thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben, drawing partly on Michel Foucault's theories about biopolitical power, do not seem to need elaborate refutation, apart from an appeal to common sense (Bratten 2021, Agamben, Nancy & Esposito, 2022).[7] Of course, one may agree that the constitutional guarantees of respect for our rights and liberties do require the vigilance of democratic citizens, who will make sure that the authoritarian measures will be relaxed or revoked entirely, as the threat of the pandemic subsides and, hopefully, disappears. In fact, it may be true that some authoritarian regimes, such as China, have been rather succesful in containing the coronavirus, but it is also true that some liberal governments, such as those of New Zealand or Iceland have been equally or more successful.

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6) The Greek Supreme Court (Conseil d'État) has thus not rejected appeals against the measures imposed by the government, invoking the superior good of the protection of the population from the pandemic. There were also similar court decisions regarding the measures of mandatory vaccination, based on analogous arguments. See below, section 5.

7) Here, I am perhaps being overtly optimistic. There are still philosophers, jurists and social scientists who seem to be concinced by such views, warning us about a dystopian tranformation of various institutions, including Universities, due to the eventual continuation of measures (such as distant learning and remote working) imposed in order to ensure protection from the pandemic (Forest, 2020). I think that their fears are exaggerated, to say the least.

5. Particular dilemmas II

The availability of reliable vaccines, which were tried and approved for use only nine to ten months after the onset of the pandemic has given rise to different, but rather analogous dilemmas, which are still being discussed, although they have become less pressing in the current latest phase, characterized by a surge of new cases of infection, but without a similar increase in hospitalizations and deaths.[8] They could be summarized as follows:

a) Imposition of mandatory vaccination, if not on all citizens, at least on certain age and professional groups (such as all people over 60, health professionals working both in the public and the private sector, and all those whose jobs involve close interaction and proximity with others, perhaps including teachers and members of police), entailing serious sanctions, fines and/or additional restrictions, "making life difficult" for those who violate the relevant law by refusing to be vaccinated, *or* full respect for the rights and liberties invoked by the latter to sustain their refusal.

b) Differential or discriminatory treatment of anti-vaxxers, not so much as an additional sanction, but rather as a just way of catering for the needs of other patients in serious condition, who may be left out of intensive care units because of the priority accorded to acute Covid-19 emergencies, *or* equal consideration of all, prescribing urgent care for ill anti-vaxxers, requiring medical assistance, despite their irresponsible and reckless behavior.

c) Suspension or limitation of the freedom of expression of anti-vaxxers, by imposing restrictions on favourable media (TV, radio, press) coverage, and on their own use of internet sites and social media spreading misinformation, *or* full, equal protection of freedom, even for the expression of unpalatable, foolish and often dangerous views concerning vaccines.

d) Free distribution of vaccines by governments of wealthy, developed countries not only to their own citizens, but also to people in developing countries, and implementation of measures to ordain vaccine patent waivers and to impose limits on the profits of pharmaceutical companies, *or* refusal to interfere in the free market of vaccines and antiviral drugs.

Once more, we encounter lines of reasoning that we have already isolated in our responses to the dilemmas presented in the previous section. I would like to argue, that the justification of most of the

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[8] Indeed, the pandemic is continuing to spread, with many spikes of cases of infection and illness in many countries, while in Greece one still witnesses a high daily toll of fatalities (above 50). The latest variants, such as Omicron, are more contagious, though apparently less virulent and lethal. Thus it is be reasonable to expect that we may soon reach a stage at which regular vaccination and other kinds of anti-viral drugs will allow us to live with Covid-19 (as an endemic cause of a seasonal illness not very different from the flu) and eventually return to our normal lives.

options we want to defend in the cases at hand is more clearcut. This is due to the fact that most normative theories do converge in the recognition of the relevant values and of the priorities they indicate and in the conclusions arrived at through the application of their principles. We shouldn't however think that it is much easier to promote the implementation of the relevant policies that seem to be sustained by our insights.

Now, when we focus on dilemma (a) it seems that the imposition of mandatory vaccination, at least on health professionals, doctors, nurses and carers who are exposed to a higher risk of infection and who could easily carry the virus in hospitals and institutions such as homes for the elderly and the disabled, is justified both on *consequentialist* and *deontological* grounds. Such a measure could be extended to people over 60 or 65 years old, not just out of a paternalistic concern, "for their own good", but mainly because of the need to reduce the viral load circulating in the community, protect others, and eventually prevent more mutations. Morover, the pursuit of the maximization of utility for the greatest number, as well as compliance with the Kantian categorical imperative, commanding respect for our own lives and health, but also for those of our fellow human beings, could also provide sufficient justification for sanctions against those who refuse to be vaccinated. Such sanctions amount to a form of indirect coercion, which is deemed necessary when positive incentives. or simple "nudging" don't work. Admittedly, they shouldn't be excessive and could be determined according to principles of proportionality. People subjected to them wouldn't be imprisoned or fired from their jobs, but could be suspended for the period of the crisis, or/and obliged by the government to pay fines. Anyway, the social benefit of severe but reasonable sanctions outweighs the cost of the limitations on the exercise of rights of those disobeying the law and endangering others and of the damage inflicted upon their interests. Still, their punishment should be always proportional to their offense and shouldn't threaten their subsistence.

At this point, it may be observed that we should be careful in endorsing policies targeting people who resist the main effort to combat the pandemic through universal vaccination. We should be ready to ackowledge more or less fine distinctions among groups or individuals who refuse to be vaccinated for psychological or ideological reasons. Such reasons range from vaccine hesitancy, because of doubts about the effectiveness of vaccines, or fears of the risk of serious long-term side-effects, to active support for the anti-vaccine movement and to sometimes aggressive, militant action against health and political authorities.[9] Thus, we may first want to try to cure them from their

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9) In fact, we could also draw on more general discussions of "conscientious objection to vaccination", for various religious, moral and political reasons, which go back to the confrontation with anti-vaccine movements before the pandemic (Clarke, Giubilini & Walker, 2017). Here, it should be noted that in Greece many anti-vaxxers and virus negationists are still being encouraged by some conservative circles of the Orthodox Church, despite the official directives of the Archbishop and of the Holy Synod.

fears, or remedy their lack of trust in science, making sure adequate information is communicated in the proper way, but we have to admit that conspiracy theories and some forms of anti-systemic ideologies, embraced by the most extreme anti-vaxxers, and by virus negationists for that matter, are very difficult to deal with. In order to make their supporters change their views, one needs to resort to special psychological techniques and kinds of persuasion, and even these may fail (McIntyre 2021). At the end of the day, one may realize that it is futile to persist in the effort to overturn recalcitrant opinions of this kind and that recourse to coercive and punitive measures cannot be avoided.

However, when it comes to dilemma (b), which in Greece seems to preoccupy a few doctors and health administrators, we are inclined to reject the first horn. The duty to try to provide to those who need them public healthcare services, including emergency treatment in ICUs, however scarce or costly, even if the behavior of the patients has been irresponsible and reckless, is dictated by basic deontological principles of biomedical ethics, reinforced by empathy and compassion, which should normally override utilitarian considerations and do not allow any kind of cruel retributive measures. Discriminatory practices, involving differential treatment as a form of punishment, are not justified. In analogous cases, one wouldn't refuse or delay the treatment of cancer patients who are heavy smokers or drinkers, even though insurance companies may charge a much higher price to provide full coverage of their medical expenses.

Moving to dilemma (c) we realize that an adequate analysis of the alternatives it presents us with would require a lengthy attempt to adjudicate the thorny issues regarding freedom of expression that it raises. Here, we can simply highlight the difficulty to legislate and to enforce constraints on the right to free speech, in any full- fledged and well functioning liberal democracy, even with a view to protecting higher goods, such as the safety or health of the majority of the population. To be sure, it is not true that the exercise of this right knows no bounds. Nonetheless, we should hesitate to propose laws which ban the favorable coverage, or even the promotion of the views of anti-vaxxers in advance out of fear that they will turn out to be harmful. The expression of false and foolish claims against the safety or the efficiency of the vaccines, which we may regard as dangerous, or even of crazy conspiracy theories about their production and dissemination should be tolerated and countered, as much as possible, by effective scientific argumentation. Prohibitions and control of the use of the internet and social media appear to be even more problematic, also for technical, apart from political reasons, although some form of regulation could eventually be attempted. Anyway, prior censorship would be very hard to justify and the first option should be rejected.

The last dilemma (d) in our list, would also call for a careful consideration of political concerns, insofar as its first horn entails the need to interfere in a more or less direct way in the operation of the free market, which allegedly plays an important role in the efficient production and distribution of

most goods, including drugs and vaccines. It could be maintained that the spectacular success of scientists collaborating all over the world has been made possible by an unprecedented, joint and strenuous effort, which has been partly motivated and sustained by the pursuit of profit by individuals and by the companies for which they work (such as Pfizer, Moderna and Astra Zeneca). All the same, I believe that it would be worth trying to impose some limits on the unfettered commercialization of the products of medical research. Investments in such research and decisions about the production and distribution of its products shouldn't be regulated only by blind market forces. Thus, I would cautiously opt for a version of the first horn for serious humanitarian reasons. In any case, I believe it is a shame that the international community of nations hasn't yet been able to provide vaccines to less wealthy, developing countries. It could also be argued that the reasons supporting this view are not just moral and humanitarian, but also prudential, because combating Covid-19 all over the world, would help avoid further mutations which could spread also in wealthy countries. If such mutations are prevented or stopped at an early stage, everyone will benefit.

6. Applied philosophy for the pandemic

We can now go back to the questions we hinted at in the introduction of this paper and venture some answers. What have we learned about the pandemic and about the most effective practical ways to cope with it by resorting to philosophical reflection, more particularly to normative thinking, informed by moral and political philosophy? And conversely, what can we gather from our analysis about the applicability of philosophical concepts, principles and theories themselves and about their more general usefulness?

We have seen that the dilemmas presented above allow us to test our philosophical tools in the study of intuitions regarding apparently conflicting values and in the elaboration of arguments supporting particular decisions. Actually, the solutions proposed and endorsed in most cases in Western democracies, by liberal politicians, administrators, judges and most importantly by health professionals, reveal their commitment to the priority of the protection of life and health of all citizens, over the maintenance and the growth of a well-functioning free economy. Thus, it is confirmed that deontological constraints imposing respect for basic rights and equal treatment of all, justify restrictive measures and trump utilitarian considerations. Consequentialist reasoning, leading to triage and similar practices in hospitals, is unavoidable in emergencies, when, due to extreme pressure and lack of resources, the health system is threatened by imminent collapse. Moreover, when it comes to legislating and enforcing policies of vaccination, indispensable for fighting the pandemic, measures of indirect coercion in the form of sanctions, may have to be adopted, and

certain liberties may have to be curtailed for some period and to some extent, always in conformity with a principle of proportionality, dictating moderation.

It is clear that the abstract concepts and the principles which we have marshalled in our attempt to justify the options we consider to be correct, help sustain our premisses and can be invoked in more or less lengthy argumentation deployed at some level in the context of legal and political debates. However, they are not particularly useful for people who haven't studied much philosophy, deliberating about what to do in particular circumstances, when they are obliged to make difficult practical decisions, often under pressure. It is at this point that we should pay attention to the traits of character of agents confronted by moral quandaries during the period which concerns us. We are thus led to draw on insights provided by virtue ethics, to which we haven't appealed in our analysis so far. It may turn out that we can't properly evaluate responses to the pandemic, without appreciating the role of certain virtues, and also of weaknesses and vices in determining attitudes and in guiding action.

Indeed, I would like to argue that the pandemic makes it possible to realize the importance of basic and traditional moral virtues, such as courage, patience and perseverance, resilience, compassion and solidarity. These are clearly displayed in the admirable behavior of doctors, nurses, administrators and of many of those with jobs, necessary to feed, transport, educate, protect or cater to various needs of their fellow people, thus exposing themselves to a significant risk of contracting Covid-19. Here, it should be noted that intellectual or epistemic virtues also contribute significantly to coping with the many challenges we have had to face. It may suffice to mention the virtues of the scientists at the front line of biomedical research who made possible the discovery, the testing and the fast production of vaccines. Actually, their efforts exemplify the coordination of both epistemic and moral virtues characterizing the best scientists committed to the pursuit of truth, but also to humanistic values inspiring the will to serve their fellow human beings. Philosophy of science can learn a lot from the impressive successes, but also from the shortcomings and difficulties encountered in various practices, including applied research and science communication. Unfortunately, the latter was not particularly successful, at the time of the pandemic (Oswald, Lewiński, Greco, & Vilata, 2022). In fact, the understanding of the function of virtues, moral and epistemic, provide an additional justification of some of the solutions of dilemmas which we have tried to defend. Conversely, anti-vaxxers offer negative examples, making evident the price of the lack of prudential and moral virtues, and also the disastrous role of vices, such as selfishness, and, quite often, plain stupidity.

To be sure, I don't want to downplay the force of objections to the dominant conceptions of virtue ethics and I am not going to claim that the appeal to excellent, dispositional properties of human character can by itself lead to satisfactory solutions to the dilemmas examined in this paper. Still, the function of virtues in human behavior, even if it may be disputed by those who deny their psycho-

logical reality and their practical effectiveness, could be regarded as a supplementary hypothesis regarding the pursuit of right action, which does account for the steadfastness of moral thinking and acting and supplements the explanation of how normative principles can and do motivate (Virvidakis 2014a). Virtues (and vices) should not be excluded from any analysis of moral experience at the time of the pandemic, particularly insofar as we are interested in understanding our responses to a series of crucial dilemmas.

7. Concluding remarks – suggestions for further discussion

At this point, we can sum up our tentative conclusions and perhaps allow some speculation about the prospects of the post-pandemic era. Despite the deaths, the ordeal and the ongoing suffering of so many people all over the world, some of the lessons we have learned during the past two years constitute a net gain for humanity, which must not be underestimated.

Philosophy has helped us improve our comprehension of the crisis and has cast light on the phenomenology of the painful experience we have had to endure, providing new insights into the human predicament. The conceptual tools it provides have been instrumental in the construction of convincing arguments for the defense of the positions we want to advance when we are faced with moral and political dilemmas, corroborating or questioning intuitions on one or another side. Not only academics and intellectuals, philosophers themselves and theologians, jurists, educators and journalists, but also governmental officials, scientists and health professionals serving in special committees which draft and recommend policies to be implemented in order to deal with the challenges of the pandemic, draw on the resources of philosophical thinking, directly or indirectly. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to say that what we have been going through has been an occasion for more intense and broad ranging philosophizing.

However, it should be acknowledged that the obvious lessons of the pandemic do not require much technical philosophical analysis.[10] The virtues diplayed by people affected by the pandemic, in trying to cope with the various emergencies, to contain the spread of the virus and to take care of others, show humanity at its best. The successes of biomedical research and the advances of vaccine technology reveal the potential of good scientific practices, involving close collaboration of top specialists in various countries.

On the other hand, we must also learn from the failures of many supposedly advanced healthcare

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10) There are already many books and articles developing more or less systematic reflection on the impact of the on-going crisis, dwelling on the new scientific, technological, geopolitical and social prospects for the post-pandemic era, in particular countries and worldwide, which could be consulted. (Boniface 2020, Le Goff 2020, Zakaria 2020, Renaut, A. & Lauvau, 2021, Oswald, Lewiński, Greco & Vilata, 2022).

systems, due to inadequate planning and inefficient coordination. Moreover, we should definitely improve channels and methods of communication among scientific experts, policy makers and the wider public, building trust in science through proper education and through the cultivation of rational thinking and of the epistemic virtues which sustain it. Finally, we can only deplore the inadequate responses of our democratic societies to moral imperatives of justice, which enjoin us to try to remedy inequalities among social groups and individuals, aggravated due to various factors at the time of the pandemic, and, last but not least, to cater for the needs of those beyond our borders, especially regarding the availability and fair distribution of effective vaccines.

All these issues require further interdisciplinary study and could constitute the object of more research and publications. Philosophy could and should play a critical guiding role in coordinating relevant discussions at various levels. We can close this article by expressing the conviction that it will keep contributing not only to the resolution of moral and political dilemmas, but also to the adjudication of a wide range of post-covid issues.[11]

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Session 2

Autonomous AI and how will we regulate it?

Sangkyu Shin

Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea

1

Summary

- To develop a model to comprehend moral agency of AI/ AI robot.
    1. Can we regard AI robot as autonomous moral agent?
    2. How AI robot may take any responsibility/accountability/liability for what they caused?
- Proposing a *functionalist* framework in which we may attribute some moral responsibility or accountability to AI.
- Comparison between human agent and artificial intelligence in terms of their functional qualifications for autonomous moral agent.
- Trying to show that artificial intelligence meets many of the same qualifications of human moral agent.

2

Background

- EU proposed legal status for robots as "electronic personhood".
- Give robots 'personhood' status, EU committee argues(The Guardian, 2017/1/12)
  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/12/give-robots-personhood-status-eu-committee-argues
  - The European parliament has urged the drafting of a set of regulations to govern the use and creation of robots and artificial intelligence, including a form of "electronic personhood" to ensure rights and responsibilities for the most capable AI. In a 17-2 vote, with two abstentions, the parliament's legal affairs committee passed the report, which outlines one possible framework for regulation.
- We need to worry about a way (model) on how artificial intelligence and robots can/may take legal or social responsibility (accountability/liablity).

Some radical changes are happening

- Bruce Mazlish: *The Fourth Discontinuity - The Co-Evolution of Humans and Machines* (1993)
- Floridi: *The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality (2014)*
- Klaus Schwab: 4th Industrial Revolution 2016 Davos World Economic Forum
  - Autonomous technologies made possible by the developments of information and communication technologies (ICT) will replace human jobs in various eras which has required human judgments in the past. (investment expert, medical doctor, lawyer, ...)

Changes in our forms of Life

- The modern revolutions in biogenetics and computer and brain sciences that have brought humans and machines closer together than ever before, i.e., humans becoming more mechanical and machines becoming more human (being programmed to think and to exhibit emotional behavior).
- The changes caused by the current information/technological revolution is more radical than what people usually think about it, in the sense that they are <u>changing our forms of life entirely in a very fundamental level</u>.

Traditional agent/patient distinction

- The concept of moral agent has been confined to **the person** who can take **responsibility** for the consequences of his/her actions. The conditions for being a person(moral agent) include intelligence(reason), intention, consciousness, free will.

- Traditionally, the extension of moral agent usually coincides with the extension of moral patient. The changes in the extension of moral agent reflects our history of exclusion from whom we consider to be human being. Ex: man, female, slave, race.

New Ethics on AI Robot

- Luciano Floridi, *The Ethics of Information* (2013)
  - Ontocentric Information Ethics - Turning to patient oriented ethics from agent oriented ethics
- David Gunkel, *The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics (2012)*
  - ✓ Are machines, like robots, AI, and other autonomous systems, deserving of ethical consideration?
  - ✓ How to react to Ai robot as a new other?

Redefining agency(agenthood) and patienthood

	Agent	patient
human	O	O
Animal, life, nature	?	O
Autonomous machine, AI	(X → O)?	(X → O)?

- The conceptual frameworks we currently have are mostly of modern humanism.
- We need a paradigm shift to (radically) renew the categorical distinctions such as moral being and amoral/non-moral being, or moral agent and patient, through which we understand ourselves, the world, and relations to other beings including machine.
- It is involved with changing our habit of thinking, ways (forms) of life.

8

Floridi's Information Ethics

- From biocentricism to ontocentrism.
  - ✓Anthropo- ⇒ **animo-** ⇒ **bio-** ⇒ **natural-** ⇒ **onto-centric**
  - ✓Being is more fundamental than life, entropy is more fundamental than suffering
- He lowers the threshold to become moral patients so as to include technological artifacts by the ontological equality principle.
- A <u>moral agent</u> is an interactive, autonomous, and adaptable transition system <u>that can perform morally qualifiable actions</u> (Floridi and Sanders 2004b).

