한국논리학회 회원 여러분께,
안녕하십니까. 한국논리학회 2026년 2학기 첫 번째 월례윤독회 일정이 결정되어 다음과 같이 일정에 따라 진행될 예정임을 사전 공지드립니다.
발표자: 이경근 (연세대학교)
주제: Hume’s law and Normativity of Logic
주제: Hume’s law and Normativity of Logic
일시: 2026년 9월 28일(월) 오후 4시 (한국 시각)
소개글: It is folklore in logic literature that logic is normative (Priest 1979, 279). To illustrate, if you believe ¬¬A, then you ‘should’ believe A by DNE rule of classical logic. According to some logicians, such normativity is defining property of logic which distinguishes it from other scientific disciplines such as physics and mathematics. However, recently, Gillian Russell crucially suspected that logic per se is not normative. If, as she says, logic is purely descriptive theory on necessary truth preservation, then it is conceptual fallacy to take logic as normative. This inference is licensed by Hume’s law, such that you cannot get ‘ought’ from ‘is’. There exist rich debates on the validity of Russell’s proposal, and I will discuss central points among them. As a conclusion, it will be shortly argued that there is no appealing reason to see logic as particularly normative, which supports ‘Anti-exceptionalist’ approach on logic by Hjortland.
[REFERENCES]
Christopher Blake-Turner & Gillian Russell, Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese:1-19 (2018)
Gillian Russell, Logic isn’t normative. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388 (2020)
Gillian K. Russell, Barriers to Entailment: Hume's Law and other limits on logical consequence. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2023)
Ole Thomassen Hjortland, Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658 (2017)
소개글: It is folklore in logic literature that logic is normative (Priest 1979, 279). To illustrate, if you believe ¬¬A, then you ‘should’ believe A by DNE rule of classical logic. According to some logicians, such normativity is defining property of logic which distinguishes it from other scientific disciplines such as physics and mathematics. However, recently, Gillian Russell crucially suspected that logic per se is not normative. If, as she says, logic is purely descriptive theory on necessary truth preservation, then it is conceptual fallacy to take logic as normative. This inference is licensed by Hume’s law, such that you cannot get ‘ought’ from ‘is’. There exist rich debates on the validity of Russell’s proposal, and I will discuss central points among them. As a conclusion, it will be shortly argued that there is no appealing reason to see logic as particularly normative, which supports ‘Anti-exceptionalist’ approach on logic by Hjortland.
[REFERENCES]
Christopher Blake-Turner & Gillian Russell, Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese:1-19 (2018)
Gillian Russell, Logic isn’t normative. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388 (2020)
Gillian K. Russell, Barriers to Entailment: Hume's Law and other limits on logical consequence. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2023)
Ole Thomassen Hjortland, Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658 (2017)
아무쪼록 논리학회 회원님들의 많은 참여와 관심 부탁드리며, 해당 주제에 관심을 가질 만한 분들께 널리 알려주시면 감사하겠습니다.
한국논리학회 학술위원장 드림
한국논리학회 학술위원장 드림