9

Relational Approach to Moral Status

- Mark Coeckelbergh: *Growing Moral Relations: Critique of Moral Status Ascription* (2012)
- Criticizing the "standard" property-based approach, he suggests a relational approach to moral status and moral standing.
  - "... the moral status of an entity is constructed and, to the extent that we cannot control it, grows, on the soil of relations we have with an entity as epistemic subjects. This approach brings in human subjectivity. Relational thinking then does not, and should not, constitute a new ontology, a better, "correct" view of the world, but should focus on relationality between subject and object, on how we "world", on how we relate, epistemically and morally. ... It also means that a philosophical discourse on moral standing does not only focus on direct arguments about moral standing, but also questions how moral standing comes into being, how moral patients are constructed. (From "The Moral Standing of Machines: Towards a Relational and Non-Cartesian Moral Hermeneutics" in the Special Issue of *Philosophy & Technology* on Machine Morality

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Two urgent problems with AI robot

- The emergence of new "others" which humans are related to emotionally and/or are capable of emotional interaction with humans.
  - Funeral for robotic dog AIBO
- Algorithmic society: Much of our life is reorganized, depending on decision making by algorithms.
  - Need to investigate the nature of AI's autonomy and its limit, and the subject of responsibility or accountability for AI's decision

Emotional Interaction

- How do we understand and respond to the otherness of AI observed in the emotional interaction between humans and emotional robots?
- The key point is not "what the AI robots really are", but "how we look at them" or "how they appear to us".
  - ✓ Coeckelbergh: "our ethical attention is shifted from ontology to epistemology, from object to subject, from "what things really are" to how we look at things. This enables us to be aware, for instance, of historical changes in the construction of machines, animals, women, slaves, etc. and of cultural differences in these matters and therefore to critically reflect on our own and on today's constructions of "machines", "companions", "artificial slaves", etc."
- AI's moral status is not an abstract philosophical question that can be solved by *a priori* arguments, but rather a practical question about how we should relate to and react to them in various concrete situations at home, hospital or store.

Algorithmic society

- It is most likely that our society shall change into a society which is managed and controlled by the so - called 'Algorithm Boss'.
- We will trust and be more reliant on machine judgment than human judgment. The overall structure and functioning of our society, including the economy, shall be redesigned to match the way that algorithms work. The greater our daily life depends on these technologies, the more human autonomy will be reduced.
- This means that much more powerful productivity and efficiency-oriented societies will emerge than Fordism or Taylorism, which enabled mass production in the industrial age

Regulating algorithmic decision

- We need to put more constraint on the development and application of AI algorithm to matters of public interests.
- Unlike other old machines, where designers or producers have full control over their behavior, current AI technology is characterized by the inability of humans to fully predict or control their behavior. (AlphaGo)
- This suggests that measures to secure the safety and reliability of AI technology should be different from those of other technologies. It seems necessary to recognize that AI robot is autonomous to some extent and to seek ways to assign responsibilities corresponding to their degree of autonomy.
- The public's perception are still reluctant to regard AI as autonomous moral agent. Need to develop a model of AI agency fitting the public's perspective and to make sense of AI's responsibility, accountability, or liability.

Functional Morality

Figure 2.1. Two Dimensions of AMA Development.

- Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen: *Machine Ethics - Teaching Robots Right from Wrong* (2009)
- Operational morality vs. Functional morality
- Whereas machines of "operational morality" is within the control of a tool's designers and users, machines of "functional morality" themselves have the autonomous capacity for assessing and responding to moral challenges.

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Suggestion

- Approaching the autonomy issue of AI in a functionalist way.
- Relevant question we need to ask is whether or not we can describe, analyze, and evaluate the behavior of AI in the same way that we <u>functionally</u> describe, analyze, and evaluate autonomous moral behavior of human being.
- In other words, the question I am asking is whether AI can be regarded as autonomous agent of ethical behavior at the 'functional' level.
- If an AI that satisfies certain conditions, it can be recognized as an autonomous moral agent with a limited meaning in the functional dimension, though not completely at the same level as humans.

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Principle of Functional Parity

- In the moral context in which AI is involved, if AI's behavior is done in much the same way that autonomous human agents do, is it not acceptable to regard AI as an autonomous moral agent?

- If AI's behavior is functionally equivalent to that of a human, in terms of the process of selecting and performing as well as the consequences, AI can be recognized as an autonomous moral agent in proportion to the degree of functional equivalence.

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Extended Agency/ Distributed Responsibility

- Considering an agent of action/behavior as an extended system that includes AI as a cooperative partner, not just human beings. The system consists of a combination of various actors, including human beings.

- The party with the primary responsibility is the entire system.

- Responsibility of the whole system is then distributed according to the role or contribution of the actors constituting the system.

- In the case of a corporation, the primary responsibility lies with the corporation. Then, members of the company take responsibility internally according to their roles and contributions.

Who is to be punished?

- When we say that AI is responsible for something, what we usually imagine is a situation in which someone's rights are violated as a result of behaviors carried out by AI. We need to decide how to pay for it or who to punish.
- If we decide to blame AI, what is the method to punish it?
- To stop its operation or to disassemble it?
- However, in this case, it is the maker or owner of the AI who is punished, and punishment does not seem to applicable to AI.

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Responsibility as deserts

- Responsibility is not merely a concept associated with punishment, but a concept of reward (praise) or punishment according to one's deserts.
- Reward and punishment, praise and reprimand are symmetrical concepts, and if one of them is applicable, the other should also be applicable.
- In the case of praise, it seems much more natural to recognize AI as an agent.
  - ✓"It was because of AI's role and contribution that we were able to accomplish this successfully."

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Responsibility and Accountability

- Responsibility also means accountability in the sense of having an obligation to do something or to meet certain constraints. To say that one is responsible for something means that one ought to play certain roles or one have some duty to fulfil in relation with it.

- The most important sense of responsibility that can be attributed to AI is accountability.

- Accountability of AI can be viewed as *a preventive obligation* to control and regulate AI's behavior *in proportion to its ability to act.*

- It sounds much more natural to talk about AI's responsibilities in the sense of accountability than AI's responsibility in the sense of liability of today's legal and social institutions.

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AI and Distributed Morality

- Today's moral phenomenon is a result of the complex interaction of a wide variety of factors, so it is very difficult to attribute responsibility or improvement obligation to any particular individual or group.

- It is also the case that many things are determined by the interactions of actors which cannot take responsibilities in the traditional sense.

- In the future, much of what humans do will be delegated to artificial intelligence. Accordingly, the area of actions that artificial intelligence is responsible(accountable) will be expanded.

- The boundary between the human responsibility area and the AI responsibility area will become increasingly unclear, and it will be harder to pin down one's clear responsibilities.

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AI and Safety issue

• Unlike traditional technologies in which designers or producers can completely control their behavior, AI has the characteristics that humans can not completely predict or control its behavior.

• Opacity of deep neural network and Explainable AI

• This suggests that measures to secure the safety or reliability of AI technologies should be different from those of traditional technologies.

• We need to be aware of the autonomous nature of AI technology and to find a way to attribute appropriate responsibilities(accountabilities) to AI.

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Risk management and accountability

• Given the potential power of AI or the uncertainty or unpredictability of its impact, it is necessary to seek a concept of responsibility(accountability) that is preemptively imposed for preventive purpose, not a responsibility based on a direct causal result that is evaluated afterwards.

• AI's having accountability means that AI designers and creators are required to implement the moral sensitivity of accountability in some way to their AI.

• This amounts to the claim that AI designers and users must adhere to very strict precautionary principles.

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Philosophical Messages from COVID-19
-Human Survival, Coexistence with Nature, and Transformation-

KIM Yang hyun / PARK Ey yeon
Department of Philosophy, Chonnam National University

1. Introduction

COVID-19 raised several fundamental questions that required philosophical reflections. How do we live? Is it okay to go on like this? Can we, the human species, continue to survive? All these questions are not only about the survival of individuals but also about the very essence of human civilization. In addition to the coronavirus pandemic, humanity faces potential risks from the climate crisis and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Therefore, more than ever, it is necessary to reflect on human civilization and to establish new values.

In this article, we will discuss three philosophical aspects of COVID-19, namely the survival of mankind, the coexistence of man and nature, and transformation. For the discussion of the topics, we will refer to three classical philosophers: Aristotle, H. Jonas, and I. Kant. First, we would like to interpret the problems of human survival and well-being in today's context with Aristotle's discussion. Next, we will deal with the coexistence of humans and nature through Jonas, who already presented the ethics of human responsibility for nature and future generations in the 1970s. Most importantly, A number of people emphasize the need for the change to overcome the crisis that mankind faces. Therefore, we will invoke Kant to clarify the meaning of the transformation and present what and how to change it briefly.

2. Purpose of life or human survival

Reflective questions about life do not usually get much attention, and their importance is often overlooked. Only when a crisis or difficulty, such as COVID-19, comes up, people consider the fundamental questions of human life. In particular, the life-threatening situations force us to reexamine the current way of living critically. We have to decide what to maintain and what to change. How will

you live? What is the good life? Is there a better way to survive? Through these series of questions, we can rediscover the meaning of life and regain the motivation which inspires us to greater efforts. As is well known, the questions of a practical philosophy of life have long belonged to the philosophy itself. Unfortunately, however, it does not attract particular attention in contemporary philosophical discussions. Now, it is necessary to recall and remember what philosophy used to do.

For us, to summon Aristotle here today means more than just bringing up a very ancient story. Aristotle presents us with practical wisdom and insights into life in *Nicomachean Ethics*, the very first book of ethics in the West. In the first sentence of this book, Aristotle writes as follows: "Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks." (NE 1094a)[1] This very implicative statement clearly shows what Aristotle's idea is. All human actions pursue some good. Whether it's theoretical or practical, or whatever kind of rational choice and decision it is, they're all for the good. In short, humans aim for good and pursue it. Aristotle goes one step further from this idea and says that *eudaimonia* is the highest of all goods that people seek. In other words, "for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness (eudaimonia), and they suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy." (NE 1095a) People often say happiness is the ultimate purpose of life. But it is very abstract, and it is also an open concept that can be understood or interpreted differently by different people. Therefore, it is not easy to say what happiness is, with confidence. As Aristotle points out, if you ask what happiness is, the answers can vary from person to person, and also vary depending on the individual circumstances. People usually think of certain things as happiness, such as pleasure, wealth, honor, power, health, and longevity. Also, for a person, being healthy is happiness when sick, and being wealthy becomes happiness when poor.[2]

It should be noted here that living well, doing well and happiness are all equivalent in Aristotle's statement of the concept of happiness. To understand it better, we can divide it into two parts. First, from the statement that doing well is happiness, we can find what the core principle of Aristotle's ethics is. For happiness, you have to act in a moral way, and you can become happy if you act morally. In other words, the essential element is the relationship between happiness and virtue, that is, harmony or coincidence of virtue and happiness. Aristotle's theory of happiness reveals its meaning with the theory of virtue. Second, from the statement that living well is happiness, we can expand the interpretation of the meaning of happiness by using everyday terms. To live well means to live life successfully, lead a good life, and survive well as an organism. Living well, being well,

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1） Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, tran. Terence Irwin (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999).
2） Contrary to the idea of ordinary people who understand happiness as a state of having something, Aristotle understands it as a continuous activity that excellently exerts human inherent abilities. Details are not discussed here.

and surviving well is perhaps the greatest concern of a human being. It is the most important value and purpose for humans.

In this way, we can understand happiness as the same meaning as living a good, successful, and better surviving life. What we want to particularly emphasize here is that the essence of happiness is directly related to the successful survival and well-being of humans. This was confirmed through the COVID-19 Pandemic. Through the questions of what are the purpose and values of life, we can set the directions for the present and future. It can be found in the process of reflecting on the possibility and condition of better surviving life over and over again.

For human survival and well-being, we can take human interests as a starting point for solving problems. Human desires or interests seem very complex, but in fact, they can be simplified into several elements. Humans have some important interests like "the interest in avoiding pain, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, to love and care for any children one may have, to enjoy friendly and loving relations with others and to be free to pursue one's projects without unnecessary interference from others."[3] In other words, the most important and basic benefits of humans are the fulfillment of basic needs, preservation and well-being of life, avoidance of disease and pain, opportunities for developing capabilities and professional activities, friendship and love, freedom, and future planning. We need to carefully consider the interests of humans in all areas of practice: politics, economy, society, culture, education, etc. In other words, the most significant practical principle of life in the period of transformation of human civilization is to consider human interests.

3. Coexistence of Humans and Nature

The coronavirus taught us how important human survival and well-being are. Furthermore, it confirmed that the well-being of mankind is sustainable only through the coexistence of humans and nature. Already in the early 70s, the crisis in the ecosystem or the problem of climate change was recognized as a serious problem directly related to the survival of mankind. Therefore, it has become a pivotal issue of discussion in various academic fields, not to mention in the field of international politics. In the field of philosophy, of course, diverse solutions for the problems were presented along with the analysis of the causes of the ecological crisis. Great attentions of philosophers in this issue is obliquely illustrated by the number of numerous books and papers published over the past 50 years.

In his book *Das Princip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik fuer die technologische Zivilization*, H. Jonas warns sternly about the end of human civilization or the destruction of the earth.[4] According

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3) Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 3rd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 21-22.
4) Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age* (1979), trans. Hans Jonas and David Herr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)

to him, the end of mankind is no longer just a message of religion or metaphysics; it now has historical and realistic implications. In the past, so to speak, end-of-the-world scenarios were either a religious eschatological message or was regarded as a superhistorical and metaphysical prophecy. However, the possibility of a global catastrophe is based on the reality of the present ecosystem or climate crisis. Jonas argues that ecological ethics are needed along with the establishment of a new relationship between man and nature for the survival of existing humans and no-human, including current and future generations.

Jonas finds the cause of the crisis we confront today in the excessive success of the scientific and technological utopianism of F. Bacon. The dangers of the Baconian idea of the conquest of nature through science and technology are exposed through the capitalist economic system. The capitalist economy has grown at a tremendous rate, using nature as a resource and material. It is manifesting itself as infinite growth, mammonism, materialism, financial capital, and environmental destruction. In terms of the crisis facing mankind, the logic of science and technology underlying it, along with the capitalist ideology of infinite development, can no longer be effective and appropriate. Furthermore, Jonas points out that the crisis has accelerated with the biological success of humans. In other words, humans have no choice but to mercilessly exploit the environment for survival. The population explosion led to catastrophes for mankind and nature. As a result, the long-held equilibrium laws of ecology can no longer be maintained. Jonas argues that to escape from the crisis at hand, we must first and foremost reject scientific and technological utopianism and optimism. But still, the vast majority seem to believe in optimism and have not given up hope for optimism.

Then, what is the principle of coexistence between humans and nature suggested by Jonas? In a word, consider nature in our moral deliberations! Consider the natural environment severely destroyed by humans! Don't threaten the foundations of future generations! Now it is an inevitable consequence that nature is the object of human responsibility because it is the only way for human survival. Jonas presents new moral principles toward nature, which in a sense reformulates Kant's categorical imperative into an ecological form. The new types of moral imperatives presented by Jonas are as follows. "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human-life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or, again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."[5]

The new imperatives presented here have similarities to Kant's categorical imperative in their formation, but in terms of their contents, they could be a completely new moral principle. Compared

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5) Ibid, p. 11.

to Kant's categorical imperative, "so act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means"[6], it becomes clearer.

In Kant, moral imperatives dictate how we ought to treat ourselves and others; it is a demand to treat oneself or others not as a mere means, but as an end, as a person, as a being with dignity. However, the moral imperatives newly proposed by Jonas require proper conduct for the continuity and harmony of human life. It again mandates not to destroy the future possibilities of life, but to prohibit threats to the conditions of human existence, and to preserve the inviolability of future human beings. According to the principle of coexistence between man and nature presented by Jonas, nature is not a useful means that can be manipulated and exploited for human arbitrary purposes. Even though nature cannot co-operate or communicate as humans can, it must be regarded as an object of moral consideration.

4. The problem of transformation

The necessity of transformation is resonating more than ever. The COVID-19 Pandemic and the recent climate crisis which are revealed to us are paradoxically the dominant driving force of this demand. Only the great transformation is the key to solving the problem. Without it, mankind cannot overcome the crisis at hand. Numerous experts who diagnose this problem reach the same conclusion. However, what does the transformation mean here? The dictionary definition of 'transformation' is a marked change in form, nature, or appearance. The word "great transformation" means a fundamental change, that is, a thorough change.

As is well known, 16th-century astronomer N. Copernicus is regarded as a representative person who succeeded through the attempt of transformation. Copernicus could not solve the celestial problems faced by astronomy of the day through the existing way of inquiry. So, Copernicus changed his mind 180 degrees and was able to achieve great scientific success. In other words, the celestial motion could not be explained under the time-honored assumption that the stars of the celestial body rotate around the observer, but on the contrary, by fixing the stars and rotating the observer, the problem of the time could be solved. Kant called it "kopernikanische Wendung" or "the revolution of the way of thinking." As a result of this great transformation, the worldview changed from an Earth-centered cosmology to the Solar-centered one. Kant was also able to overcome the academic crisis in which philosophy faced by modeling after the Copernican revolution. In other words,

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6) Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), trans. and ed. Christine Korsgaard, Jens Timmermann and Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), B67.

through a revolution in the mindset that cognitions of objects depend on the subject bringing forms of thought, he was able to resolve the crisis of philosophy.[7]

What is the meaning of the Copernican revolution? It is, in a nutshell, a change of mindset. It is an overthrow of the prevailing values and demands a new approach to solving problems. Until now, traditional discussions of philosophy have tried to identify and prove human values and specificities. Jonas pointed out that Western Greek-Jewish-Christian 'anthropocentric' self-understanding of the human had self-destructive consequences. Now, what we need to pay attention that humans are a part of nature; it is a real mistake to believe we humans are separate from the natural world. The great transformation that we must now seek, the complete transformation, must start from the point of view that human beings are vulnerable and powerless on their own, that is, from the inability to separate humans from nature, not from a special ability humans have. COVID-19 tells us that humans can survive only when we understand that we are connected to nature.

There will be countless targets for transformation when you try to fundamentally change your current dominant mindset, values, and lifestyle. Though it is impossible to enumerate and discuss everything, we would like to emphasize a few points, bearing in mind the messages that COVID-19 has sent us.

First, the transformation in the field of education is very important—this issue should be emphasized more than anywhere else in the reality of Korea. Through reflective questions and reasonings for the purpose of life, we need to reaffirm the fundamental purpose of education and check whether all educational activities are desirable. As discussed above, living and surviving better, and living good life have intrinsic value and they are the purpose of life. For it is a fundamental problem of human survival, education should be understood as a positive activity to teach and learn a better way of survival, a better way of living for individuals and communities. In this way, in light of the nature of human life, the purpose and activities of education should be reestablished accordingly. Therefore, it is necessary to break away from the current knowledge-centered education system that mediates, transmits and acquires knowledge and information.

We must speak of the limits of individual achievement. We should know that my contribution can be extraordinary only through others. Because other people and society exist, mere potentials can become abilities. All members should understand that my ability is a product of luck and that the existence of others who seem to be incompetent and the society they maintain are the soil and conditions that allowed my ability to bloom. Also, people should know that there is no case where they can claim full credit for the outcome of the competition because it is impossible to completely invalidate the difference in their social background. It allows us to expand our sense of coexistence

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7) Ibid., BX VI.

and even our sense of morality. Only this expansion enables a shift from anthropocentric ethics to biocentric or life-centered ethics as an alternative.

Second, it is necessary to accept the inevitable limitations of capitalist growth and development and switch to an alternative way of thinking. In the meantime, the logic of science and technology has dominated the ideology of capitalism. To find a way to correct the eroded values and realize the original purpose of human life, normative logic must be activated. In particular, economic inequality and employment problems should be resolved in this process, and public problems such as medical care, welfare, and education need to be considered without business logic. From the normative point of view, the market has no choice but to have moral limitations. As M. J. Sandel argued, the expansion of markets and market-oriented reasoning into spheres of life results in problems beyond justice.[8] In other words, it is necessary to understand that there are areas of human life that cannot be measured by market values. The market does not have a mechanism to control itself, even though free marketeers would deny it. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize that there are areas of human life that cannot be measured by market values and standards.

Third, a particular emphasis should be placed on ecological transformation. In the face of the climate crisis, we were able to confirm that the problem of human survival and well-being can only be solved through the principle of coexistence with nature. Therefore, it is necessary to give up the current dominant anthropocentric lifestyle and switch to an alternative perspective. Even to avoid catastrophe on the global level, ecological transformation is inevitable. Ecology requires us to accept our responsibility for nature as new principles of life and action. It starts by rejecting scientific and technological utopianism or optimism. A world of Ecotopia where humans and nature are truly reconciled should be established. To this end, we should accept the imperative suggested by Jonas; "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human-life."[9]

The capitalist attitude and the modern conception of nature, centered on growth, are the basis of the anthropocentric attitude we have maintained so far. Transformation to ecology rather than anthropocentrism means accepting that humans are part of the ecosystem. Starting with empathy for things that are close to our eyes, there is a risk that we, as humans, may create a hierarchy of importance by arranging things from close to distant to expand our interests. It is another meaning of great transformation to be aware of the risk.

The anthropocentric attitude we have has been embodied as an ability to encroach on nature along with growth. If we understand that the achievements made by us were all possible thanks to the environment around us, we may be able to avoid tyranny over the world in the past. We should

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8) M. J. Sandel, *Justice: What's The Right Thing to Do?*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), P. 265.
9) Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age* (1979), p. 11.

reverse the worldview that everything I enjoy has been achieved with my abilities and I deserve to enjoy this achievement. Then we will see that we have taken the world without hesitation, merely according to our needs. Such a change in world perception is the great transformation.

Most people agree that a great transformation is needed to overcome the crisis in the period of civilization. However, the key is whether we have the will to change and whether we can practice it in detail accordingly. We cannot help but ask ourselves; are we willing to radically change our consciousness, thoughts, attitudes, and values? Do we have the will to abandon the existing way of life and pursue the new?

5. Conclusion

In the above, we have discussed the issues of sustainable survival and well-being of mankind, the coexistence of humans and nature, and the transformation presented as an alternative in the face of the COVID-19 and climate crisis. The coronavirus has given people an opportunity to seriously consider the nature of life and the issues of human survival. Through reflective questions about life, we rediscover the meaning of life and gain new strength for life. By pondering the essential question of the purpose of life, we could obtain valuable answers in today's context. Happiness, like the word well-Being, is to live well, it means to be well and to live a successful life, and to lead a good life as a human being. It can be said that living well is perhaps the greatest interest of man and the most important purpose of human life. Through this interpretation, we were able to obtain a concrete and persuasive answer to the essence of human life and human survival during a transformational period in civilization. In other words, the essence and fundamentals of happiness are directly related to the survival and well-being of human beings, and the successful management of life.

In addition, we were able to confirm the fact that the problem of human survival and well-being is only possible through coexistence with nature. An alternative perspective, that is, the principle of coexistence with nature, is necessary for the sustainable survival of human beings. The relationship between humans and nature must be reestablished for the survival of the present and future generations. The ecological ethics of responsibility of the time dictates that we should act reasonably for the sustainability and harmony of human life, not destroy the future possibility of life, prohibit threats to the condition of the infinite existence of mankind, and preserve future generations' inviolability.

As many experts diagnose, mankind is in the midst of a great turn of civilization. The great transformation is the key to solving the problem. This era requires us to change our thought, attitudes, and values, and to give up the existing way of life and choose a new one. Unfortunately, our awareness and understanding tend not to last for a long time. What is important is to practice. To know is to

practice. Throughout the ages, the mentors of mankind emphasized the importance of the unity of knowledge and action. Dreaming of a new future cannot overcome the current crisis. There is a clue to solving problems in tangible changes in real life.

Session 3

The Opportunities and Boundaries of Intercultural Encounters
–Confronting Charles Taylor's views with those of Paul Ricoeur–

Peter Jonkers
Tilburg University

Abstract

This paper confronts Charles Taylor's views on intercultural encounters with those of Paul Ricoeur. After a short introductory section, the second section explores the enduring importance of socio-cultural identity and analyses how it has become the result of recognition. Moreover, in our time, recognition not only concerns the equal recognition of all human beings but also the recognition of (socio-cultural) differences. Against this background, the third section discusses Taylor's ideas about the possibility of an undistorted understanding and encounter of the cultural other, based on Gadamer's idea of a fusion of horizons. After raising some critical questions about the possibility of such a fusion, section four confronts Taylor's ideas with Paul Ricoeur's views on encountering the cultural other in a world 'after Babel', resulting in the idea of cultural hospitality. The final section addresses the vexing question of the principled boundaries to cultural hospitality, asking how to criticize the cultural other on fair grounds in the absence of uniform and universally recognized standards for such a critique.

Introduction

One of the things for which I admire Charles Taylor is his courage to raise, in our time of academic hyperspecialization, big and complex philosophical, theological, and societal questions and to give thoughtful responses to them. One of these questions, how to encounter the cultural other, is not only big and complex but also hotly debated against the backdrop of rising ethnocentrism. In contrast to the modernization theory, which predicted that cultural differences would have become irrelevant with the spread of modernity, history has taken a quite different turn as people have become aware of the importance of their socio-cultural identity. As human beings, we not only long for a large and even expanding *space*, in which we can develop our talents, explore new geographical and cultural

horizons, make new contacts that reach beyond our family ties, etc. but we also need a specific *place* where we feel at home, speak our native language, meet our family and friends, are familiar with its values, etc.

To get a better insight into these developments, it is very rewarding to discuss Taylor's views on encountering and understanding the cultural other. To show my indebtedness to Taylor's work I start with examining his views on (the recognition of) socio-cultural identity, followed by a critical analysis of his ideas about understanding the cultural other undistortively. This leads me, in the section thereafter, to discuss an alternative model of intercultural encounters, built on Paul Ricoeur's insights on this matter. Yet, both models raise an important question, namely, whether a fair critique of the ideas and practices of the cultural other is possible in a heterogeneous world, that is, in a world without a common frame of reference. This question will be discussed in the final section, thereby drawing on some of Taylor's and Ricoeur's insights.

The fragility of socio-cultural identity

Empirical research shows that we remain strongly attached to our socio-cultural identity, even in these times of modernization and globalization.[1] The socio-cultural world in which we live forms a general horizon of meaning, against which we define who we are and where and to whom we belong; it becomes manifest in our shared stories, legends, and histories, in our festivals with their celebrations and rituals, in our pride of our (sport)heroes, in our attachment to our native language, etc. One could even state that personal identity is to a large extent a social product. One of the clearest examples of this dialectic is that we express the most intimate elements of our personal identity in a common language; our earliest personal memories are bound up in the lives of others - in our family, school, or city.[2]

Yet in our times, the (socio-cultural) identity of the self has lost a great deal of its self-evidence and stability. As Taylor has convincingly argued, our identity is no longer seen as derived from eternal natural law, God's unchangeable will, or from a fixed hierarchical social order, as was the case in premodern societies, but has become the outcome of social recognition. This has made the identity of the self contingent upon whether other individuals, a specific community, the state, or other societies are willing to recognize and value it.[3] The fact that "our identity is partly shaped by

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1) Wil Arts and Loek Halman, eds., *Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014).

2) Paul Ricoeur, "Fragile Identity: Respect for the Other and Cultural Identity," in *Philosophy and the Return of Violence. Studies from this Widening Gyre*, eds. Nathan Eckstrand and Christopher Yates (London: Continuum, 2011), 81f.

3) Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed.

recognition" inevitably implies the possibility of a "*mis*recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, a real distortion if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves."[4] Even though the modern state rests on the principle of the unconditional and equal recognition of all human beings, this does not exclude the possibility that individuals or segments of society disrespect the identity of (groups of) persons, as the examples of misrecognition of individual persons in various settings, the discrimination against migrants, people of color, indigenous people, and other cultural minorities show. Obviously, this compromises an unbiased understanding of and encounter with cultural others.

Another factor contributing to the fragility of the (socio-cultural) self is the growing importance of recognizing the identity of individuals and communities insofar as they differ from other persons or groups. This development is a consequence of the rise of the ideal of authenticity, which has become predominant in all Western societies since the seventies of the last century.[5] As a result, people have become individualized individuals. Nowadays, the identity of the self has become a matter of an internal feeling, to which only I have access: my unique feeling of myself as a person with a specific gender, sexual proclivity, religion, culture, etc. defines who I am. Yet these examples show that there is no such thing as a monological self. The "crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally *dialogical* character. […] We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us."[6] This shows that recognition is still as essential for the identity of the self as before. The difference between early and late modernity is not the need for recognition per se but the fact that people nowadays want to be recognized as unique individuals, being different from all other people. This has contributed to the fragility of the self and complicated the understanding of and encounter with the cultural other in her own right.[7]

The increased importance of the ideal of authenticity and the redefinition of the self as an individualized individual have also brought about a shift in the modern political principle of equal, unconditional, and universal recognition of human beings; it has evolved and become part of the politics of (the recognition of) difference: "We give due acknowledgment only to what is universally present - everyone has an identity - through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgment of specificity."[8] In other words, the principle of universal

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Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-27, 31f., 34f.

4) Ibid., 25.
5) Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
6) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 32-3.
7) For a more detailed analysis of the importance of socio-cultural identity and its fragility see Peter Jonkers, "Inescapable Boundaries as a Challenge to Intercultural Dialogue," in *Crossing Boundaries: Challenges and Opportunities of Intercultural Dialogue*, ed. Peter Jonkers and Fu Youde (Washington DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2022), 23-26, and Peter Jonkers. "How to Respond to Conflicts over Value Pluralism?," *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics* vol. 13, no. 2 (2019): 1-22.

recognition has been modified and intensified by the growing importance of the recognition of specific (socio-cultural) identities. Yet because of this modification, a (potential) conflict has cropped up between equal recognition and the recognition of difference: equal recognition protects people against all kinds of discrimination, while the recognition of differences protects their specific socio-cultural identity. What is more, many people belonging to socio-cultural minorities point to the fact that the so-called universalism of equal recognition is often a hidden particularism, insofar as it favors the socio-culturally dominant segment of society.[9]

Taylor: encountering the cultural other in her own right

These developments as well as the simple fact that societies are becoming more multicultural and porous have made us aware of the difficulties of encountering and understanding the socio-cultural other in her own right. "The great challenge of this century, both for politics and social science, is that of understanding the other as such. The days are long gone when European and other Westerners could consider their experience and culture as the norm toward which the whole of humanity was headed, so that the other could be understood as an earlier stage on the same road that they had trodden."[10] How to avoid reducing the cultural other to an (inferior) variant of my own culture? Is there a neutral ground or a common universe of discourse where we can understand her undistortively? Does recognizing the socio-cultural other automatically mean that we should accept her ideas and practices unreservedly, even if they run counter to our fundamental values and way of doing things? In this paper, I will not so much focus on Taylor's response to the political dimension of these questions, e.g., whether liberalism really offers such a neutral ground or whether the democratic, liberal state should recognize by law specific cultural-minority rights,[11] but rather discuss his ideas about the attitudes and virtues that are needed for an unbiased encounter and understanding of the socio-cultural other.

As argued above, we are formed by recognition, it is constitutive of our identity, which explains why the demand for recognition has become so explicit and important during modernity. Yet the

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8) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 39.
9) Ibid., 43f.
10) Charles Taylor, "Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes," in Charles Taylor, *Dilemmas and Connections. Selected Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011), 24. This paper was first published in *Gadamer's Century. Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, eds. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) All references in this text are to its reprint in Charles Taylor, *Dilemmas and Connections. Selected Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011).
11) See e.g. Taylor's analysis of the discussion about the protection of the specific culture of the French-speaking province of Quebec: Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73; Charles Taylor, "Interculturalism or Multi-culturalism," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* Vol. 38, No. 4-5 (2012): 413-423.

above analysis of the importance of socio-cultural identity has shown that, although equal recognition of human dignity is certainly a necessary condition to understand the cultural other in her own right, it is certainly not a sufficient one. After all, equal recognition does not imply any positive value judgment about the specific socio-cultural identity of the other and no commitment to encountering her and understanding her undistortively. When (the members of) a dominant culture refuses to recognize the specific identity of the cultural other, e.g., by disqualifying her language as jabber, this is as harmful as any other form of oppression or misrecognition.[12] To avoid this, we need not only to recognize her as a fellow human being, which is guaranteed by the human right of equal recognition but also to recognize her specific socio-cultural identity, which points to the principle of the recognition of difference.

This positive attitude towards the socio-cultural other is based on the presumption "that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings."[13] Although the validity of this presumption can only be demonstrated concretely through the actual encounter of that specific culture, what is basically required is a willingness "to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. [This enables us to develop] new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts. So that if and when we ultimately find substantive support for our initial presumption, it is based on an understanding of what constitutes worth that we couldn't possibly have had at the beginning. We have reached the judgment partly through transforming our standards."[14] By contrast, judging the culture of the other by our original familiar standards is an expression of ethnocentrism and leads, inadvertently, to praising the cultural other for being like us.

It is important to note here that accepting the presumption that other cultures have, in principle, equal worth is not the same as actually judging those other cultures, as a matter of right and without further qualification, of equal worth. In other words, Taylor's fundamentally positive attitude toward the cultural other should certainly not be understood as if he would yield to cultural relativism. Apart from the fact that, in the latter case, the issue of justification falls away and is replaced by an expression of liking or dislike, the fundamental problem is that an unqualified judgment of equal worth fails to really encounter the cultural other because it only offers her condescension, not respect or recognition of her culture.[15]

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12) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 64.
13) Ibid., 66, see also 72.
14) Ibid., 67. See also Taylor, "Understanding the Other," 35.
15) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 69f.

For a philosophical underpinning of the need for broadening our cultural horizon and transforming our common standards about worth, Taylor refers to Gadamer's idea of a fusion of (cultural) horizons.[16] First of all, because of the complexity of understanding the cultural other and the persistency of our prejudices, we need to pass "through the patient identification and undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding that distorts the reality of the [cultural] other." This long process "will bring about two connected changes: we will see our peculiarity for the first time, as a formulated fact about us and not simply a taken-for-granted feature of the human condition as such; and at the same time, we will perceive the corresponding feature of their life-form undistorted."[17] This patient endeavor can only be realized through a dialogue, in which the challenges and interpellations of the cultural other enable us to identify and explicate our cultural self-understanding and our initial understanding of the cultural other. Yet even a dialogical attitude does not guarantee that we will be able to encounter the cultural other in her own right since the language and conceptual scheme, with which I approach her will inevitably differ from the words and concepts she uses to describe and interpret herself. Thus, to prevent the co-existence of different languages from ending up in a cacophony of voices that would obstruct every understanding of and encounter with the cultural other, the speakers have to make a shift towards a richer language that bridges these differences. There is a similar need to broaden the conceptual horizons of the speakers to bridge the different individual universes of discourse.

The term dialogue points to how these changes can be realized. Through our dialogue with the cultural other, we lay bare the ground for a way of seeing that before did not fit within our cultural horizon. Yet the broadening of my cultural horizon is actually a fusion of different horizons because not only I but also the cultural other undergo a shift. In a similar vein, the term "richer language" refers to a language that "will not be the same language in which members of that culture understand themselves; it will also be different from the way members of a distinct culture will understand them, coming as they will to this goal through a quite different route, through the identification and overcoming of a rather different background understanding."[18] The result is a more comprehensive cultural horizon, which enables persons and communities with different socio-cultural identities to "to talk undistortively of each."[19] The criterion of "undistortiveness" allows for a critique of all kinds of ethnocentric understandings and biased encounters with the cultural other. Through a fusion of cultural horizons, we will be able to refrain from categorizing "difference" as an "error," a "fault" or a "lesser, undeveloped version."[20] In other words, an undistorted understanding of and encounter

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16) Ibid., 67, 70, 73.
17) Taylor, "Understanding the Other," 29.
18) Ibid., 30.
19) Ibid., 31.

with the cultural other requires us to approach her with an attitude of fundamental openness, even if her culture cannot be integrated into our own cultural horizon, but rather challenges it.

To illustrate the complexity of the fusion of cultural horizons, Taylor confronts two very different cultural practices: the Roman Catholic mass and the Aztec practice of human sacrifice. In this case, "a good starting point for an eventual fusion of horizons involves identifying what something in the puzzling life of an alien people can usefully be contrasted with in ours. […] What we are doing is identifying that facet of our lives which their strange customs interpellate, challenge, offer a notional alternative to."[21] In this specific case, the fusion of horizons ultimately rests on the idea that Christians and Aztecs "share the same humaneness, and that therefore we can ultimately find our feet in Aztec sacrifice because it's a way of dealing with a human condition we share," just like the Roman Catholic mass.[22] Yet beyond this idea of shared humaneness, we have no stable, culture-transcendent name for these rival construals of the human condition.[23] In the Catholic tradition, the interpretative names of this ritual are guilt, sacrifice, and redemption but we have no idea which names the Aztecs used for their ritual and even less how these names are related to the Catholic ones.

This example shows that the shift towards a richer language to understand the cultural other undistortively, as well as the fusion of horizons imply a painful "identity cost" because the cultural other sometimes confronts us with disconcerting views of what human fulfillment means.[24] This example also requires us to admit that "we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident."[25] Yet, Taylor is convinced that, eventually, we will be enriched by the encounter of the cultural other since the fusion of different cultural horizons will familiarize us with the many ways in which people give meaning to their existence.

The great merits of Taylor's analysis of the encounter of the cultural other are evident. He convincingly argues that approaching the other as much as possible in her own right by recognizing her in her specific socio-cultural identity is an intellectual as well as a moral obligation. It is also a challenge because the encounter with the cultural other can turn so easily into a biased understanding, resulting in a misrecognition of her specific identity, even against our own conscious intentions. At the same time, accepting this challenge enriches us because the encounter with the cultural other extends our cultural horizon and is constitutive of our identity. Finally, Taylor deserves to be commended for pointing to the "identity-cost" that intercultural encounters involve and for acknowledging how difficult it is to find a culture-transcendent vocabulary and a shared conceptual horizon.

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20) Ibid., 37.
21) Ibid., 35.
22) Ibid., 36.
23) Ibid., 36.
24) Ibid., 37.
25) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 73.

Intercultural encounters are more often than not the opposite of cozy chats between like-minded people; rather, my attempt to understand the cultural other in her own right turns my initial identity upside down, which is why such a dialogue is often a painful experience.

Yet, despite all these merits, Taylor's analysis raises the critical question of whether a fusion of cultural horizons can be realized when the cultural differences are substantial.[26] What is at stake here is the dichotomy between space and place: our deep attachment to a specific socio-cultural *place* prevents us to live in a culture-transcendent *space* where an undistorted understanding of and encounter with the cultural other is realized. In a similar vein, the idea of a fusion of cultural horizons ignores the gap that separates my lifeworld from that of the cultural other. My impression is that, in this respect, Taylor's analysis is tributary to the prediction of the modernization theory that socio-cultural identities and conceptual horizons would eventually merge into a common horizon of understanding. Het interprets the ensuing identity cost that ensues from this development as an overdue expression of typically Western socio-economic and political dominance over non-Western cultures.[27] Yet in my view, the empirically observed resistance of many people against this development should not be cast away but rather seen as an expression of the fundamental anthropological truth that we are always bound to a specific place. This insight has to be balanced against another anthropological truth to which Taylor has convincingly drawn out attention, namely, that extending our cultural horizon and encountering the other in a shared space are constitutive of our identity.

To underpin this critical comment, I take the above example of the gap between the Roman Catholic mass and the Aztec practice of human sacrifice as my point of departure. As Taylor acknowledges, we have no culture-transcendent vocabulary for these practices beyond the very general idea that both practices are attempts to deal with the human condition. This certainly substantiates the importance of equal and unconditional recognition of all people, including the Aztecs, because the human condition is by definition common to all human beings. However, a dialogical encounter of the Aztecs in a shared space requires not only the unconditional recognition of their humaneness but also the recognition of their difference from other cultures: the Aztec practice of human sacrifice should be recognized as constitutive of their socio-cultural identity and, in principle, of equal worth as the Catholic mass. Yet allowing the conceptual horizon of the Aztecs into our ontology and appreciating its worth presuppose that we have minimal understanding of their culture. Otherwise, there is no recognition of the specific identity of the Aztec culture and hence, no dialogical encounter with that culture. Moreover, such an understanding is needed as a starting point

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26) I made some other critical comments on Taylor's insights on this matter in Peter Jonkers, "Intercultural Dialogue in a World 'After Babel,'" in *Universitas. Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 10 (2018): 7-10.

27) Taylor, "Understanding the Other," 37.

for the shift of our cultural horizon, resulting in an eventual fusion of different cultural horizons. The problem, however, is that in this cultural practice of the Aztecs, just like in so many other ones where the distance with our culture is substantial, we have no understanding of what this conceptual horizon is, so it is impossible to make the shift and allow it into our ontology. Consequently, a common, transcultural vocabulary to understand these very different practices unbiasedly cannot be realized. Taylor's appeal to a common humaneness is, in my view, too weak to serve as the basis of a dialogical encounter with the other in her specific socio-cultural identity and as the telos of a fusion of cultural horizons. Moreover, it is questionable whether the Aztecs would regard the reference to the common humaneness indeed as the recognition of their specific cultural identity. Hence, the encounter between of people from substantially different cultures risks resulting in an impasse, in which the strange customs of the cultural other do not challenge or interpellate us anymore, nor stimulate us to make a conceptual shift to broaden our cultural horizon. Reversely, the cultural other experiences the shift towards a richer language and a fusion of cultural horizons as a misrecognition of her socio-cultural identity.

At the end of his paper, Taylor acknowledges that his employment of the fusion of horizons for the understanding of the cultural other on her own terms differs from the context in which Gadamer introduced this idea. "Gadamer's argument [⋯] deals with our understanding of our own tradition, the history of our civilization, and the texts and works which belong to this. This means that what we study will be in one way or another internal to our identity. Even where we define ourselves against certain traditions of the past [⋯] this remains within our identity as the negative pole, that which we have overcome or escaped."[28] Yet, acknowledging that the fusion of horizons deals with the understanding of our own tradition raises the question of whether this idea can be extended to the understanding of the cultural other in her own right and a dialogical encounter with her. The problem is that such an understanding and encounter require that we distance ourselves from our socio-cultural identity, e.g. by overcoming it. Yet, as Taylor acknowledges, this only shows that we are still negatively bound to our identity. Hence, because we can never escape from our cultural situatedness, we can only broaden our conceptual horizon to some extent, being aware that this can never result in a fusion of cultural horizons. In sum, Taylor convincingly argues that the attitude of openness to the space of the cultural other is a fundamental epistemological condition for intercultural encounters and also a moral requirement to stem the tide of ethnocentrism. Yet, these two attitudes always have to be balanced by the epistemological awareness that we always encounter the cultural other in and from our specific place, that is, our conceptual horizon, and by the moral need to be loyal to this place as the linchpin of our socio-cultural identity, our basic sense of belonging. In other

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28) Taylor, "Understanding the Other," 37.

words, we always have to find a balance between the opportunities and boundaries of intercultural encounters.

Ricoeur: cultural hospitality

In response to the problems caused by Taylor's claim that the dialogical encounter of the cultural other should be based on allowing her conceptual horizon into our ontology, eventually resulting in a fusion of cultural horizons, I want to confront his ideas with those of Paul Ricoeur on this matter. Just like Taylor, Ricoeur is convinced that the intellectual, anthropological, and ethical opportunities of intercultural encounters outweigh the threats of the loss of identity. Furthermore, both authors analyze these encounters from a hermeneutic perspective, which is a prudent middle way between the extremes of cultural uniformity and incommensurability. Finally, Ricoeur, just like Taylor, convincingly argues that our identity is formed through interaction with significant others and, hence, stresses the importance of respecting the specific socio-cultural identity of the other.[29] What distinguishes their views on intercultural dialogue is that Ricoeur considers the universe of discourse, in which this encounter takes place, as a heterogeneous one, thereby acknowledging that there is an unbridgeable gap between different languages and different horizons of understanding and judgment. Although humans share the (formal) capacity to express themselves linguistically, there are only individual languages, not a universal language that could serve as an original mother tongue for everyone. In a similar vein, although all cultures can be defined as ways to deal with the human condition, as Taylor correctly argued, this common ground evaporates as soon as one descends to the level of concrete socio-cultural opinions and practices. Hence, Ricoeur concludes that we live in a world "after Babel",[30] not only in a linguistic but also in a cultural sense. This explains why he does not interpret the opportunities and boundaries of encountering and under-standing the cultural other in terms of a fusion of horizons but rather in those of hospitality. In other words, just like I will never be able to express my ideas and feelings with the same eloquence and nuance in a foreign language as in my mother tongue, the cultural other is not a family member, with whom I spontaneously feel at home, but a guest, who will always remain somewhat strange to me.[31]

The starting point of Ricoeur's investigation is the problem of translation. The fact that translation

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29) See e.g. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as another* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Paul Ricoeur, "Fragile Identity: Respect for the Other and Cultural Identity," in *Philosophy and the Return of Violence. Studies from this Widening Gyre*, eds. Nathan Eckstrand and Christopher Yates (London: Continuum, 2011), 81-100.

30) Paul Ricoeur, *On Translation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 12. The expression "After Babel" stems from George Steiner, *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation* (Exford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

31) I discussed Ricoeur's insights in more detail in Peter Jonkers, "Inescapable Boundaries as a Challenge to Intercultural Encounters," 32-36.

always takes place in a world "after Babel" means accepting the limits of language and the heterogeneity of languages.[32] Every language has a different way of carving up words phonetically, conceptually, and syntactically. Consequently, there is no transcultural vocabulary that could legitimately claim universality, no Esperanto that could serve as a native language for everyone. In other words, there is no pre-Babylonic, paradisiac language underlying all the specific languages.[33] Yet, the heterogeneity of languages does not mean that they would be incommensurable, implying that we would confine ourselves forever to the linguistic world we are familiar with and enclose ourselves in a monologue. Therefore, translation is needed to communicate with the linguistic other in a situation where we have no immediate access to her. What is more, translation is not only necessary to understand a foreign language but also to understand our own, native language, since what is our own has to be learned just as much as what is foreign.[34] Nevertheless, translation is always a risky business since one has to serve two masters, one's mother tongue and the foreign language. Being bound by conflicting loyalties means that translation is situated somewhere between faithfulness and betrayal.[35] This explains why we spontaneously resist translation and mourn the loss of a pre-Babylonic linguistic transparency and self-sufficiency: we are afraid that the original meaning of our words may be lost by translating them into another language. Yet there *is* translation: people have always translated since it is "a remedy for plurality in a world of dispersion and confusion."[36]

Ricoeur's insights into the fundamental heterogeneity of languages and the complex dialectic between a spontaneous longing for linguistic self-sufficiency and the need for translation to communicate lead to the conclusion that "we can only aim at a supposed equivalence [between different languages], not founded on a demonstrable identity of meaning [between them]."[37] This equivalence without identity reflects Ricoeur's basic hermeneutic insight that there will always be conflicts over interpretations. This situation calls for multiple translations and retranslations, which can be compared with each other, but also for acknowledging that there is no complete linguistic transparency, nor a standard of a correct translation since there is no universal language beyond the heterogeneity of individual languages that could serve as such a standard. In sum, there will always remain something untranslatable.

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32) Ricoeur, *On Translation*, 3-5, 8. For an excellent interpretation of Ricoeur's philosophy of translation in relation to cultural diversity see Mehmet Büyüktuncay, "Cultural Diversity, Linguistic Hospitality and Ethical Reflection in Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Translation," *MCBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2017): 189-218.
33) Ibid., 15-8.
34) Ricoeur, *On Translation*, 29.
35) Paul Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just* (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26.
36) Ibid., 28.
37) Ricoeur, *On Translation*, 33.

In this situation, Ricoeur holds a plea for linguistic hospitality; it carries the double duty "to expropriate oneself from oneself as one appropriates the other to oneself."[38] Expropriating ourselves from ourselves means that we give up our longing for linguistic self-sufficiency and transparency. Yet, translation also offers an opportunity: by appropriating the foreign language to ourselves, we become aware of the specific expressive possibilities and idiosyncrasies of our native language as well as those of the foreign language. This multifaceted learning process explains why the desire to translate goes beyond constraint and utility. In sum, the opportunity of linguistic hospitality consists in that "the pleasure of dwelling in the other's language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign word at home, in one's own welcoming house."[39]

Which lessons can we draw from Ricoeur's theory of translation for the understanding of the cultural other? Do his ideas indeed present a better alternative to Taylor's position that a fusion of horizons is needed for intercultural encounters? First of all, Ricoeur argues that the above analysis not only applies to translating the language of the other but also to understanding the (cultural) other in a broad sense because to understand is to translate. Therefore, it makes sense to confront his ideas with Taylor's. One of the opportunities of translation, namely, that the encounter with the linguistic other helps us to better understand the complexities of our own language, also holds for our encounter with the cultural other. Since we have no immediate access to our own (socio-cultural) identity, we need the detour of the encounter with the cultural other to learn our identity. This insight corresponds closely with Taylor's view that understanding and encountering the cultural other make us aware of the peculiarities of our own culture and are constitutive of our identity.

Another lesson we can learn from Ricoeur's ideas about translation with regard to intercultural encounters is that the dissemination of cultural horizons is just as much part of the human condition as linguistic dissemination. However, since our deep attachment to our socio-cultural identity knocks up against this dissemination, it is no wonder that we spontaneously oppose cultural expropriation, just like why we resist translating our native language into a foreign one. This also explains why intercultural encounters can so easily become conflictual. In my view, this attitude should not be interpreted as a falling back by the dominant party on past socio-cultural, political, and economic privileges, as Taylor argues, but rather as a consequence of a deeply embedded longing for self-sufficiency. Yet, yielding to such a self-sufficient and self-transparent cultural identity is just as illusionary as the longing for an absolute, pre-Babylonic linguistic homogeneity. Hence, Ricoeur's analysis of our spontaneous resistance against dissemination corresponds with and offers an anth-

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38) Ibid., 10. See also Richard Kearney, "Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Translation." *Research in Pheno-menology* 37 (2007): 150f.
39) Ricoeur, *On Translation*, 10; see also 26-9.

ropological underpinning of Taylor's idea of the painful identity cost that encountering the cultural other causes. Complementing Taylor's analysis, Ricoeur convincingly shows that the resistance against cultural expropriation not only concerns our conscious reluctance to allow the cultural horizon of the other into our ontology but also points to our deep, unconscious longing for self-sufficiency and self-transparency; admitting that we will always remain strangers to ourselves and our culture hurts our self-esteem.

However, just like learning other languages balances the loss of linguistic self-sufficiency with the awareness of the possibilities and idiosyncrasies of our own and the other's languages, the encounter with the cultural other offers similar opportunities. They consist of an enhanced awareness of the specific characteristics of our own and the other's culture, thus preventing the deadlock of self-enclosure. Just like Taylor, Ricoeur highlights the importance of an extension of our cultural horizons: learning about other cultures is enriching and removes our spontaneous biases against them. Moreover, through this learning process, we discover our own socio-cultural identity through that of the other. The term cultural hospitality aptly expresses this attitude of respect for the otherness of the cultural other, her irreducible strangeness to me while acknowledging the opportunities that the encounter with her offers. This attitude is essential to keep at bay the lure of interpretative omnipotence, of interpreting the other by one's own standards, as well as the tendency to radicalize this strangeness to an incommensurability between different universes of (cultural) discourse. By being hospitable towards the cultural other we can indeed learn from her, although there will always remain something that escapes our understanding. In other words, the cultural other is a guest, not a member of our family.

This shows that Ricoeur's proposal of cultural hospitality is more modest than Taylor's attempt to understand the cultural other through a fusion of cultural horizons. As argued above, although the human condition is common to all human beings, the cultural responses to this condition are so diverse that trying to fuse their conceptual horizons would come down to a misrecognition of their specific nature and blur the complex dialectic between expropriation and appropriation. In sum, it seems to me that Ricoeur's proposal of cultural hospitality captures better the unsurmountable dissemination of human cultures than Taylor's (and Gadamer's) idea of a fusion of horizons.

Conclusion: The problem of a critical encounter with the cultural other

Yet, there is a vexing problem with intercultural encounters that has not yet been addressed explicitly. Irrespective of their mutual differences Taylor and Ricoeur have given convincing arguments that the specific socio-cultural identity of the other should be recognized by allowing her

conceptual horizon into our ontology and by offering hospitality to her, and that intercultural encounters can be enriching for everyone involved. Still, there are boundaries to our capacity to transgress our cultural horizon and to offer hospitality to the cultural other. Moreover, these boundaries are not only pragmatic or practical but also principled, which points to the fundamental difference between linguistic and cultural hospitality. There are obvious practical reasons to limit our linguistic hospitality since nobody can possibly learn all foreign languages. Yet at the same time, nobody seriously considers her native language superior to other ones and uses this as an argument against learning foreign languages. In contrast, many of us think to have not only pragmatic, but also principled arguments to criticize or reject certain ideas, values, and practices of the cultural other, even after having familiarized ourselves with them. Among many other examples, the one that stands out is the disrespectful practices of men towards women in some societies, often defended by referring to the human right of the recognition of (cultural) differences and the protection of the identity of socio-cultural minorities. Although Taylor and other authors, like Will Kymlicka, argue that "there would be no question of cultural differences determining the application of *habeas corpus*,"[40] this argument does not solve the problem of the disrespectful treatment of women in some cultures, since disrespectful treatment is not part of the *habeas corpus* rights. Moreover, what is at stake is not only the political question of minority rights but also the attitude of individual persons, which is the focus of this paper.[41] The question is how to criticize these ideas and practices while at the same time upholding the presumption that other cultures have, in principle, equal worth. Whether or not the ideas and practices of another culture are actually of equal worth cannot be determined a priori but has to be demonstrated in the actual study of the other culture.[42] However, such a demonstration is compromised by the fact that we live in a heterogeneous socio-cultural landscape, in which there are no universally accepted and uniform criteria for an objective assessment of worth. An excellent example of how easily we impose culture-specific value judgments upon (the products of) other cultures is given by Taylor's analysis of a presumed quote from Saul Bellow: "When the Zulus produce a Tolstoy, we will read him." Taylor argues that this statement not only illustrates the ethnocentric arrogance, with which Bellow applies a European standard of literary quality (Tolstoy) to the literary production of another culture, that is, the Zulus, but also negates the presumption of equal worth. Bellow makes things even worse by saying that their contribution is yet to be made.[43]

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40) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 61. See also Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
41) An example of its political dimension is the discussion about the cultural rights of the French-speaking people in Quebec. Taylor gives a profound analysis of the complexities of this problem in Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 52-61, and Taylor, "Interculturalism or Multiculturalism," 413-423.
42) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 66f., 72.

On the other hand, if all value judgments are culture-specific, the assessment of the ideas and practices of the cultural other is reduced to an expression of personal liking or dislike and, ironically, fails to really recognize the cultural other, as Taylor argued.[44] The result would then be a complete indifference towards cultural differences: "we approve of everything, because everything is the same because everything is equal."[45]

So, if there are no precise reference points, let alone uniform standards to criticize the ideas and practices of the cultural other in a fair way, while there is at the same time an urgent need to criticize some of them to avoid cultural relativism, the question is: In the name of what can we criticize these ideas and practices of the cultural other? In an intriguing article, Ricoeur answers this question by starting from the feeling of indignation that the intolerable arouses in us. To keep at bay the problematic expressions of indignation on ethnocentric or purely subjective grounds he adds a crucial qualification, namely that his analysis only concerns the feeling of indignation "in a culture educated by and for tolerance,"[46] in other words, in a culture that is, in principle, hospitable to the ideas and practices of the cultural other and is willing to presume that other cultures are, in principle, of equal worth. Ricoeur argues that it is legitimate to criticize the cultural other in the name of the harm that her ideas and practices inflict on other persons, especially the most fragile ones, and our responsibility to prevent harm in its multiple forms.[47] To return to the above example, this allows us to criticize the disrespectful attitudes toward women, regardless of the cultural motivations to justify this practice.

Yet, it is also essential to recognize that harm always exists in multiple forms and that the sounding of a moral alarm over them depends on the specific socio-cultural contexts of people and therefore cannot be lumped together. If a moral alarm sounds in the name of only one conception of harm, presumably of the one that is predominant in our culture, then only the harm that arouses *our* indignation is what counts, while other kinds of harm, experienced by the cultural other, are forgotten or repressed. This is why the critique of the cultural other needs to rest on an attitude of 'level-headedness' between rejecting the biased and ethnocentric attitude that we have a uniform standard of cultural critique at our disposal and refusing an attitude of not disturbing the cultural identity of the other at any cost, which risks letting harm be inflicted on the most fragile.[48] This attitude of open-minded, yet critical level-headedness characterizes not only Charles Taylor's work but also his personal encounters with cultural and philosophical others.

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43) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 42; see also 70-71.
44) Ibid., 69f.
45) Paul Ricoeur, "The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable," in *Tolerance between intolerance and the intolerable*, ed. Paul Ricoeur (New York: Berghahn, 1996), 196.
46) Ibid., 197.
47) Ibid., 199.
48) Ibid., 200f.

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What Role for the Reflective Society?

Riccardo Pozzo

Tor Vergata University of Rome

Abstract

This paper is about innovation, reflection, and inclusion. The argument starts with a general thesis on philosophy and innovation. The pages on the reflective society continue the argument by embodying the reflective stance in consideration of societal readiness and cultural innovation. The argument closes up with a comprehensive presentation of the paradigm shift from a close reading of texts to a distant reading of corpora and its implications for the translation of languages and the translation (in the literal sense of transporting crates full of books) of studies.

In this paper, I talk about innovation, reflection, and inclusion. More precisely, I talk about philosophy and cultural innovation. Cultural innovation, no doubt, might sound like an oxymoron. Think of the famous statement of Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) in the *Analects*: "The Master said, I have 'transmitted what was taught to me without making up anything of my own.' I have been faithful to and loved the Ancients" (Confucius 2017, 7, 1-2). However, cultural innovation is something whose existence we cannot deny today: something that tops up social and technological innovation. Cultural innovation is about *spaces of exchange* in which citizens *share their experiences* while appropriating *common goods*. I am talking of public spaces such as libraries, museums, science centers, and any place in which co-creation activities may occur, for example, research infrastructures such as the *Digital Research Infrastructure for the Arts and the Humanities*.[1] At this level, social innovation becomes reflective and generates cultural innovation.

The main objective is to show the effectiveness of philosophy and its history, for every philosophical text rests stratigraphically on thousands of years of textual traditions from all over the world, in societies that are innovative, reflective, and inclusive. The argument carried out in the pages that follow rotates around the need rethinking history of philosophy in terms of transformative innovation towards a dialogical civilization by ensuring participatory translations, individual processes of reflection, and collective processes of inclusion. Information technology is revolutionizing how to

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1) *https://www.dariah.eu*, visited on 6 April 2022.

approach texts and how to practice philosophical inquiry. I argue that time is ripe for a paradigm shift from thinking of texts to thinking of corpora, which is an issue that connects with hard, theoretical questions such as how to conceive of philosophical works within the infosphere (Blair et al. 2011; Floridi 2019; Romele 2019). "Distant reading," says Franco Moretti, "is a condition of knowledge," for it allows one "to focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes一or genres and systems" (Moretti 2013, 48-49). Texts that are findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable (FAIR) will enrich readers in the next years. That currently, very few open access recent English translations of philosophical works are available on the internet ought to belong to the past (Schäfer and Serres 2016). We are only beginning to become aware that digital rights management is a *key enabling technology*.

1. Communities of Practice

Inaugurated in Summer 2019, the city of Helsinki's new Central Public Library at Oodi is different from a traditional library. It has been built as a meeting place, a house of reading, and a diverse urban experience. On top of providing users and visitors with knowledge, new skills, and stories, Oodi is a comfortable place to access for learning, relaxation, and work. On the first floor of the building, we see a cinema, the books check-out and return service, the wardrobe, and a restaurant. On the third floor, books. Not many, a few thousand on open shelves, mostly in Finnish, some in other languages. Circling the shelves, we see ample reading spaces, declining floors, oversized cushions, a sunlit terrace. Most readers read from their laptops; some一but indeed not many一read on paper. Now, let us step onto the second floor. What do we expect to find? The answer is: sewing machines, three-dimension printers, and six glass-walled group rooms, seating up to twelve people, each outfitted with two monitors, one for reading texts and one for hosting distant participants.[2]

Glass-walled rooms that can be reserved free of charge by laypeople, by members of communities of practice, by working groups, by anybody who has something to share. These rooms are exactly what this book is about: sharing philosophical texts一for the profit of a reflective society.

2. Cultural Innovation

Considering current trends towards a data-driven history of philosophy as a branch of both philosophy and digital humanities (Betti and van den Berg 2019), my point is that the future of history of philosophy depends on finding ways to bring about radical enhancements of the way we edit, store, annotate, access, and translate corpora. Advances in technology enable history of

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2) *https://www.oodihelsinki.fi/en/*, visited on 6 April 2022.

philosophy to exercise an influence beyond its narrowly understood disciplinary borders to scholars of different disciplines worldwide and far into the future.

While research implies government or private funding that brings about new knowledge, innovation is about knowledge that generates value, either in the form of new lines of products that ameliorate the well-being of citizens or in the way of services whose cost-effectiveness is maximized (OECD 1986, 1). Technological innovation impacts society insofar as it fosters social innovation, which generates cultural innovation when it becomes reflective. The first philosopher who considered innovation was Francis Bacon. As early as 1625, he wrote:

> As the births of living creatures at first are ill-shapen, so are all innovations, which are the births of time. Yet notwithstanding, as those that first bring honor into their family are commonly more worthy than most that succeed, so the first precedent (if it is good) is seldom attained by imitation. For ill, to man's nature as it stands perverted, hath a natural motion, strongest in continuance; but good, as a forced motion, strongest at first. (Bacon 1908, 109)

As a matter of fact, philosophy keeps encountering innovation. The fourth industrial revolution has provoked new waves of *science and technology studies*, in which philosophers have a say (Godin 2009; Bontemps 2014; Gingras 2017). Besides, all societies have been *anchoring innovation* insofar as people can connect whatever is presented as new as something familiar to them.[3] Today, also philosophy is talking of transformative research that produces transformative innovation (Sen 2014). How does the encounter of philosophy with science and technology take place?

Social and cultural innovation is a notion that embraces two syntagmata. It has become of current usage among researchers since 2013 due to the name chosen by the European Strategy Forum Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) for its working group on projects and landmarks that are primarily connected with the SSH:

> The *Social and Cultural Innovation Strategy Working Group* proposes possible solutions (related to Research Infrastructures) that can help tackle the Grand Challenges facing society, such as health or demographic change, or the "Inclusive, innovative and secure societies" challenge from the third pillar of *Horizon 2020*, called "Tackling societal challenges." It establishes possible methods through which social sciences and humanities could be used as an evaluation criterion for the activity of other Research Infra-structures in the ESFRI roadmap (e.g., social impact, etc.). It also explores how Research Infrastructures can contribute to social innovation or better knowledge transfer towards society.[4]

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3) *https://www.ru.nl/oikos/anchoring-innovation/*, visited on 6 April 2022.
4) *http://www.esfri.eu/working-groups/social-and-cultural-innovation*, visited on 6 April 2022.

As a working hypothesis, cultural innovation can be understood as the outcome of complex co-creation processes that involve the reflection of knowledge flows across the social environment while promoting diversity within society. This chapter defines and contrasts the notion of cultural innovation against other recently discussed forms of innovation, such as social innovation, scientific culture, and heritage-led innovation. Based on such conceptualization in a second step, it proposes indicators for measuring cultural innovation and shows their operationalization in some empirical case studies. Finally, considering science and public policy agenda-setting, it wraps up by discussing policy implications and verification strategies for widening participation in cultural experiences on behalf of policymakers such as the ministries of research, education, economics, and culture.

While several definitions of social innovation are abundantly discussed in the literature (Moulaert et al. 2017), it is a fact that within innovation studies, the cultural dimension of innovation is far less defined than the social aspects accompanying technological innovations (Pozzo et al. 2020). For instance, the term has been used around creativity (Jöstingmeier and Boeddrich 2005), marketing (Holt and Cameron 2012), and migration (Pozzo and Virgili 2017). The lack of a clear conceptualization of cultural innovation has also prevented the development of indicators from measuring it, which are crucial to plan, monitor, and evaluate policies (Archibugi et al. 2009; Godin 2009; Bonaccorsi 2018).

Today, we are considering the *transformative capacity of social innovation* (Dias and Partidário 2019). No wonder policymakers, researchers in science and technology studies, and economists would also want to know more about a notion that finds its origin in the domain of cultural economics, innovation economics, and social innovation studies (Godin 2007, 2015; Bontems 2014). No doubt, cultural innovation might sound like an oxymoron, as I have suggested in section 3 of chapter 1 when I first referred to Chinese culture. It is not void in any case. It is something that tops up social and technological innovation. It is about competencies related to various forms of *shared experiences*, such as communication in foreign languages, social and civic competencies, and cultural awareness and expression (EAC 2014, 16).

Research infrastructures foster innovation by providing access to services and knowledge. First and foremost, they are *knowledge infrastructures* that enhance the human factor (Borgman et al. 2013). The new *ESFRI 2021 Roadmap* is configured to embrace six groups of research infrastructures: Data, Computing, and Digital Research Infrastructures (DAT), Energy (ENE), Environment (ENV), Health and Food (H&F), Physics and Engineering (PSE), and Social and Cultural Innovation (SCI). The ESFRI distinguishes three stages of maturity: ESFRI Landmarks, ESFRI Projects, and High strategic potential research areas.

Regarding infrastructures for cultural innovation, some of them are "among the first known infrastructures," such as traditional libraries, museums, and archives, i.e., "the most obvious examples of this legacy." However, in today's digital age, infrastructures are expected to "enhance research into the historical, social, economic, political and cultural contexts of the European Union, providing data and knowledge to support its strategies" (ESFRI 2018, 107). I am not talking about isolated events of cultural innovation as they might occur in any area of society. I am talking instead about the systemic boundary conditions that enable cultural innovation. In other words, cultural innovation is triggered by a specific policy discourse, which sets the conditions of possibility for the outcomes outlined in the next section. Six research infrastructures for cultural innovation are currently up and running (at various stages of maturity):

> CLARIN ERIC—*Common Language Resources and Technology Infrastructure*, listed as an ESFRI Landmark, is a large-scale pan-European collaborative effort to create, coordinate and make language resources and technologies available and readily usable.
> DARIAH ERIC—*Digital Research Infrastructure for the Arts and Humanities*, listed as an ESFRI Land-mark, is the first permanent European digital infrastructure for the arts and humanities.
> EHRI—*European Holocaust Research Infrastructure*, listed as an ESFRI Project, supports the Holocaust research community by building a digital infrastructure and facilitating human networks.
> E-RIHS—*European Research Infrastructure for Heritage Science*, listed as an ESFRI Project, creates synergies for a multidisciplinary approach to heritage interpretation, preservation, documentation, and management.
> OPERAS-D—*Design for Open Access Publications in European Research Area for Social Sciences and Humanities* coordinates and pools university-led scholarly communication activities in Europe in the Social Sciences and Humanities to enable open science as standard practice.
> ReIReS—*Research Infrastructure on Religious Studies* collects historical documents and current information on global theological-political issues while fostering interfaith dialogue. (ESFRI 2018, 107-115, 177-178, 212-216; Maegaard and Pozzo 2019)

Let me single out DARIAH as an example of key infrastructure for cultural innovation, for DARIAH fosters innovative forms of collaboration among scientists and helps humanities researchers to produce excellent, digitally-enabled open-data scholarship that is reusable, visible, and sustainable, thus contributing to the understanding of the cultural, economic, social and political life in Europe and beyond. The mix of scientific cultures fostered at DARIAH and the mix of cultures in society are strongly connected.

6. Key Performance Indicators

How can we measure *cultural innovation*? The answer is, as a result of co-creation (Prahalad and Venkatram 2000, 2004), i.e., by analyzing the traces that we leave behind us when we have a cultural experience, which has become quite simple today starting with the contents we download from the internet, especially from providers to whom we as users have agreed to have our profiles being set up, as it happens, e.g., with content providers such as Netflix. An emerging approach for tackling many of these issues is to focus on co-creation for growth and inclusion: engaging citizens, users, academia, social partners, public authorities, businesses including small and medium enterprises, entrepreneurs in the social and creative sectors in processes that span from identifying problems to delivering solutions.[5]

Research funding institutions need outcomes to monitor and evaluate their investment in research infrastructures. Outcomes are innovative products, processes, or methods by type of innovation and intellectual property rights applications. In sum, while all knowledge production could be a cultural innovation, we nevertheless need to discriminate. For this reason, the *outcomes of cultural innovation* can be defined in terms of the following features:

Fostering open innovation. Cultural innovation itself is necessarily open innovation because culture is understood as shared in society. Moreover, a cultural innovation should contribute to the character of openness of innovations in other forms, e.g., technological innovations or innovations in the public administration. In the public sector, as well as in other sectors, research infrastructures are data-driven. Consequently, their management systems are designed in an open data context.

Improving welfare. This feature of cultural innovation is shared with social innovation, namely the improvement of individuals or communities' welfare, for both are innovations "defined by their (social) objectives to improve the welfare of individuals or communities" (OECD 2018, 2).

Transmitting heritage, the content of culture, from the world heritage to all kinds of local collections.

Fostering creativity. Cultural and creative industries address this feature. Creativity is the process of creating new experiences out of existing materials, which are common goods.

Experiencing beauty, a philosophical condition, which requires a politics of beauty.

Two processes make knowledge production an *outcome of cultural innovation*. They are:

Reflection, the ability of the individual to single out from the whole indiscriminate mass of the stream of floating content certain fixed elements in order to isolate them and to concentrate attention upon them.

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5) *https://www.euro-access.eu/calls/co-creation_between_public_administrations_once-only_principle*, visited on 6 April 2022.

Inclusion, which is the social process of sharing one's reflection in participatory co-creation processes.

Based on these five features and two processes, the "outcomes of cultural innovation are products or services that represent an open innovation that improves social welfare by creatively processing beauty-laden heritage content in a reflective and inclusive way" (Pozzo et al. 2020, 428-429).

To measure the impact of cultural innovation, we have to consider the co-creation of knowledge. How do we measure co-creation? We can do it by analyzing data. Indeed, we measure cultural innovation in terms of co-creation. However, the use of data for reconstructing cultural innovation is praiseworthy but not simple. Measuring the impact is fundamental to improve social acceptance of public investment insofar as it provides a basis for aligning research and innovation with the values, needs, and expectations of society (Kaase 2013; Žic-Fuchs 2014; Bonaccorsi 2018; Maegaard and Pozzo 2019).

Public administrations sponsor cultural heritage and the performing arts (Towse 2011; Battistoni and Pedrini 2014). Museums, primarily, act as material custodians of memories. Their responsibility is "to collect things and to communicate information about them in a truthful way" (Tonner 2016). The return on investment is measured primarily with knowledge production indicators, such as advances in scientific knowledge, training of highly skilled people, and use of research infrastructures. Obviously, the socio-economic impact is also achieved through technology development in collaboration with companies, including high-tech small and medium enterprises (Reale et al. 2017).

To measure this, we need to model the comprehensive impact of cultural innovation at the societal level. Complexity science tells us how minor effects can grow to the prevalence and how social networks, under different conditions, can amplify or dampen the forces running along with them.

Could these innovation outcomes qualify as cultural in the sense outlined above? We live in an era of metrics. Once based on tradition, the management of complex societies looks now for justification in optimization criteria inspired by the scientific method: systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, bringing to the validation of hypotheses and laws.

We are looking for key performance indicators. The simpler, the better, summing up complexity in simple figures. Based on the available evidence, we look for "the means which has the greatest probability of attaining" the desired goal (Merton 1936, 896). While all this functioned even beyond expectations in the hard sciences field, the application to the realm of society has been thwarted by the specificity of human societies—namely, non-reproducibility, unintended consequences, and the persistence of traditional solutions to societal problems. Performance indicators lead to perverse incentives and unintended consequences. Human beings address the specific measurements and their mechanisms instead of the intended objectives (National Endowment for the Arts 2014).

How can we improve on oversimplifying indicators? We advocate a search for those indicators that enable citizens in need of information to reflect on their decisions in a novel way (Hicks et al. 2015). A promising approach in this regard is being pursued at the Center for the Evaluation of Public Policies of Fondazione Bruno Kessler. The research center, which is primarily aimed at carrying out public policy analysis, uses counterfactual impact evaluation tools that integrate methodologies of *computational social science*.[6] The awareness of their transient nature should always accompany the use of indicators. Indicators ought to change as soon as the ability to circumvent them—to game them—becomes widespread. Also, indicators should integrate information at different levels, various kinds, and from diverse disciplines, capturing the counterintuitive results of complexity science (path dependence, tipping points) and integrating contributions from qualitative science. For an example of the latter, consider how important it would be, for a model of social behavior, to integrate ideas from Durrheim (et al. 2018), showing how conflict about racism generates a tripolar relation which helps both sides of the controversy to consolidate their social identity by reappropriating stigmatized labels.

Rosaria Conte and Mario Paolucci have shown that *agent-based simulation*, which allows the reproduction and study of social life *in silico*, could be used for such a purpose. Simultaneously modeling their micro-context of cognitive processes (such as beliefs, desires, intentions, values, etc.), at the same time as their macro-context of social interaction, simulation enables us to understand core phenomena of the social world and its dynamics, such as trust, norms, and cooperation (Conte and Paolucci 2012). An agent-based simulation is unrivaled in its ability to integrate information at different levels, various kinds, and from diverse disciplines, making explicit the hidden assumptions that abound in natural language. An agent-based simulation would make an ideal approach for developing tools to explore strategies and not just calculate indicators through risk analysis of the options and what-if scenarios for the outcomes, for a simulation on the impact of social measures should consider at least two ideas from complexity science: *social percolation* and *critical mass*. Without taking these effects into account, any indicator will be incomplete. It will lack the multiplicative factor generated by social percolation and ignore the risk of some field disappearing catastrophically if the minimal critical mass for its existence is endangered (Pozzo et al. 2020, 428).

This methodology relies on composite indicators with reliable characteristics when complex and multidimensional phenomena need to be measured. It considers the effects of engaging stakeholders and civil society in the dynamics of science-based innovation. To this purpose, we can use a reasoned collection of ingredients that should enter such a model and such calculation as a base for developing indicators. The existing *DARIAH Impactomatrix* classification, to name an example,

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6) *https://irvapp.fbk.eu/about-us*, visited on 6 April 2022.

consists of twenty-one impact areas:

External Impact—Education—Data Security/Safety—Dissemination—Effectivity—Efficiency—Funding Perspective—Innovation—Integration—Coherence—Collaboration—Communication—Transfer of Expertise—Sustainability—Usage—Publications—Relevance—Reputation—Transparency—Competitiveness—Transfer of Knowledge.[7]

These areas produce an extensive base on which to evaluate the outcomes of cultural innovation but exhibit partial overlap and might be, in general, challenging to calculate in the absence of an underlying model. As a first step in the direction of a model, one can reorganize the *DARIAH Impactomatrix* areas into four groups of indicators.

Summing up, institutions responsible for the production and the circulation of knowledge have been continuously changing due to internet technologies, such as social media, big data, open-source software, ubiquitous computing, and *Wikipedia* (Borgman et al. 2013). Co-creation requires extensive reforms of regulatory backgrounds, which means that institutional change becomes essential. Not by chance, then, the key performance indicator for the *Science with and for Society* cross-cutting area of *Horizon 2020* is the number of institutional change actions promoted by the program.[8] For example, think about changes in the organizational structures of public libraries, in which the open science paradigm has required new norms, procedures, guidelines, and protocols.

Cultural innovation is related to the fragility of experiential knowledge (Foray 2012). It is also related to the unfairness in distributing epistemic goods such as knowledge, education, and communication, the already mentioned epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007). In sum, fair and unfair epistemic practices of co-creation, by elaborating on the practice of giving and taking reasons, play a role in the responsible co-creation of knowledge.

Assessing the number of users of knowledge produced per discipline within the humanities can be seen as a relative concept, especially since cross-disciplinary research is becoming more widespread. A starting point might be to estimate the number of users per discipline connected or using a research infrastructure (Žic-Fuchs 2014). In DARIAH, the question is how it can expand its user access base by building better interactions with national nodes, not just at the top layer but also into them. To name one example, it is arguable that more images have been produced and stored during the last twelve months than in the whole history of photography. We are talking of a patrimony that is not only produced and disseminated digitally, it is also co-created, which calls for capacity building so

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7) *https://dariah-de.github.io/Impactomatrix/*, visited on 6 April 2022.
8) *http://grace-rri.eu/about-grace/*, visited on 6 April 2022.

that it generates actual participation. This technological vision is inclusive and open to everybody. The *Politics of Metadata Group* asks:

> How to develop open ecosystems that involve a diversity of stakeholders in the cultural heritage domain, from providers to consumers?[9]

Furthermore, it indicates five directions: controlling levels of access, transparency, secrecy, closeness, connectedness, alienation, the relation between control dynamics and power relationships outside the technology framework, differentiation in entry/exit points to the platform, the tensions between individual scoring systems and collective sharing processes, and photo tagging behaviors across languages (Eleta and Golbeck 2012; Ridge 2014).

The *Rome Declaration for Responsible Research and Innovation in Europe* has made it clear that participation is the issue, which turns out convenient for the argument of this chapter, given that cultural innovation is about co-creation. Indeed, cultural innovation relies on the participation of groups of civil society that take part in co-creation processes.[10]

Regarding participation at the individual level, one must note that there are still some social groups that are excluded or avoid engaging in participatory and co-creation activities in spaces of exchange. For this reason, cultural innovation needs, first and foremost, to envisage (self)excluded individuals and groups together with the causes of (self)exclusion (Wyatt 2003). To name an example, diversity has become a structural element of contemporary societies, with migration at the core of generative dynamics of our social, economic, and political texture. As regards participation at the institutional level, the *Politics of Metadata Group* asks: "How to handle the tension between the institution's need for stability, continuity, and control, and dynamic participatory practices online?" and in fact:

> Participatory open science practices create new challenges due to the character of the networked publics involved and the established structures between and within institutions, but also new opportunities and practices when it comes to an understanding and defining our common goods.[11]

DARIAH offers a meaningful case study for investigating how researchers embrace new institutional freedom to shape conditions for their own research. This infrastructure has adopted an open

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9) *http://politicsofmetadata.blogs.dsv.su.se*, visited on 6 April 2022.
10) *https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/rome-declaration-responsible-research-and-innovation-europe*, visited on 6 April 2022.
11) *http://politicsofmetadata.blogs.dsv.su.se*, visited on 6 April 2022.

innovation approach that relies on the input of *working group*s, whose creation comes grass-rooted and research-driven. DARIAH's currently about twenty-one active working groups are communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991) that can be seen as a means for shaping cultural innovation outcomes and as particularly fertile examples for experimenting with indicators. The most striking aspects of the DARIAH working groups are the activities of co-creation and collaboration among scholars from different European institutions at different seniority levels and the fact that working groups are run voluntarily by their members (Edmond et al. 225). What makes DARIAH unique is that the infrastructure becomes a space of exchange for all kinds of initiatives. In the DARIAH wiki platform, there are templates and information. An example is the working group *Ethics and Legality in the Digital Arts and Humanities*, which discusses privacy protection, intellectual property rights, and ethical issues.[12]

The last set of indicators looks into the data identifying users insofar as they induce open inno-vation. The most urgent goal is to overcome barriers to participation and receive valuable input from citizens (Maynard and Lepori 2017). The *Politics of Metadata Group* notes that we need to look into different types of participatory practices online concerning the cultural heritage domain and into varying interaction levels. Possible sites of analysis could be the interaction between participants, the participation in the work by different stakeholders, the potentially privileged levels of interaction with the metadata, or tensions in the agency of the participants in relation to the task:

> The directions are (1) communication needs within the crowd, (2) avenues of communication to support collaboration, (3) relations between the crowd and the institution, (4) navigating intersecting communities in crowd settings, and (5) crowd dynamics.[13]

Although there might be some overlap between having access to datasets and using them, the difference lies in today's sharing practices of data initiated by the users, which substantially impact public policies. The *Proposal of a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market* approved on 12 September 2018 states that "new uses have emerged as well as new actors and new business models," so that uploading and downloading of cultural contents have become processes that require constant monitoring.[14] The first results indicate an increase in understanding and awareness of what humanities and ICT researchers are doing to elaborate participatory approaches. On the other side, the obsession for surveillance and control has

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12) *https://www.dariah.eu/activities/working-groups-list/*, visited on 6 April 2022.
13) *http://politicsofmetadata.blogs.dsv.su.se*, visited on 6 April 2022.
14) COM(2016) 593 final 2016/0280(COD). *https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX: 52016PC0593&from=en*, Executive Summary and Articles 11 and 13, visited on 6 April 2022.

conquered our collective imagination and shaped the work of urban planners, administrators, policymakers, and entrepreneurs. Digital infrastructures have reshaped the technological landscape of our cities (Morozov and Bria 2018).

As regards ways to operationalize the definitions introduced in the preceding sections in some empirical case studies, it is clear that cultural innovation has an impact on related domains: education, science, and culture in the first instance, but also society, policy, and the economy. It achieves impact by raising awareness in the civil society thanks to the engagement of stakeholders in narrative co-creation processes, by establishing broad audiences, targeting stakeholders and involving them proactively in designing and evaluating narratives, and finally by enabling cooperation of diverse actors and partners (Pozzo et al. 2020, 430).

7. Conclusion: What Role for the Reflective Society?

The *Vilnius Declaration—Horizons for Social Sciences and Humanities* of 23 September 2013 states:

> Europe will benefit from wise investment in research and innovation, and Social Sciences and Humanities, SSH, are ready to contribute. European societies expect research and innovation to be the foundation for growth. Horizon 2020 aims to implement inter-disciplinarity and an integrated scientific approach. If research is to serve society, a resilient partnership with all relevant actors is required. A wide variety of perspectives will provide critical insights to help achieve the benefits of innovation. The effective integration of SSH requires that they are valued, researched, and taught in their own right as well as in partnership with other disciplinary approaches.[15]

We are talking about the integration of the SSH in society (EUR 2019). Under the heading of *Living Together: Missions for Shaping the Future*, a group of institutions headed by the network of All European Academies has called for ideas to put forward mission-oriented research in *Horizon Europe* while proposing concrete suggestions that consider global challenges ahead (ALLEA et al. 2017). The Austrian Council of Europe presidential conference on the *Impact of the social sciences and humanities for a European Research Agenda* in Vienna on 28-29 November 2018 was opened by the Austrian Federal Minister for Education, Science and Research, Heinz Faßmann. He insisted that the challenges of our time cannot be solved only by STEM sciences because also SSH research produces innovation. All disciplines must work together, while the critical and self-reflective

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15) *http://horizons.mruni.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ssh_mru_conference_report_final.pdf*, visited on 6 April 2022.

perspective of the humanities and social sciences is indispensable insofar as it continually puts established patterns into question.[16]

In *Horizon 2020,* the proposed approach was that of the so-called *embedding*, according to which the dimension of reflectivity would not only have been lost but would instead be enhanced by the explicit request to be evaluated for the rankings of projects. Despite the good intentions, however, embedding did not work in *Horizon 2020*. The scientific integration of the SSH has not been achieved yet. In fact, the integration of the contribution of the SSH has proven to be crucial during the drafting phase of the funding work program (upstream embedding). Truly interdisciplinary topics are to be designed so that the challenges in question are framed with the SSH as an integral part of the solution. Hence, there is a strong correlation between the quality of the topic texts and the respective outcomes in terms of the integration with SSH (EUR 2019, 5). Clear scope for SSH input yields higher participation from SSH partners, confirming that integrating the dimension of the SSH needs to happen from the earliest stages of the drafting process. Good integration of the SSH steers the research and innovation process towards concepts, solutions, and products relevant to societal needs, directly applicable or marketable, and cost-efficient. The research partners of SSH investigators belong to a broad range of institutional backgrounds: higher education establishments, research organizations, and the public and private sectors.

Summing up, at the basis of innovative, reflective, and inclusive societies are the SSH and their twenty-first-century offsprings—i.e., computational social, cultural analytics, and innovation in religion. As it is clear from amendment 67 to article 6a of the proposal constituting *Horizon Europe* (mentioned above in section 5.2), the battle for attributing to the humanities a role within *Horizon Europe* revolves around a change of tactics (EUR 2021, 6). The experience gained in *Horizon 2020* has made it clear that to implement interdisciplinarity with the full involvement of the SSH, it is best to neglect the idea of embedding and think instead of cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect.[17] It is to be expected that under Pillar II, *Global Challenges and Industrial Competitiveness* of *Horizon Europe*, the SSH will cooperate and participate in all phases of the implementation cycle of the projects of each cluster. Again, historical-philosophical reflection is mobilized to engage the SSH in carrying out research in all domains of science.

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16) *https://www.ssh-impact.eu*, visited on 6 April 2022.

17) In this direction, the *Guidelines on How to Successfully Design and Implemented Missions Oriented Research Programs* issued by the Zentrum für Soziale Innovation in Vienna on 23 January 2019 are particularly useful. *https://www.ssh-impact.eu/guidelines-on-how-to-successfully-design-and-implement-mission-oriented-research-programmes/*, visited on 6 April 2022.

The Ukraine War and Philosophy

LEE SangHoon

President, The Korean Federation of Humanities and Social Science

1. The tragedy of Ukraine

The most beautiful and special wedding ceremony in the world was held on May 3 in Lviv, a city in western Ukraine. Bride Oksana Balandina danced in the groom's arms and hands at the ceremony, who lost her legs and fingers in a landmine explosion on March 27, just a month after Russia went to war.[1] Following the coronavirus pandemic that swept the world for two years and killed more than 20 million people, on February 24, 2022, Russia, the world's second-largest military force, launched a war of aggression against Ukraine, shocking the world again.

According to the British daily Guardian on April 25 (local time), British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace attended the House of Commons and reported the damage to the Russian troops proximately over 15 thousand soldiers. Considering that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned that the number of Ukrainian soldiers killed was about 3,000, the number of Russian casualties is up to five times that of the Ukrainian forces, and the combined damage from both sides is a staggering number.

The Daily Mail reported as follows, "It was noted that Russia's death toll in Ukraine was now more than double the number of US casualties during the conflicts in both Afghanistan (4,431 troops killed) and Iraq (2,401 troops killed), waged as part America's 'war on terror' since the 2001 attacks on New York."[2]

What is even more surprising is the brutality of the civilians who are sacrificed in the midst of such

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[1] REUTERS, "Ukrainian nurse who lost both legs dances with new husband, vows to keep living," PUBLISHED: 17:56 BST, 3 May 2022 | UPDATED: 17:56 BST, 3 May 2022.

[2] MailOnline, "THOUSAND Russians killed in Ukraine," PUBLISHED: 16:45 BST, 25 April 2022 | UPDATED: 08:41 BST, 26 April 2022

an absurd war. It is estimated that more than 20,000 civilians have been killed in the southern Ukrainian city of Mariupol alone, not to mention the devastation of the Bucha region once occupied by Russia. According to President Zelensky, Russia was the first to get rid of intelligentsia, such as philosophers and teachers, from the occupied territories.[3] It goes without saying that schools, hospitals, markets, and broadcasting stations that are directly related to the lives of civilians were hit. In the 21st century society, where interest in the value of life and human rights has risen remarkably, completely unexpectedly in Europe which was thought to be the most stable region since World War II, carried out once again barbaric aggression and atrocities.

2. Is Russia now an OutLaw State?

In his book *The Law Of Peoples*, John Rawls said, in all well-ordered peoples "no state has a right to war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests."[4] Rawls allows the right to war in self-defense to any society. But he also noticed if a society requires its citizens to fight in order to gain economic wealth or to acquire natural resources, much less to win power and empire, then "it becomes an outlaw state." Is Russia now different in the Ukraine War?

Carl Von Clausewitz said in his book *On War (Vom Kriege)*, "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means."[5] If war is politics by different means, it must not exist only for its own sake. It must serve some purpose for the state. Therefore we can philosophize what aspects of war are justifiable according to morally acceptable principles. In the philosophy of just war theory four core criteria are suggested to be followed by those determined to go to war. These four principles are as follows: just authority; just cause; right intention; last resort.[6]

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3) President Zelensky made a video address to the South Korean Parliament on Monday, 11 April 2022, which contained such content.
4) John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, Harvard Univ, Press, 2003, p. 91f.
5) Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War Volume I*, First published in1832, The Floating Press, 2010. p. 70

Just War Theory states that a just war must have just authority which means a legitimate government or the will of the people. The determined legality of going to war has been legally processed and also justified. Just cause has been understood as a justifiable reason that war is the appropriate and necessary response. If war can be avoided, that must be determined first, according to the philosophy of just war theory.

Right intention designates the intentions of determining war should be right according to morality. Right intention criterion requires the determination of whether or not a war response is a measurable way to the conflict being acted upon. Last resort principle prohibits any attempts to go to war without sufficient efforts of political and diplomatic methods. Whenever there is a conflict between disagreeing parties, all solutions must be attempted before resorting to war. War should be a last resort response.

Although these four criteria of just war, every war generates certain civilian victims and human lives sacrifices in reality. Not only looting and slaughtering person but also rape and even genocide occur.[7] Because of such evil consequences, modern secular pacifism always bans any type of war as immoral. The benefits accruing from war can never outweigh the costs of fighting it and above all, it violates foremost deontological duties of justice, such as not killing human beings.

In the mid of the Ukraine War, as I mentioned, the same problems and barbarism escalates in short time. Particularly, the defense industrialization of science and technology is prominent characteristic of the Ukraine War. As seen in the example of the atomic bomb, it was a long time ago that advanced science and technology were converted into weapons, but recently, it is developing into military industrialization or even commercialization. The importance of information and communications technologies and surveillance and reconnaissance assets is emerging, and aerospace technologies are increasing their destructive power with hypersonic missiles.

Just war theory, along with pacifism, holds that morals do apply to war. If then, military science and technologies should consider the conditions of Just war. In case of defense scientists and engineers, considering the level and power of the weapons they are developing, sufficient philosophical considerations about what and how they will be used on what battlefield should be done concurrently. Therefore, in a system such as the Defense Science and Technology Committee, members who can take ethical considerations must participate.

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6) Jon Dorbolo, "Just War Theory," © 2001, http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/just_war_theory/criteria_intro.html

7) MailOnline, "The pictures that shamed the UN into silence," PUBLISHED: 15:34 BST, 5 April 2022 | UPDATED: 01:03 BST, 6 April 2022, MailOnline, "Russian soldiers are raping Ukrainian men and boys as well as women, says UN war crimes investigator," PUBLISHED: 11:00 BST, 4 May 2022 | UPDATED: 17:52 BST, 4 May 2022

3. The hypocrisy of science

The era of the 4th industrial revolution represented by AI and Big Data is making the world smarter unprecedentedly. Robots and high tech operational facilities perform surgeries more accurately than surgeons with advanced experience and skills. Satellites glance down at life on the earth's surface, passing by in space, like Son Goku's glass bead. With the development of ICT technologies and the benefits of it make the world rapidly a global society in common value. But until now, it is not able to overcome the corona pandemic that has plunged the whole world into chaos. Moreover, it is now used as a brutal destroyer in this Ukraine War.

Our daily lives are getting smarter in the mobile environment and science and digital technology go to demiurge in the 21st century which turns even life into a subject of engineering such as gene scissors. However, 'human', the decisive subject, is even 'lost' beyond alienation. To borrow the phrase of the 18th-century German philosopher I. Kant, who laid the foundation for modern science and other modern studies to be differentiated from philosophy, 'philosophy without science is empty, but science without philosophy is blind.' This is the reason why all academic fields return to philosophy at the cutting edge of asking their boundaries until these day. The realm of philosophy has the most important use values like air that form the basis of communal life of human being.

Kim Gu, who served as the last president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea during the Japanese imperialism era, said in his article 'My Wish', as if predicting the 21st century Korea Wave and BTS ARMY, as follows.

> I want our country to be the most beautiful country in the world. The national wealth of our country will not need to be greedy more than enough to make a good living, and military power will suffice to prevent aggression from others. However, the only thing I want to have infinitely is the power of high culture.

Philosophical spirit and social values is a window of a semantic system through which we can understand the world. Through philosophical perspective, we understand the nature of our experiences, set norms of behavior, and create new realities. So, in order for science to engage in standards of fairness and to consider the restrictive functions of new realities such as AI, it must go along with the philosophy and humanities. When Steve Jobs, who was the symbol of the most innovative and challenging entrepreneur of the 21st century, released iPad2 in 2011, another prominent product that will be recorded in IT history, he said, "The idea that technology alone is not enough is Apple's DNA. In our heartbeat there is a technology combined with the liberal arts & the humanities."

4. Suggesting One More Criterion on Just War Theory

Immanuel Kant clarified in his book *The Perpetual Peace*, the basic requirements for forming a peaceful world system. The first chapter of second article of it states, "The civil constitutions of all countries must be republican (Die bürgerliche Verfassung in jedem Staate soll republikanischen sein)."[8] Russia claims to be a socialist people's republic. In addition, many Russians support Putin, who ordered the invasion of Ukraine. This fact proves that it can be difficult to prevent conflicts between states, such as war, only with the spirit of republicanism.

In the long history of philosophy, the argument for a just war has continued since Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius. John Rawls modernizes these theories, proposing six codes of conduct for a just war.[9] In 3rd of them, Rawls carefully describes 3 different groups of enemy as follows, "In the conduct of war, well-ordered peoples must carefully distinguish three

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8) Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Reclam, Stuttgart, 2005, s. 10. *The Perpetual Peace* was written in 1795, during the signing of the Treaty of Basel by Prussia and revolutionary France. Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*, Cambridge Univ. Press. 2004, p. 25.
9) John Rawls (2003), p. 94f.

groups: the outlaw state's leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population." Most of contemporarily war against terrorism waged as Just War, distinguished these three groups, and applied a different code of conduct. But even in such cases, unintentional civilian casualties occurred when operations were carried out around the city areas.

Although just war theory allows war in case of being waged in a state or nation's self-defense, or waged in order to end gross violations of human rights, it cannot be prevented innocent damage and harm that occurs in the process of it. Nearly three months have passed since the war in Ukraine, and the damage to both Ukraine and Russia is snowballing in the war. While the world society condemns Russia as an aggressor, Russia defends itself as wagering a just war against the far-right neo-Nazisists.

Of course, the International Court of Justice will make late the final decision about it. But considering the enormous damage to both sides including civilians and young soldiers that will occur in the meantime, we feel the urgent need to propose stricter norms to prevent such damage in the future. We should try to propose a new more rigorous international norms on just war adjusted to the level of the 21st century world spirit, where the value of human rights is further elevated.

Although there are certain unrealistic aspects, I would like to propose a code stated as, "Non ground battle allowed except conducted by the UN force." In my view, this international meeting of FISP is the most honorable place and opportunity to propose additional conditions for a just war. With such a new norm added on the conditions of a just war. the merits of this provision are clear.

First, it will be possible to elevate the status of the United Nations, which is supporting the safety of the world society after World War II. In the 21st century the status of the United Nations is declining, because wars are waged by members of the Security Council of UN under the pretext of a just war. If this provision is added, there will be no justification for aggressive war or the outbreak of war by a hegemonic states for any reason.

Second, this article can change war from an event that can easily occur through local conflicts to a strict normative action that can only be implemented on the basis of the active judgment of the international community. Through this, the UN will be able to be reborn as an active cosmopolitan republican organization that maintains the stability and peace of the world system.

Third, in spite of this provision, an effective decision-making body that can quickly rely on the United Nations for a defensive war against apparent aggression should be prepared. Besides this provision, rather than completely preventing any regional conflict, some conflicts in the sky or in the sea are perhaps open. However, once the possibility of causing a huge number of innocent harm could be blocked and above all the path of internationalization of regional issues will be also institutionalized.

Unlike pacifism, philosophy of just war says it is possible for a war to be morally justified. About 2500 years ago, in the Age of Philosophy, Plato in his book Timaeus described Demiurge as a supernatural being who created the world as close as possible to the original supreme good. Today, the scientific and technological civilization would be called the modern version of Demiurge. However, even if science and technology create the most beautiful and wonderful world possible, as long as it is an imitation, it will inevitably fall behind human beings, the original. In spite of being a hyper-connected society, rather than cooperation, conflict and confrontation, hatred and discrimination threaten our daily life, and war and barbarism plunge the world into chaos. So, paradoxically, I believe that now is the very time when the philosophical spirit and social values is desperately needed as a new Renaissance of the 21st century.

Session 4

Philosophizing in Korean
–*Uri* as Extended Self–

PARK So Jeong

Sungkyunkwan University, selfsopark@skku.edu

[Difficulty of Philosophizing in Korean]

I'd like to start with an old memory. It was the winter of 2001, a time when I had just finished my doctoral dissertation and regained the peace of mind to chat with colleagues in the lecturer's room. A senior who just returned from a doctorate in Germany said, "In Korea, there is *no concept of 'individual'* as in the West."

His point was the following. There are *no personal pronouns in Korean*, or Korean pronouns are too complicated to be specified. Indo-Germanic, on the other hand, has first, second, and third person pronouns, which express the person regardless of whoever is being mentioned, whether in spoken dialogue or written form. He argues that societal forms and linguistic forms are closely intertwined with each other. This linguistic form, supposing an abstract individual who is not placed in any relationship with another, enables the abstract contractual relationship between independent individuals, and is essential for the maintenance of civil society in the Western sense. On the other hand, the absence of personal pronouns in modern Korean is because people have not been able to break free from the linguistic habits formed in the "*pre-modern*" way of life. And so the Western style of life accepted after Korean modernization and Korea's traditional way of life are in conflict with each other. Perhaps as a payoff, in Korean, alternative expressions that reveal relationships contribute to preventing individual isolation and atomization by making it easier to call people who were originally strangers as brother, sister, mother, or father.[1]

Since I chose philosophy as major in 1987, I have kept hearing similar sayings from professors: *You can't do philosophy in Korean*. At the time, the main point was the problem of conceptualization, rather than the problem of personal pronouns or syntax. They claimed that it was difficult to formulate

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1) His casual conversation with us was published in the following paper. Cho, Dae-Ho. "Sahoe-jeok Salm-ui Hyeongsik-gwa Uisa-sotong [Social Life Form and Communication]," *Haeseokhak-Yeongu* [Hermeneutik Studien], vol. 9. 2002.

a concept in Korean, where the conceptual coinage was not developed, and it was too difficult to *conceptualize a new idea in contemporary Korean*, so they had no choice but to *rely on Chinese characters*. In this atmosphere, many went to study abroad in countries where philosophy was believed to have developed. I stayed in Korea because I was hardly convinced that I could do philosophy only by learning a foreign, or, more accurately, a western language. However, I changed my course to Chinese philosophy, recognizing that it would be possible to understand Korean thought in depth by first understanding the concepts behind the Chinese characters deeply engraved in Korean, as well as the influence of Chinese culture and thought on Korean culture.

A few years after receiving my Ph.D. in Chinese philosophy, my unplanned, but eventually self-determined, exile in Singapore began. While living there as a philosopher, I came to the piercing realization that deep communication was impossible without being connected to the social life of the place. Looking back then, my English was at the point where I could read at a college level but had only just begun to actually speak. I often made absurd mistakes such as calling him she or calling her he. I had a lot of trouble speaking by putting grammatical requirements in the right places, which are unnecessary in Korean. Conversely, I also realized that it is impossible to accurately express thoughts that come to mind in Korean into English or Chinese. From a Korean native speaker's point of view, English and Chinese seemed like rather indifferent languages to express subtle changes in emotions and actions.

When I had the opportunity to teach Korean at university as a side job, I began to question whether standard Korean textbooks for foreigners were designed in a way that was optimized for Korean grammar.[2] For example, I felt that there was no way to explain the differences between the various expressions in Korean that connect preceding and following events,[3] and the various markers, particles, and prefinal endings etc., which are mobilized to finely reflect human relationships and associations between objects, the passage of time, and the speaker's intentions.[4] Well, these may not be necessary for beginners. They will just read a lot, listen a lot and finally be able to master Korean on their own. However, I found that Korean textbooks for foreigners teach in a problematic way even at a very basic level of knowledge. In English, the demonstrative pronouns are divided into two, "this and that," according to near and far.[5] The equivalent in Korean has a triple structure of "*yi* (이, this) ‒ *geu* (그, that) ‒ *jeo* (저, that),"[6] so there seems to be one more "that." In the textbooks at the

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2) From 2009 to 2010 at NUS and NEX in Singapore.
3) For instance, ~아서/어서, ~니까, ~으니, ~때문에 etc.
4) For example, it is taught that "겠" is the future tense, and "었" is the past tense.
5) Of course, the demonstrative pronouns can be increased to four, including "these" and "those," when considering the plural form, but only "this" and "that" are dealt with here for the sake of brevity of discussion.
6) Strictly speaking, "*yi-geu-jeo*" is an unconjugated adjective or attributive, which is not found in English grammar, but its adverb forms, "*yeogi-geogi-jeogi*" and noun forms (i.e. pronoun), "*yigeot/geugeot/jeogeot*" or "*yigeo/geugeo/*

time, it was said that "*jeo*" refers to "that" a little farther away, and "*geu*" refers to "that" more distant.[7] But it didn't make sense to me to need "another that" to tell the difference in distance. In addition, the use of "*geu*" is not limited to "that" in English. There is a context in which it is necessary to use "*geu*" as being at the same distance as "*jeo*," and a context in which an imaginary object that has no relation to spatial distance is called "*geu*." A different explanation was needed.

After pondering for a while on how to explain it to my students, I finally got a taste of a Eureka moment. The key was in the self-designation of "*uri*,"[8] the Korean "we." In Korean, the basic self-reference is "*uri* (우리, we-self)" rather than "*na* (나, I-self)." When referring to something that "*uri*" cannot encompass, "*geu*" is necessary.[9] "*Geu*" has nothing to do with direct distance. That is to say, "*yi*" is "*uri*-this," "*jeo*" is "*uri*-that," and "**geu**" is the "**off-*uri*-that**."[10]

What became clearer to me after this Eureka moment was that the *basic grammar of Korean philosophy* is *different from that of Western philosophy*. And I started to understand why my professors and seniors had complained that they *couldn't do philosophy in Korean*. Because the basic frameworks for self-understanding, world understanding, and the relationship between self and the world, which are the very foundations of philosophy, are so different, they must have felt that it was impossible when they tried to apply the philosophy they learned abroad to Korean contexts.

Thankfully, my English steadily improved when I realized that my broken English was not because I was wrong, but because my language and thoughts worked differently from native English

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jeogeo" vary greatly, so "*yi-geu-jeo*" is commonly regarded as the demonstrative pronouns.

7) Instead of distinguishing by "less far" and "farther," see: *yeogi* =here, *geogi* =there in your part, *jeogi* =over there from us.

8) This paper adopts the Revised Romanization of Korean (hereinafter RRK) to transliterate 우리 into *uri*, but references related to 우리 often use various romanization in addition to the McCune-Reischauer System (*uri*) the Yale System (*wuli*). Refer to Hye-Young Kim (2021): *ouri*, Hye-Kyung Lee (2020): *wuli*, Kyeong-Ouk Jeong (2005): *woorie*.

9) I shared this idea when I met Hye Young Kim at CCPC in Taiwan in March 2016, and she seems to have adopted it from what she says in her book: "To point at a person, you can say 'this person' or 'that person' as in many languages, but there is a third demonstrative pronoun in Korean which is *geu* [ge]···.. This particular demonstrative pronoun refers to someone or something that does not belong to the 'we.'" (2021: 187). However, while she defines "*geu*" as "'not-in-the-we-belonging' person" and emphasizes the contrast between *uri* and *geu* by regarding "*geu*" as "an object in contrast to the all, who belong to the 'we.'" (ibid), I would like to point out what she mentions is just one example of "*geu*" in a variety of conversational contexts. For example, "*uri geu-i*" could mean "my husband" or "my boyfriend," and "*geu-geo*" could mean something you remember with your interlocutor in conversational contexts. These complex characteristic of "*geu*" reguire more detailed discussion in relation to the situation in which "*geu*" in Korean was adopted as a translation of "he" in the Western 3rd person pronoun in the early 20th century.

10) In an online lecture, "Introduction to Korean Philosophy" (https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/what-is-korean-philosophy) developed in 2019 and launched on the FutureLearn in June 2020, I dealt with the relationship between "*uri*" and "*uri*-this," "*uri*-that" and "off- *uri*-that" as an example of philosophical thinking through Korean. For an expanded version of this topic and its course, refer to "Introduction to Korean Philosophy and Culture," (https://ko.coursera.org/learn/introduction-to-korean-philosophy-and-culture) which launched on the Coursera in February 2021.

speakers. Singapore, where Chinese and English are both academic languages, was a great multi-lingual school where I could witness both worlds by going back and forth in three languages, including my native Korean. By the time I got a sense of *how to do philosophy in Korean*, I returned to Korea after 11 years of teaching and learning in Singapore.

[*Uri* as Extended Self][11]

Since I say "*uri*" as "Korean 'we'," you might think that "*uri*" is the plural of the first-person pronoun "I." Many Koreans think the same way. However, if it is in the first-person plural, "*uri*" is too often and consistently used in ungrammatical usage. We Koreans do not call Korean "Korean (*hanguk-mal* or *hanguk-eo*, 한국말 or 한국어)" but "our language (*uri-mal* 우리말)," not Korea "Korea (*hanguk*, 한국)" but "our country (*uri-nara*, 우리나라)," not my house "my house (*nae-jib*, 내 집)" but "our house (*uri-jib*, 우리집)," not my husband "my husband (*nae-nampyeon*, 내 남편)" but "our husband (*uri-nampyeon*, 우리 남편)," and not my wife "my wife (*nae-manura*, 내 마누라)," but "our wife (*uri-manura*, 우리 마누라)" in most cases. You might think that Koreans are crazy. Okay, it is understandable to call their country and language in a plural form, but how can they call their husband and wife in a plural form?

Analytic philosophers in Korea have been debating this issue, especially concerning the expression "*uri manura*," or "our wife," for over a decade.[12] It was Chung, Daihyun (2009) who opened the door. Chung argues "contemporary Koreans like to use 'our wife,' partially recognizing a world view suggested by the expression that the ancient Korean community prefers a corporate family community to an individualistic society."[13] He hypothesizes that Korean ancestors formed large families and favored communitarianism, and in this worldview, there was no place for the word 'I (*na*)' and, in its stead, the word 'we (*uri*)' would have taken a strong place.[14] His proposal

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11) Since the Eureka moment, I have called "*uri*" as the "extended self," to distinguish it from the "*na*," namely, the "isolated self," and to express that *one's inner capacity and tolerance can be expanded* through self-cultivation when one's awareness of the relational self is realized. So, depending on the context in which "*uri*" is used, I also call it "the embraced self," "the integrated self," or "the connected self." Coincidentally, Kim (2017, 2020) also uses the expression "extended self," which she uses in the sense of a unique plural form that can include "someone else" as well as I and you. She argues that the Korean we, *ouri* in her transliteration, is not a collection of 'I's, or simply the plural of 'I's, but "an extended self" which refers to "plural words that take singular forms," like the "royal we." However, she also points out the difference between "*ouri*" and the "royal we" in that the extended 'central self' in the two cases. (Kim 2021: 43-44)

12) Including research in the fields of linguistics, sociology, or Korean studies, this issue has been discussed count-less times since much earlier. For an outline of the discussion on "Uri" developed in the broader field, see Seo & Park et al. (2021). Here, only the papers that directly exchanged arguments published in the journal, the *Cheolhak-jeok Bunseok* [Philosophical Analysis] are introduced: Chung, Daihyun (2009, 2017), Kang, Jinho (2010), Choi, Sungho (2016, 2017), and Kim, Joongol (2020).

13) Chung (2009: Abstract page 303).

14) Refer to Chung (2009: 81).

provoked various rebuttals from analytic philosophers in Korea. Although there have been various proposals such as the intimacy thesis, the community thesis, and the courtesy thesis[15] etc., Chung's view is still the most widely accepted proposal.

Regardless of which thesis one relies on, what they have in common is that (1) *"uri" is a plural form of "I"*, and that (2) "*uri*" was mainly used in the *past community*, but *strangely enough* "uri (*we*)*" is still used all over in Korea today*, where "*na* (I)" should be used more, and therefore it needs explanation. So far, I have also called *uri* as "we-self" and translated *uri* as "we, our, or us" for the convenience, but in fact (1) **uri is not "we"** in the sense you are familiar with. And (2) it is **not true** that **"*na* (I)" was rarely used** and "*uri*" was mainly used **in the past**, and that "*uri*" is still used despite **"*na* (I)" should be predominantly used in modern Korea**.

"***Uri***" is not a 1st person plural pronoun like the word "we," namely, a group of isolated individuals, "I" and "another I (you)," but **is the boundary of demarcating "self."** In other words, when Koreans think of themselves, they do not conceive of "I-s" as a collection of isolated individuals but of "Uri", as an extended self.[16] If you think this means that Koreans do not recognize individuals as individuals because they are communitarian or collectivist, it is because you are still living in a grammar based on I-self. Collectivism is the opposite of individualism, and these opposing concepts provide an indispensable conceptual basis for each other. In other words, as long as you think in the linguistic semantic network with the premise of "individual I-self," the opposite side is only "collectivism." Those who think that Korean society has a collectivist nature cannot explain the other prominent aspects of Korean society: 'the individuals' relentless resistance to totalitarianism' and 'agreement reached by voluntary participation.'

It is not true that "*uri*" was used and "*na*" was not used in the past. What should be noted ins that **"*uri*" is the primary self-designation** and "*na*" is only the secondary self-designation, regardless of past or present. In Korean sentences, the subject is often hidden. In this case, the hidden subject is mostly "*uri*." On the other hand, "*na*" appears when it is necessary to distinguish between "I, me, or mine" and "You or others." For example, when you say, "This is mine, not yours," or "This is my personal opinion that has not yet been shared with others." "I-self" is secondary and non-default does not in any way mean that "I" is trivial. The "I" is important as the beginning of all thoughts, feelings, and actions. Nevertheless, Korean language holds "*uri*-self" as the primary and default, by doing so, the following is implied: In some cases, the self can be divided into individuals, but this is only a temporary state, and the original state is communication with others, holding hands, and empathizing

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15) The most recent proposal is the courtesy thesis by Kim, Joongol. He argues that the ubiquitous use of '*uri*' in Korean such as '*uri manura*' "results from the linguistic embodiment of the Confucian tradition in Korea that values courteous words and behavior." (Kim 2020: 132)

16) See Week 4 Step 2 "Different Chunking: Uri-self" of my FutureLearn lecture script, mentioned above.

with each other. Therefore, a person who has mastered Korean language will be able to speak and write "*na*-self" and "*uri*-self" freely and flexibly, while being appropriate for a given situation, whether in conversation or writing. "*Uri*-self does not restrict or force "*na*-self" to appear, but rather allow "*na*-self" to reflect on itself by constantly making a connection between "*na*" and the other.

This usage was **no different in the past**. Fortunately, we have the lyrics of some indigenous songs that were popular in Silla and Goryeo in the 6th and 12th century,[17] where we can get hints on how "*na*" and "*uri*" were used in ancient Korean. A song that describes a common situation, sings "**uri maum** (lit. our heart-mind),"[18] while a song commemorating a deceased sister mourns, saying to the dead sister, "How (you) left (me) without saying, '**na**-*neun ganda* (lit. I'm going)'?"[19] Since the creation of Hangeul in 1443, more examples prove that "*uri*" and "*na*" have been used the same way as we use them today.[20] "*Na*" continued to be used when necessary, while "*uri*" has been the primary designation for the self.[21]

[The Significance of *Uri* in a Global Context]

If you look at "*uri*" in the framework of Western languages, we cannot help but misunderstand "*uri*" as collectivistic or pre-modern. Even Koreans today who learn Korean based on Western grammar often mistake "*uri*" as a product of communitarianism. I've seen quite a few people deliberately modifying all "*uri*" to "*nae* (내, my),"[22] to emphasize individuality, even when "*uri*-self" usually comes, not where "*na*-self" should be used, such as "*nae jib* (my house)", "*nae manura* (my wife)," "*nae adeul* (my son)," and "*nae eomeoni* (my mother)."[23] However, after decades of observation, their attempts appear to have never been successful. Even the younger generations, who are inclined to individualism, still use "*uri*" and "*na*" just like people did hundreds of years ago. Even so, people use "*uri*" every day in the same way that ancient Koreans did long ago,

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17) These indigenous songs, called Hyangga (鄕歌), were recorded in Hyangchal(鄕札), a writing system to borrow Chinese characters to express Korean pronunciations, similar to the Japanese Kana (仮名). For more detail, refer to the video "Writing systems before Hangeul" at Week 2, Lesson 3 of my Cousera lecture.

18) Refer to "A Song asking the Buddha to stay in this world (*Cheongbul-juse-ga*, 請佛住世歌)" out of the "Songs of the Ten Vows Samantabhara (*Bohyeon-sipwon-ga*, 普賢十願歌)" by Gyunyeo (均如: 923‑973).

19) Refer to "A Requiem for a Dead Sister (*je-mangmae-ga*, 祭亡妹歌)" by Wolmyeong (月明: about 8 CE).

20) For early instances, refer to "우리 始祖" in the *Yongbieocheonga* (lit. "Songs of the Dragons Flying to Heaven") by Sejong (1397-1450), "우리나랏말" in the Preface of the *Seokbosangjeol* (釋譜詳節, A Korean Biography of Gautama Buddha) by Sejo (1417-1468).

21) The addition of the plural suffix "*deul* (-s)" to "*uri*" is an important proof that "*uri*" is not a plural form of "*na* (I-self)" but an extended self-designation. Likewise, in the *Gyolin-Suji* 交隣須知, the first Korean language textbook for Japanese in the early 18th century, "*uri*" is simply written as "*uri*," while the plural form of *uri*, "*urideul*," is written as "*uri*輩" or "吾等."

22) "*Nae*" is an abbreviation of "*na-ui* (나의)," which is the possessive of "*na*."

23) To give just one known example, My Mother, a 2013 short film by director Kim Ki-duk, 1 minutes 32 seconds long, ends with the words "*na-ui eomeoni* (my mother)' and "*na-ui adeul* (my son).

but they do not understand why. Korean grammar needs to be explained anew. And I think the newly explained grammar can become the basis of philosophizing in Korean.

I don't have the full picture yet, as I have just begun working on the usages of "*uri*" across traditional and modern times. However, in the process of tracing "*uri*" that has persisted till today, I am increasingly thinking that a proper explanation of the grammar that is the basis of Korean thinking is not only essential for Koreans, but it may also be helpful for those who wish to philosophize in today's global context after the days of philosophizing with the capital letter P. At the very least, I believe it would be an opportunity to think about the world outside the frame that has been hidden by the framework of Western grammar.

You probably learned "I-you-he/she/it," when you first learned English. In German, it would have been "ich-du-er/sie/es." On the other hands, when we first learn Korean, we learn "*na-neo-Uri* (나-너-우리)," in other words, "I, you, and *Uri*." In Western grammar, which is based on the I-self, "you" is opposed to "I." You and I can talk, exchange opinions, and share information, but to the end, each only joins or shares "intersubjectivity" as autonomous individuals. When "I" and "you" are combined, the plural "we" is formed. The third person, that is, the other, must be established because there will be another "I" in the world who cannot belong to this plural group of "we." The third person pronoun – divided into female and male – is placed in the same position as a singular, neuter, third-person pronoun, *it*. These pronouns can be joined to form the third person plural "they," but cannot belong to "we" in any way.

However, the formula of "*na-neo-Uri*" works very differently. We learn "*na* (나, I)" and "*neo* (너, you)" first, as it is necessary to distinguish and denote both persons separately, but in practice, "*na*" and "*neo*" are rarely used as subjects compared to "*Uri*." One of the reasons is that there is no need to indicate you and me because the basic Korean sentences are conversational rather than narrative. But, if you continue to use "I" or "*na*" as a subject even when writing non-dialogical narrative sentences, your writing teacher will probably teach you to omit "I" as much as possible. Because it does not go well with Korean grammar. Instead of filling in the subject's position with abstract personal pronouns, each of the individuals is referred to by his or her own name, by a unique characteristic name, or by the name s/he occupies in the relationship. On the other hand, "*uri*" appears frequently as if trying to fill the subject's place even when the speaker is obviously not plural. When the speaker is truly plural, the suffix "*deul*" is often added to indicate that "*uri*" here is plural. "*Uri*" provides a kind of connected bundle, but it is not a closed structure, so it works flexibly. Depending on the situation, it binds you and me, or you and others, or sometimes everyone and everything.

This usage of "*uri*" is not a personal choice, but a kind of norm formed by the agreements and

participations of those who have used Korean. Here, I think it is meaningful in that "*uri*" is a *working concept* through the *agreement and participation of Korean-speaking people*. In other words, many have tried to stop using "*uri*" with the misconception that "*uri*" undermines individualism, but in the end "*uri*" survived because there were far more people who appreciated the meaning of "*uri*." Today, we continued to approve and enjoy using "*uri*" in essentially the same way it was used a thousand years ago. This, however, does not mean that only native Korean speakers can follow this norm, but rather suggests that "*uri*" can interact with other language speakers beyond Koreans.

When non-Koreans learn and speak Korean, they do not follow the norms of their mother tongue but that of the Korean language,[24] just like when Koreans learn and speak English, they follow the norms of English. You can also switch between the two worlds. The late Kim, Jaegwon, a famous analytical philosopher, wrote very little in Korean. But I found an interesting fact in his Korean article, contributed to a book called *The Attitudes towards Philosophizing in Korea*, published in 1986.[25] The title of his thesis is "Is Korean Philosophy Possible?" And he advocates that philosophy is universal, i.e., *Philosophy*, taking the position that "Korean philosophy" is only possible when limited to "meaning that Korea had a philosophical tradition in the past." I have no intention to dispute his arguments here. What caught my attention is the way he used "*na*" and "*uri*." In the thought experiment he conducted to develop this discussion at the beginning of his thesis, he mainly uses the personal pronouns "*na* (I)" and "*dangsin* (you)" rather than "*uri*." However, after presenting a thought experiment, in the following chapters where he demonstrates his own arguments, he almost always consistently uses "*uri*," except in a few examples where he clearly states, "my opinion [*nae saenggak*]." If he had written this article in English, I don't think he would have used the word "we" so widely.

I have been able to get interesting responses from students who have attended my lectures on "*uri*" both online and offline. Quite a few students online commented that the use of "our" in their neighborhood, for instance, Northern England, is synonymous with "*uri*." The reaction that really impressed me was that of an exchange student from North Florida. She said, "We don't have self-referential expressions like "*uri*," but when I'm talking about my mom with a really close friend, I don't say 'my mom' but I just say 'mom.' I think the "*uri*" is in that void." I think that if more people empathize with the philosophical implications of "*uri*" like this and try to find more such

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24) In my FutureLearn course, I introduced a video clip of a Spanish girl and a German guy talking in a mixture of Korean and English. They said "*my* country, *my* mom" when speaking in English, while calling their own country "***uri*** nara" when speaking in Korean.

25) Jaegwon Kim (or Jayson Kim, 1934-2019) was a Korean-American philosopher who lived longer and was more well-known in America than in Korea. The Korean title of his article is "한국철학이란 가능한가? (Hanguk-Cheolhak-iran Ganeung-hanga) [Is Korean Philosophy Possible?]" and this article had been published in another magazine *Sin-dong-a* in February 1985, before being included in the book. Refer to Sim (1986: 83-96).

connections between "*uri*" and their languages, maybe one day our understanding of "*uri*-self" could be expanded beyond Korea. Furthermore, through these attempts to philosophize in different languages, our understanding of each other can be deepened by conceptualizing what were not well recognized because of the existing philosophical framework.

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Calling a Spade a Spade
-Reflections on Political Language in time of Covid-

Gerhard Seel

University of Bern, Switzerland

Some people could take what I am going to develop as a right- wing position. However, I consider myself rather as situated at the left of the political spectrum. This exactly is the starting point of my linguistic reflections. We observe that political agents try to put their adversaries in a blameworthy and negatively loaded position, calling a moderate conservative a fascist or a racist and - on the other side of the spectrum - calling a social-democrat a communist or a Stalinist. Political parties also try to fill positively connoted terms like 'progress' or 'justice' or 'freedom' with their own political content which often turns out to be exactly the contrary of the original meaning of the term. This way of using terms of our language makes rational political debates impossible, but democracy needs rational political debates.

Analytical philosophy was motivated by the desire to make the language of philosophical discourse clear and understandable and to make sure that philosophical arguments follow strict logical rules. It was mostly successful in doing this. However, political discourse - especially in times of pandemic and war - needs the same discipline and here analytical thinking had no influence at all. The purpose of my talk is to draw your attention to this damageable situation, give you some examples of linguistic and logical shortcomings and invite you to intervene, whenever you can, in the debate using a correct and understandable language and rectifying, if necessary, the language others use.

Xenophobia

Let me start with two closely related terms which I consider both as misnomers. In the political debate some people are blamed for being 'xenophobic' or 'Islamophobic' and being either of these is declared as morally blameworthy. Islamophobia is a species of xenophobia. Both terms have ancient Greek routes, the Greek term 'phobos', 'phobein' is an element of each of these expressions. So, taken literally, a 'xenophobic' is one who fears strangers or foreigners and an Islamophobic is one

who fears Muslims. Fear is an emotion. Emotions can be adequate or inadequate, but they are not morally right or wrong. The reason for this is the fact that we cannot control our emotions. We cannot decide to have them or not to have them. We can at best try to get rid of them through psychotherapeutic exercises. But this needs time. Even such an ugly emotion as hate is not morally reprehensible. What is morally reprehensible are the actions that are motivated by hate. That is why it is a wise political measure not to let people who hate each other live in close neighbourhood. For the same reasons, putting moral blame on somebody for being xenophobic or Islamophobic is by no means justified. The Oxford Dictionary defines 'islamophobia' as the "unreasonable dislike or fear of Muslims or Islam". This seems to imply that reason plays an important role in the generation of fear and that these emotions should correspond to what reason tells us. However, reason is not a necessary factor in the generation of fear. To be sure, there are cases where fear is provoked by the result of reasoning. But in most cases, fear is the immediate response to the experience of something dreadful. Therefore, it is wrong to require that fear should be reasonable. However, as I said, fear is either adequate or inadequate. It is adequate, if and only if the experienced item is objectively dangerous, it is not adequate, if the experienced item is not dangerous. Fearing a lion is adequate, fearing a spider is not. So, Islamophobia is objectively not adequate, if and only if Muslims are not dangerous for non-Muslims. However, even if an emotion is inadequate or ugly it makes no sense to morally condemn people who feel these emotions. For they are not responsible for their feelings. What we should morally blame are unjustified actions that are motivated by these emotions. The same analysis holds of xenophobia. One may even argue, that the fear of strangers is encoded in our genes, for only those of our early ancestors survived who approached strangers with caution and circumspection.

Foreigners and Muslims have the same rights as everybody else. They should not indiscriminately be bereft of their rights only because some members of these groups behave in an illegal and dangerous way. But on the other hand, it is perfectly legitimate to take protective measurers against those who pose a threat to public security, and we should not blame these measures as xenophobic or Islamophobic.

For, if minorities have rights, and they do, majorities have rights as well.

Foreigners and immigration

Let us analyse political actions concerning foreigners and ask whether they are justified or not. We must distinguish the following categories: Foreigners who live legally in a host-country, foreigners who live illegally in a host-country, foreigners who immigrate legally into a country and foreigners

who immigrate illegally into a country. The first enjoy the protection of the laws of the host-country. The second can in principle be brought back to the country of origin. But these measures have to be taken shortly. If someone stays illegally in a country for long time, he acquires a kind of customary right to stay there. The third are again protected by the laws of the host country. What is problematic is illegal immigration. Political parties who militate against immigration should concentrate their effort on this case. Their adversaries often argue that there is a human right to immigration. But, such a right cannot be justified philosophically. If we deny the human right to colonialize a foreign country - and I think we should - we must also deny a human right to immigration. To be clear, I don't say that colonialism and immigration are the same thing. They differ considerably: colonialism is based on the use of power to a much higher degree and it is very often - though not exclusively - based on the political and military action of states. However, the reasons philosophers like Kant have used to criticize colonialism speak also against a right to immigration. It lies completely in the competence of a state to determine its immigration politics and if a state uses discriminatory criteria in doing so, this cannot - as we shall see later - be classified as racist. Therefore, it is a completely legitimate political action if a group of citizens or a political party aims at making certain kinds of immigration illegal. But the contrary political action is legitimate as well.

Asylum

Whether there is a human right to asylum is a completely different question. In fact, unlike the right to immigration, the right to asylum can be philosophically justified as a human right. This can be seen, if we analyse the content of this right. We have two main texts that fix the meaning of the right to asylum, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Geneva Convention. The first declares in paragraph 14: "Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". The latter calls asylum seekers 'refugees' and defines a refugee as someone who "owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". In both texts the term 'persecution' plays a key role. Persecution is defined as an act of inflicting severe suffering on a person or a group, such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, apartheid (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). It is important to make clear that the inflicting of these sufferings, if it is not done by organs of the home state itself, must at least be tolerated and encouraged by the latter. This explains why the refugee is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country. The right to asylum

passes the test of Kant's categorical imperative. For everybody would, were he persecuted in his home-state, claim such a right and it would be contradictory to claim such a right for oneself and deny it for others. In a world, where many states do not grant and respect human rights, the right to asylum is a very important and a very fragile human right. Unfortunately, many people use this right not to escape persecution, but simply to immigrate in another country. This abuse has negative consequences for the acceptance of the right to asylum and therefore should not be tolerated.

Racism

In the context of the right to asylum we have to speak about racism as well. For persecution for reasons of race is one of the most important motives of seeking asylum. Racism is morally reprehensible and should not be tolerated. But what is racism? In the English dictionaries and in political declarations we find three ways to define the terms 'racism' and 'racist'. Traditionally it is defined as a belief, a theory, a political opinion etc., then it is defined as attitudes and actions resulting from these beliefs and finally it is defined - for instance by Critical Race Theory - as a political and social system. I think that, if a political and social system is racist, this cannot occur without racist theories, beliefs and opinions and without the actions of those who have control over the social and political system. That's why I will concentrate on the two first meanings of the term.

Let us look at some definitions presented in dictionaries and political declarations. In a recent contribution to '*Encyclopedia- Britannica,*' Audrey Smedley defines racism as "the belief that humans may be divided into separate and exclusive biological entities called "races", that there is a causal link between inherited physical traits and traits of personality, intellect, morality and other cultural and behavioural features; and that some races are innately superior to others".

The *Oxford Dictionary* defines it as "prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior".

The European Commission declares that racism amounts to " ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin".

The first and the last quotation define 'racism' as a belief, only the Oxford dictionary defines it as political action based on a belief. This belief has two elements: 1. That there are human races and 2. That one's own race is superior to the other races. These definitions are unilateral in a significant way, they define racism in terms of the superiority of one race over all others. But - as we shall see - there is also the belief that one race is inferior to all others. People who believe this will not take their own race as this inferior race. This belief must be qualified as racism as well.

Let us consider the two elements of these definitions. The first element does not stand a scientific

examination. One of the biological criteria for a biological group of beings to qualify as a race - there are others - is that the members of the biological group are capable to procreate with other members of the same group. Evidently this is true of all members of the group of humans. Consequently - biologically speaking - there is only one human race. This means that racism is not based on the scientific concept of race, but rather on the popular concept that considers certain external features that members of a group have in common as criteria for forming a human race. On this point, *Critical Race Theory* is right, race is a social construct.

The second element is questionable as well. In the heated debate on racism one can find the argument that only white people can be racists and that white people are intrinsically racist. This position depends on two premises which are both false. The first is the definition, we found in the *Oxford Dictionary,* according to which racism is the belief that one's own race is superior to all others and the second is the claim that only the white race can be superior to other races. In fact, from these premises follows, that only white people can be racists. But, in my view, this position is itself racist, because it bereaves people of other races of the possibility to be racists. In fact, one cannot deny that black anti-white racism exists. In a school book, meant to be used in primary schools in the United States (*Not my idea: A book about whiteness)* you can read: "Whiteness is a bad deal" and one understands that this is a deal with the devil. In fact, if racism is the belief that one's own race is superior, members of all races can in principle be racists. Denying this is itself a racist position. For if there is the possibility that one race is superior to others, any of the human races could in principle be the one who is superior and believing that this is one's own race is racism. However, if racism is the believe that one race is inferior to all other races nobody - except moral masochists - will believe that this is his or her own race.

But what do we mean by 'superiority or inferiority of one race over another'? Is it physical, intellectual, cultural, moral superiority or inferiority? If I say "In running competitions at big sport events black sportsmen and sportswomen are superior to all other competitors" am I making a racist statement? If I say "In exams at universities of the United States people from Asia realize the highest marks" am I a racist? And if these were racist statements, they would evidently not be morally reprehensible. They would just be either true or false from a scientific point of view. What then is the racism we all morally condemn?

There are two qualities, all human beings share and the denial of which is morally reprehensible: human dignity and original innocence. Human dignity is the property that qualifies a human being for claiming and enjoying basic human rights. Denying a human being this quality is denying him or her basic human rights. Original innocence is the property of being not guilty as long as one has committed no crime. Accordingly, we must distinguish two forms of racism: one is the belief or the

opinion that members of one human race are superior to members of other races concerning their human dignity and their human rights. The other is the belief that members of one human race are inferior to members of other races because they are morally guilty due to their race, that is by their birth. This form of racism uses elements of the Christian religion, like the conception of the original sin, to state the moral inferiority of one race in comparison to the others. The two forms of racism can be combined in one racist theory, but such a theory is contradictory, because only a being that has rights and obligations can become guilty.

Both forms of racism are very dangerous. For, they allow to justify the persecution of members of a race. As the Nazi laws given at Nürnberg show, the denial of human dignity was the basis for the denial of fundamental citizen rights to German Jews. If you believe that members of one race are originally guilty and condemned by God you feel authorized to persecute and punish them. That is what happened to Jews in Christian countries during the middle-ages and early modern time.

Insulting and Name-calling

For my next point it is important to understand that the denial of human dignity and original moral innocence takes different forms of expression and comes in different disguises. Of course, the most straight forward and hurting way of denying someone his or her human dignity or his or her original innocence is by legislation of the State. But , one can deny other people their human dignity and original innocence without giving racist laws. This is done by social discourse in form of gestures and speech-acts like spitting at somebody or calling people names. We should not underestimate the gravity of this behaviour. Insults, verbal offenses and outrage can hurt more than bodily injuries. Therefore, they are morally reprehensible and forbidden by law in most countries. However, to count as an insult it is not sufficient that the addressee feels being insulted, yet it is not an excuse either, when the speaker didn't intend to insult somebody. What counts is the objective meaning of the type of speech-act according to the current semantic rules of the language.

In what follows I will concentrate on name-calling. Let me give some examples. In German to offend somebody one uses words for animals, for instance calling a man a swine, a woman a cow etc. One uses also expressions for less noble body-parts. This is also much used in English, calling somebody an 'arsehole', for instance. You can also insult somebody by expressions for a unhonourable descent calling somebody , for instance, 'bastard' or 'son of a whore' etc. To express the original guilt of somebody you call him a criminal or you add 'damned' to his name. In these cases, the terms used are descriptively false. The puzzling thing is that you can also insult somebody by a term that is descriptively correct.

To understand how this works we must make some linguistic reflections concerning the use of swearwords and curse words. The first important feature is, that one uses these words as names - we call people names - and not as definite descriptions or as predicates. One either uses the expression on its own, or one lets it be preceded by the personal pronoun 'you', in German you even add the personal pronoun a second time after the swearword. To successfully insult somebody, the speech-gesture of calling somebody a name is decisive. The meaning of the swearword is of secondary importance. In the sixties in the German parliament Herbert Wehner - a leading Social-Democrat - insulted the leader of the Christian Democrats by saying "Sie, Sie Barzel, Sie" (You, you Barzel, you) that is, by using his real family name in an insulting gesture. This shows that what counts is the gesture not the meaning of the name.

We must not confuse the use of curse words to deny someone his or her human dignity and their use to dishonour someone. Dignity is an innate quality of all human beings, honour is a quality one acquires by positive achievements or by the positive achievements of one's ancestors. One deserves to be honoured if one has done something excellent. In this case, refusing to honour the person, that is to publicly acknowledge, what he or she has done, is morally wrong. The expressions we use to deny someone his or her dignity are different from the dishonouring expressions, but there is no clear-cut borderline between them.

A further important semantical feature of swearwords is that they have both a descriptive and an evaluative meaning. In most cases the evaluative meaning was added later. We have for instance words, like 'gypsy' which designate a social group and had originally a purely descriptive meaning. But after a while this social group got a negative image in society - for reasons I cannot analyse here - and the term 'gypsy' acquired a negative evaluative meaning. In order to avoid this negative evaluative meaning one replaced the term 'Gypsy' by the terms 'Sinti' and 'Roma', terms which didn't have this evaluative semantical element. However, it is only a question of time for these terms to get a negative evaluative meaning as well. This can only be avoided by changing the social factors that lead to the negative appreciation of this social group.

The N-word

In this context I cannot avoid considering the semantics of the N-word. This term has such a bad reputation and carries such a load of negative evaluative meaning that even linguists don't dare mention this term explicitly in their publications, let alone use it. Nevertheless, this term had originally a purely descriptive meaning. Why then did it become the worse curse word one could use in English? The group of people originally designated by this term were mostly slaves, that is people

that are bereft of their rights and their dignity. Therefore, the term that designated this social group could be understood as meaning exactly this. It was then only a short step to using this expression in acts of name calling, denying someone the status of an autonomous human being having dignity and basic rights. Of course, to speak about Afro-Americans in a neutral way one needed a term with a purely descriptive meaning. To regain this, one introduced a different term, but after a short period of time the new term took the negative evaluative meaning as well and so one had to introduce still another term to designate people of this social group. One replaced the N-word by the term 'black people' and the latter after a while by the term 'coloured people' -implying that black is a colour - and finally one started to use the term 'Afro-American', which is descriptively correct and doesn't imply a negative connotation. However, one can foresee that this situation will not remain for a long time. For as long as the social reasons for the negative prejudice concerning Afro-Americans do not change the negative connotation of the term that designates them will reappear.

I should emphasize that - for historical reasons - the terms that correspond to the N-word in other languages don't carry the same level of negative connotation. But, English has such an influence on other languages that this starts to change. I should also say that the negative connotation is necessarily present when the term is used in a speech-act of calling names. On the other hand, if the term is used in a definite description or as predicate it doesn't necessarily carry such a connotation. In a soccer-match the Rumanian referee asked his associate " Who committed this fowl?". The latter answered in Rumanian "negrul", meaning "the black one". This was heard by other players and triggered an enormous scandal. The referee team was prosecuted for racism. But, this was based on a complete misunderstanding. In Rumanian the term 'negru' doesn't necessarily carry a negative connotation and when used in a definite description - like in the present case - it is purely descriptive.

Fighting against racism

How then should we fight against racism? I will first give you some examples of what we should not do.

1. In Germany anti-racist militants forced pharmacies that called themselves 'Zum Mohren' since centuries to change their names and remove the portrait of a black man from their figurehead. They should have understood that a pharmacists would never have called his business 'Zum Mohren' if the term 'Mohr' had had a negative connotation. On the contrary, by calling his pharmacy 'Zum Mohren' he meant to tell his clients that he offered products of Arabic medicine which was in these times the most advanced in the world.

2. At the University of Michigan, Professor Bright Sheng was dismissed from his literary class

because his students felt utterly offended. What had he done? To explain the influence of classic literature on opera he showed Sir Laurence Olivier's famous interpretation of Othello. Sir Laurence Olivier plays the role in blackface.

3. In 2019 the *Conseil scolaire catholique Providence* (Canada) launched an "educational program" called "Giving Back to Mother Earth". They burned books from the library shelves which "had outdated content and carried negative stereotypes about First Nations, Métis and Inuit People".

I could add a long list of similar cases.

Events and practices like these have brought John McWhorter, a professor for linguistics at Columbia University - I should emphasize that he is black -, to speak of "Woke Racism". This is the title of his latest book, published by Portfolio. McWhorter accuses the Woke- and the associated 'Black-Lives-Matter' - movements of having transformed anti-racism into a religion, where you have to believe that white people are stained with the original sin of racism. He is right.

What then should we do against racism? I see the following three measures:

1. We should tell the truth about racism, making clear what it is and what it is not and explain why it is wrong.

2. We should remove all legal inequalities and discriminations when they exist in a system of positive law.

3. We should take the equal opportunity-requirement seriously and make sure that all children have the same basic chances of living a decent and self-determinate life. However, affirmative action, is the wrong means to achieve this. For one cannot correct an injustice by another injustice.

Ethics and Africa in international relations
-An ubu-ntu perspective-

Mogobe Ramose

Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University, Department of Clinical Psychology,
Ga-Rankuwa, South Africa. proframose@outlook.com

The geographic position of Africa places almost at the centre of planet Earth. It is interesting that this apparently spatial centrality of the continent Africa continues to make it a special point of focus because it is the mother of *homo sapiens*. Despite this special maternity, Africa is the seedbed of enduring fundamental ethical questions in the realm of both international politics and international relations. In this paper we adopt the indigenous African philosophy of *ubu-ntu* to examine only one fundamental ethical question, namely, conquest in the unjust wars of Western colonisation and its consequences with special reference to "development" and the Covid 19 pandemic.

Key concepts: Covid 19, conquest, just and unjust wars, ethics, development, ubu-ntu

Meeting with KPA philosophers

XXV World Congress of Philosophy
−Philosophy Across Boundaries−

The World Congress of Philosophy is organized every five years by the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP) in partnership with one of its member societies. Under the general theme "Philosophy across Boundaries", the 25th World Congress will be held in Rome, Italy, from August 1 to August 8, 2024.

Under the joint responsibility of Fisp, the Italian Philosophical Society, and Sapienza University, the 2024 Congress intends to foster scholarly and public reflections on the future of our societies. By questioning human beings and their diverse ways of thinking, agency, and relationships, along with the social, economic, political, technological, and cultural destiny of our common world, it will:

Use philosophical reflections as a springboard for public discourses on urgent shared concerns, including inequalities, cultural and gender diversity, natural environment, justice, rights, and political transformations on a global scale;

Enlarge the scope of philosophical debates to involve representatives of the sciences, economy, information, medicine and public health, technology, and public institutions;

Actively encourage and defend diversity in all forms by bringing together ideas, traditions, and people from all continents and regions;

Dismantle rigid cultural and disciplinary boundaries by focusing on the complex interconnectedness of human civilizations from antiquity to the present.

The 2024 Congress invites shared reflections and discussions on the models we would like our societies to be inspired by. It encourages large participation of students and young scholars from all continents and regions. It will provide a unique opportunity to present and share diverse philosophical concerns from all regions of the world. Finally, it is committed to pluralism and it aims at engaging reflectively and critically with the struggles of our time, addressing its main ethical, social, political, and spiritual concerns.

We intend to hold the whole Congress in presence.

Spheres of Boundaries

Personae

Plenary session	**Embodiments**
Symposia	Women in the History of Philosophy
	Artificial Intelligence and Other Kinds of Minds

Transitions

Plenary session	**Vulnerability and Knowledge**
Symposia	Cross-Cultural Exchanges in the Ancient World
	Translation, Imagination, Interdisciplinarity

Justice

Plenary session	**Citizenship, Care, and Self-Determination**
Symposia	Epistemic Injustice, Power, and Struggle
	Trust, Truth, and Knowledge

Earth

Plenary session	**Living in a Sustainable World**
Symposia	Biodiversity and the Environment
	Ethics and Living Beings

Infinity

Plenary session	**Emptiness and Experience**
Symposia	Beauty, Glamour, and Grace
	Temporality and Agency

Sections for Contributed Papers

1. Aesthetics and philosophies of art
2. African philosophy
3. Africana philosophy
4. Bioethics and medical ethics
5. Buddhist philosophy
6. Chinese philosophy
7. Christian philosophy
8. Comparative, intercultural, and cross-cultural philosophy

45. Philosophical anthropology
46. Philosophy, film, and tv series
47. Philosophy of education
48. Philosophy and literature
49. Philosophy and popular culture
50. Philosophy and oral traditions
51. Philosophy and psychoanalysis
52. Philosophy with children
53. Philosophy of action

9. Confucian philosophy
10. Contemporary philosophy
11. Daoist philosophy
12. East Asian and South-East Asian philosophies
13. Economic philosophy and business ethics
14. Environmental philosophy and sustainability
15. Ethics
16. Ethics of artificial intelligence
17. Experimental philosophy
18. Feminist philosophy
19. Game theory
20. Gender and queer philosophy
21. Greek, Roman, and Byzantine philosophy
22. History of analytic philosophy
23. History of philosophy
24. Human rights
25. Indian philosophies
26. Intersectionality
27. Islamic philosophy
28. Italian philosophical traditions
29. Jewish philosophy
30. Latin-American philosophy
31. Logic and philosophy of logic
32. Marxist philosophy
33. Medical humanities and philosophy of medicine
34. Medieval philosophy
35. Metaethics
36. Metaphilosophy
37. Metaphysics
38. Mystical traditions in philosophy
39. Moral psychology
40. Ontology
41. Phenomenology and existential philosophy
42. Philosophical counseling and practices
43. Hermeneutics
44. Philosophical issues about race

54. Philosophy of aging
55. Philosophy of argumentation
56. Philosophy of birth
57. Philosophy of childhood
58. Philosophy of cognitive neurosciences
59. Philosophy of culture
60. Philosophy of death
61. Philosophy of dwelling
62. Philosophy of food
63. Philosophy of globalization and migration
64. Philosophy of history
65. Philosophy of indigenous cultures
66. Philosophy of information and digital culture
67. Philosophy of language and linguistics
68. Philosophy of law
69. Philosophy of liberation
70. Philosophy of mathematics
71. Philosophy of mind
72. Philosophy of music and the performing arts
73. Philosophy of physics
74. Philosophy of religion
75. Philosophy of science
76. Philosophy of sexuality
77. Philosophy of sport
78. Philosophy of technology
79. Philosophy of the human and social sciences
80. Philosophy of the life sciences
81. Philosophy of values
82. Political philosophy
83. Renaissance and early modern philosophy
84. Russian philosophy
85. Social epistemology
86. Social philosophy
87. Teaching philosophy
88. Theories of knowledge and epistemology
89. Utopia

Endowed Lectures

There will be at least six Endowed Lectures, named Maimonides, Ibn Roshd, Kierkegaard, Dasan, Simone de Beauvoir, and Kant.

Accommodation and Travel

To be announced later.

International Philosophical Book Fair

An International Fair of Philosophy Books will take place during the Congress. Further informations and conditions for publishers to apply will be announced later.

- XXV WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
- PHILOSOPHY ACROSS BOUNDARIES

- XXV^E CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE PHILOSOPHIE
- LA PHILOSOPHIE AU-DELÀ DES FRONTIÈRES

- XXV. WELTKONGRESS FÜR PHILOSOPHIE
- PHILOSOPHIE ÜBER GRENZEN HINWEG

- XXV CONGRESO MUNDIAL DE FILOSOFIA
- LA FILOSOFÍA A TRAVÉS DE LOS LÍMITES

- XXV ВСЕМИРНЫЙ ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ КОНГРЕСС

- ФИЛОСОФИЯ ВНЕ ГРАНИЦ

- XXV 屆 世界哲學大會

- 跨越边界的哲学

- XXV CONGRESSO MONDIALE DI FILOSOFIA

- LA FILOSOFIA ATTRAVERSA I CONFINI

- المؤتَمَر العَالَمي الرّابع والعشرون للفلسفة

- الفلسفة عبر الحدود

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